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Cape Haitian notebook
Related to country: Haiti



By Jean H Charles:

Cape Haitian, akin to New Orleans, Louisiana; Charleston, South Carolina; Old Town San Juan, Puerto Rico, is a living museum site where the residents are privileged to be the custodian for future generations of a bygone era. New Orleans was destroyed in part by Katrina. It is slowly being rebuilt. Charleston as an aged grande dame is, as beautiful as it was a century ago. Old San Juan is going into a renaissance that will set it up for two more centuries. Cape Haitian is crumbling under the weight of a demographic explosion, poor governance, myopic vision and a lack of civilian and governmental leadership.











Jean H Charles MSW, JD is Executive Director of AINDOH Inc a non profit organization dedicated to building a kinder and gentle Caribbean zone for all. He can be reached at: jeanhcharles@aol.

When I visit Cape Haitian, I live in one of those grand old mansions so common in that city. The front side balcony takes the full length of the house. Sitting there in the morning for breakfast, contemplating the sun piercing through the mountain is one of the delights of life in the islands in general, in Haiti in particular. As the sun makes its chart towards the sea, the back porch with its inside courtyard provides a nirvana where the soul is confusing earth with heaven.

Cape Haitian has been for centuries the pride of colonial Ayiti. Its streets well designed, its magnificent grand houses have endured the test of ages. Henry Christophe, the commander of the city, did not hesitate in 1801 to burn his own magnificent palace to demonstrate to the returning French troops that the taste of liberty was too sweet to return back to slavery.

Some fifty years ago, a son of the city who became president, Paul Eugene Magloire, brought Cape Haitian to the modern age with paved streets, sewer construction and other amenities, such as parks and potable water. The proud citizens of Cape Haitian have since developed a very low tolerance for poor governance. They have been penalized and have suffered in the last fifty years of neglect by successive Haitian governments that care very little for the welfare of their own people.

The construction of the international airport has been halted; the sewers have not been cleaned for the past forty years. The municipal iron market, a national treasure, is in a state of such decay and in such poor hygienic condition that a reasonable city mayor should close it from the public. Labadie, the most prized vacation resort of the Caribbean, is located at only fifteen minutes from Cape Haitian, yet 12,000 tourists will visit this enchanting part of Haiti every week starting December 9, without setting foot in Cape Haitian.

Labadie is now twenty years old, successive Haitian governments had all the time to clean up Cape









A painting of typical Cape Haitian

Haitian to make it hospitable to tourists and visitors, as such providing the means for its citizens to become as rich as Croesus. I have in mind Cozumel, Mexico, with its citizens tired of making money seven days a week with the constant flow of tourists! In a recent international meeting, I have suggested to an official of the government to transform the historic village of Labadie (1,000 people) into a showcase site where the tourists could come to enjoy the true spirit of Haiti. I was rebuked as an intruder to a family gathering.

Cape Haitian has been the refuge of thousands of citizens from Gonaives, who escaped the fury of the hurricane last season. They have invaded the surrounding mountains, causing further ecological degradation. The city, thanks to President Hugo Chavez, is enjoying six to seven hours of electricity through the Bolivar plant. My father of 97-years-old told me as a lad, circa 1930, when there was a black-out in Cape Haitian that lasted five to ten minutes, it was a big event.

The main boulevard of the city, Boulevard Espanola, (Spanish Boulevard) is as busy as Times Square at five o’clock in the afternoon. The kids coming out from school, merchants selling roasted pistachio, street kids hawking bottled water and the tap-taps (decorated small vans) fighting for passengers to bring children and their parents to the city suburbs, including the famous Vertieres village, the Waterloo of the French troops.











House in Cape Haitian

The city of Cape Haitian is in deep mourning this Saturday. The beloved maestro Ulric Pierre Louis, the founder of the 60-years-old big band Septentrional, has passed away. His fans have traveled from far and near to attend the national funeral. He had before his death organized a new generation of musicians to continue the musical magic of Septent.

This October, a group of city leaders will meet to map a renaissance of the city. It will need though a benefactor in the range of Commissioner Michelle Spence Jones of the city of Miami to help Cape Haitian to become a polished jewel or, rather, it needs Charleston, South Carolina, to lend a hand to a sister city that has much in common: the gracefulness of a past century frozen in each and every building of the city.

I believe Cape Haitian has a big future in front of it, with its proximity to the Dominican Republic (two hours from Dahabon), at the feet of the Citadel (one of seven world wonders), with its deep commercial and cruise ship port, a large population of half a million people willing and ready to work, its two century old stock of habitat. It needs a minimum of good governance to reclaim its seat in the rank of one of the five landmark cities of the world.


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September 19, 2009 | 12:01 PM Comments  {num} comments

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Getting US attention for the Caribbean: Must it be chaos?
Translations available in: English (original) | French | Spanish | Italian | German | Portuguese | Swedish | Russian | Dutch | Arabic


By Ronald Sanders:

During this month, I was invited to deliver a lecture to 85 high-ranking military officers from Europe, North America, Latin America, Africa, Asia and the Middle-East on the subject of US relations with its Central American and Caribbean neighbours.











In preparing the lecture, a comment on the Caribbean’s weakness and lack of capacity to command international attention preyed on my mind.

The comment was made by my friend and colleague, David Jessop, of the Caribbean Council for Europe. In his weekly column, the week before he said this: “Taken at face value the region has a very weak hand. The Caribbean does not have conflicts that threaten to escalate into global confrontations; thankfully it has neither nuclear weapons nor terrorism, nor does it have a significant military presence or the economic ability to change global financial or trade flows. In short it has little that would make bigger, wealthier and more influential states take notice”.

There is much merit in Jessop’s observation, and I used it as a point of departure for the lecture to these seasoned military officers.

During the Cold war – particularly with Soviet troops and military hardware in Cuba - the Caribbean was strategically important to the US because much of its oil requirements had to transit Caribbean waters, and the Caribbean was an important passageway for US military supplies to Western Europe.

But with the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 and the retreat of communism, the Caribbean and Central America slipped down the pole of American priorities.

The preoccupation of the government of George W Bush between 2001 and 2008 with American involvement in Afghanistan and Iraq caused Central America and the Caribbean to fall even further away from American attention except for issues related to drug trafficking, and illegal migration.

Since the mid-1990s, US aid to the Caribbean and Central America dwindled, preferential access for Caribbean and Central American goods to the US market eroded, and there was no longer any pressure by the US on Europe to help the region by paying preferential prices for its commodities especially bananas and sugar.

In this context, Caribbean and Central American economies declined, and their already bad situation worsened in the present global recession.

The IMF World Economic Outlook, published in April 2009, suggests that Latin American economies will contract by 1.5 percent in 2009 before recovering in 2010. But, the likelihood of a start of recovery by many Caribbean economies, which are dependent on tourism and financial services, is very unlikely until 2011, even if the economies of the US and Europe pull out of recession this year.

It is in this milieu that the Caribbean and Central America face the greatest destabilising force – drug trafficking and its attendant crime including illegal arms smuggling and distribution, robberies and executions.

The US government could make an enormous contribution to resolving this huge problem by passing legislation and implementing machinery to control arms smuggling; by reviewing the practice of deporting convicted felons to their countries of origin; and by adopting measures to stop legal sale of assault weapons.

Beyond this, the United States should take the lead in organising collaborative arrangements with Europe and Latin America and the Caribbean to establish a comprehensive anti-narcotics programme that addresses both supply and demand. If this is not done, the problem of drug-trafficking and its attendant high crime will continue to plague Central America and the Caribbean with a terrible destabilising effect on the small economies that are least able to cope.

The most worrying problem for the US in Central America and the Caribbean should be their economic situation, for conditions of economic decline lead to social and political unease, and instability.

It is simply a fact that, with few exceptions, Central American and Caribbean governments have either limited or no capacity to finance policies to address shocks to their economies such as the effect of the current global recession. In the Caribbean particularly, small or poor populations do not produce sufficient savings; there is not enough access to credit, and budgets are already in deficit or pretty close to it. In these circumstances, governments have no room to pay for the size of stimulus programmes that are required to improve these economies.

The US could be enormously helpful to these countries if it led the way in encouraging the international and hemispheric financial institutions to provide them with funds on far less onerous conditions than they have in the past.

As an example, the US should use its influence with other countries who govern the World Bank to reverse the graduation of many of these countries from access to concessionary financing. At the moment, they do not have access to such funds because they are regarded as middle-income countries with no regard for the high costs which their smallness and remoteness imposes upon them.

Of critical importance is help with the debt of these countries. Much of their debt, apart from those who owe Venezuela for oil as part of PetroCaribe, is commercial debt, though their official debt is also high. Some effort should be made to help these countries to reschedule debt to all sources on a payment scheme that should include some forgiveness and a realistic repayment scheme.

In this regard, the IMF could play an important role in providing financing that (a) is not necessarily linked to the countries’ Special Drawing Rights; and (b) is not subject to the usual prescription of raising taxes, reducing public sector spending; freezing wages, and repaying foreign debt.

If governments in the industrialised world could bail out some companies and financial institutions on the basis that their economies could not allow these firms to collapse, surely this is also a basis for arguing that the collapse of states should be avoided.

But, I suspect the region will continue to be ignored, and, sadly, it will take chaos or grave upheaval before it is paid serious attention.



caribbeannetnews


Bahamas Caribbean Blog International

Sir Ronald Sanders is a business
executive and former Caribbean
diplomat who publishes widely
on small states in the global
community. Reponses to:
ronaldsanders29@hotmail.com
 

Par Ronald Sanders :

Pendant ce mois, j'ai été invité à fournir une conférence à 85 dirigeants militaires du haut rang l'Europe, d'Amérique du Nord, d'Amérique latine, d'Afrique, d'Asie et le Moyen-Orient au sujet des relations des USA avec ses voisins américains et des Caraïbes centraux.











En préparant la conférence, un commentaire sur la faiblesse de la Caraïbe et le manque de capacité de commander une attention internationale ont attaqué sur mon esprit.

Le commentaire a été fait par mon ami et collègue, David Jessop, du Conseil des Caraïbes pour l'Europe. Dans sa colonne hebdomadaire, la semaine avant qu'il dit ceci : « Pris à la valeur nominale la région a une main très faible. La Caraïbe n'a pas des conflits qui menacent d'escalader dans des confrontations globales ; avec reconnaissance il n'a ni les armes nucléaires ni le terrorisme, ni il a une présence militaire significative ou la capacité économique de changer des courants commerciaux financiers ou commerciaux globaux. En bref il a peu qui rendrait plus grand, plus riche et des états plus influents prennent la notification ».

Il y a beaucoup de mérite dans l'observation de Jessop, et je l'ai employée comme point de départ pour la conférence à ces dirigeants militaires chevronnés.

Pendant la guerre froide - en particulier avec les troupes soviétiques et le matériel militaire au Cuba - la Caraïbe était stratégiquement importante pour les USA parce que beaucoup de ses conditions d'huile a dû les eaux des Caraïbes de passage, et la Caraïbe était un passage important pour les approvisionnements militaires des USA en Europe de l'ouest.

Mais avec l'effondrement de l'Union Soviétique en 1991 et de la retraite du communisme, les Caraïbes et l'Amérique Centrale ont glissé en bas du poteau des priorités américaines.

La préoccupation du gouvernement de George W Bush entre 2001 et 2008 avec la participation américaine en Afghanistan et en Irak a causé l'Amérique Centrale et les Caraïbes à tomber même plus loin d'une attention américaine excepté des questions se sont reliées au trafic de drogue, et à la migration illégale.

Depuis le milieu des années 90, l'aide des USA vers les Caraïbes et l'Amérique Centrale ont diminué, accès préférentiel pour les marchandises américaines des Caraïbes et centrales au marché des USA érodé, et il n'y avait plus n'importe quelle pression par les USA sur l'Europe d'aider la région en payant les prix de faveur ses bananes et sucre des produits particulièrement.

Dans ce contexte, les économies américaines des Caraïbes et centrales diminuées, et leur situation déjà mauvaise ont empiré dans la récession globale actuelle.

L'Outlook économique du monde de FMI, édité en avril 2009, suggère que les économies latino-américaines se contractent par 1.5 pour cent en 2009 avant la récupération en 2010. Mais, la probabilité d'un début de rétablissement par beaucoup d'économies des Caraïbes, qui dépendent du tourisme et des services financiers, est très peu probable jusqu'en 2011, même si les économies des USA et de l'Europe retirent de la récession cette année.

Il est dans ce milieu que les Caraïbes et l'Amérique Centrale font face à la plus grande force de déstabilisation - trafic de drogue et son crime propre comprenant faire de la contrebande et distribution illégale de bras, vols et exécutions.

Le gouvernement des USA a pu apporter une énorme contribution à résoudre ce problème énorme en passant la législation et en mettant en application des machines à faire de la contrebande de bras de commande ; en passant en revue la pratique d'expulser les criminels condamnés à leurs pays d'origine ; et en adoptant des mesures d'arrêter la vente légale des armes d'assaut.

Au delà de ceci, les Etats-Unis devraient prendre la tête en organisant des arrangements de collaboration avec l'Europe et l'Amérique latine et les Caraïbes pour établir les anti-narcotiques complets programment qui adresse l'offre et la demande. Si ceci n'est pas fait, le problème du drogue-trafic et de son crime élevé propre continuera à infester l'Amérique Centrale et les Caraïbes avec un effet de déstabilisation terrible sur les petites économies qui peuvent moins faire face.

Inquiéter le problème pour les USA en Amérique Centrale et les Caraïbes devrait être leur situation économique, parce que les états du déclin économique mènent au malaise social et politique, et l'instabilité.

C'est simplement un fait que, à peu d'exceptions, les gouvernements américains et des Caraïbes centraux ont limité ou aucune capacité de financer des politiques pour adresser des chocs à leurs économies telles que l'effet de la récession globale courante. Dans les Caraïbes en particulier, les petites ou pauvres populations ne produisent pas l'épargne suffisante ; il n'y a pas assez d'accès au crédit, et les budgets sont déjà dans le déficit ou joli près de lui. Dans ces circonstances, les gouvernements n'ont aucune pièce de payer la taille des programmes de stimulus qui sont exigés pour améliorer ces économies.

Les USA pourraient être énormément utiles à ces pays s'ils menaient la manière en encourageant les institutions financiers internationaux et hémisphériques à leur fournir des fonds sur des conditions loin moins onéreuses qu'ils ont dans le passé.

Comme exemple, les USA devraient employer son influence avec d'autres pays qui régissent la banque mondiale pour renverser le repére de plusieurs de ces pays de l'accès au financement concessionnaire. Au moment où, ils n'ont pas accès à tels des fonds parce qu'ils sont considérés pendant que les pays moyens de revenu sans le respect pour les coûts élevés que leur dimension et éloignement impose à eux.

D'importance critique est l'aide avec la dette de ces pays. Beaucoup de leur dette, indépendamment de ceux qui doivent le Venezuela pour l'huile en tant qu'élément de PetroCaribe, est dette commerciale, bien que leur dette officielle soit également haute. Un certain effort devrait être fait pour aider ces pays à rééchelonner la dette à toutes les sources sur un arrangement de paiement qui devrait inclure de la rémission et un arrangement réaliste de remboursement.

À cet égard, le FMI pourrait jouer un rôle important en fournissant le financement que (a) n'est pas nécessairement lié des droites de dessin spéciales à pays' ; et (b) n'est pas sujet à la prescription habituelle de soulever des impôts, réduisant la dépense de secteur public ; salaires de congélation, et remboursement de la dette extérieure.

Si les gouvernements dans le monde industrialisé pourraient écoper dehors quelques compagnies et institutions financiers sur la base que leurs économies ne pourraient pas permettre à ces sociétés de s'effondrer, sûrement ce sert également de base à arguer du fait que l'effondrement des états devrait être évité.

Mais, je suspecte que la région continue à être ignorée, et, tristement, elle prendra le chaos ou le bouleversement de tombe avant que ce soit une attention sérieuse payée.



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Les Bahamas Blog des Caraïbes international

Monsieur Ronald Sanders est des affaires
les Caraïbes exécutives et anciennes
diplomate qui édite largement
sur de petits états dans le global
la communauté. Reponses à :
ronaldsanders29@hotmail.com
 

Por Ronald Sanders:

Durante este mes, a me invitaron que entregara una conferencia a 85 oficiales militares de la alto-graduación de Europa, de Norteamérica, de América latina, de África, de Asia y del Medio Oriente a propósito de relaciones de los E.E.U.U. con sus vecinos americanos y del Caribe centrales.











En la preparación de la conferencia, un comentario sobre la debilidad del Caribe y la carencia de la capacidad de ordenar la atención internacional cazaron en mi mente.

El comentario fue hecho por mi amigo y colega, David Jessop, del consejo del Caribe para Europa. En su columna semanal, la semana antes de que él dicho esto: “Tomado en el valor de cara la región tiene una mano muy débil. El Caribe no tiene conflictos que amenacen extenderse en confrontaciones globales; tiene agradecidamente ni las armas nucleares ni terrorismo, ni tiene una presencia militar significativa o la capacidad económica de cambiar flujos financieros o comerciales globales. En fin tiene poco que haría más grande, más rico y estados más influyentes toman el aviso”.

Hay mucho mérito en la observación de Jessop, y la utilicé como punto de la salida para la conferencia a estos oficiales militares chevronn3es.

Durante la guerra fría - particularmente con las tropas soviéticas y el hardware militar en Cuba - el Caribe era estratégico importante para los E.E.U.U. porque tuvo que mucho de sus requisitos del aceite las aguas del Caribe del tránsito, y el Caribe era un callejón importante para las fuentes militares de los E.E.U.U. a Europa occidental.

Pero con el derrumbamiento de la Unión Soviética en 1991 y el retratamiento del comunismo, el Caribe y la America Central se deslizaron abajo del poste de prioridades americanas.

La preocupación del gobierno de George W Bush entre 2001 y 2008 con la implicación americana en Afganistán e Iraq causó America Central y el Caribe a caer incluso más lejos de la atención americana a excepción de ediciones se relacionó con tráficos de droga, y la migración ilegal.

Desde los mid-1990s, la ayuda de los E.E.U.U. al Caribe y America Central disminuyeron, acceso preferencial para las mercancías americanas del Caribe y centrales al mercado de los E.E.U.U. erosionado, y había no más cualquier presión al lado de los E.E.U.U. en Europa de ayudar a la región pagando los precios preferenciales sus plátanos y azúcar de las materias especialmente.

En este contexto, las economías americanas del Caribe y centrales declinadas, y su situación ya mala se empeoraron en la actual recesión global.

La perspectiva económica del mundo del FMI, publicada en abril de 2009, sugiere que las economías latinoamericanas contraerán por 1.5 por ciento en 2009 antes de recuperar en 2010. Pero, la probabilidad de un comienzo de la recuperación por muchas economías del Caribe, que son dependientes en el turismo y los servicios financieros, es muy inverosímil hasta que 2011, aunque las economías de los E.E.U.U. y Europa se saca de la recesión este año.

Está en este entorno que el Caribe y la America Central hagan frente a la fuerza de desestabilización más grande - tráficos de droga y su crimen acompañante incluyendo pasar de contrabando y distribución ilegal de los brazos, los robos y las ejecuciones.

El gobierno de los E.E.U.U. podía hacer una contribución enorme a resolver este problema enorme aprobando la legislación y poniendo la maquinaria en ejecución a pasar de contrabando de los brazos de control; repasando la práctica de deportar criminales condenados a sus países de origen; y adoptando medidas de parar la venta legal de las armas del asalto.

Más allá de esto, los Estados Unidos deben tomar el plomo en la organización de arreglos de colaboración con Europa y América latina y el Caribe para establecer contra-narcótico comprensivo programan que trata la fuente y la demanda. Si esto no se hace, el problema de droga-traficar y de su alto crimen acompañante continuará plagando America Central y el Caribe con un efecto de desestabilización terrible sobre las economías pequeñas que pueden lo más menos posible hacer frente.

La preocupación del problema para los E.E.U.U. en America Central y el Caribe debe ser su situación económica, porque las condiciones de la declinación económica conducen a la inquietud social y política, y la inestabilidad.

Es simplemente un hecho de que, con pocas excepciones, los gobiernos americanos y del Caribe centrales se han limitado o ninguna capacidad de financiar políticas para tratar choques a sus economías tales como el efecto de la recesión global actual. En el Caribe particularmente, las poblaciones pequeñas o pobres no producen suficientes ahorros; no hay bastante acceso al crédito, y los presupuestos están ya en déficit o bonito cerca de él. En estas circunstancias, los gobiernos no tienen ningún sitio de pagar el tamaño de los programas del estímulo que se requieren para mejorar estas economías.

Los E.E.U.U. podrían ser enormemente provechosos a estos países si condujeron la manera en animar a las instituciones financieras internacionales y hemisféricas que provean de ellas los fondos en condiciones lejos menos onerosas que ellos tienen en el pasado.

Como ejemplo, los E.E.U.U. deben utilizar su influencia con otros países que gobiernen el banco mundial para invertir la graduación de muchos de estos países del acceso al financiamiento concesionario. En el momento que, no tienen acceso a tales los fondos porque se miran mientras que los países medios de la renta sin el respeto para los altos costes que su pequeñez y alejamiento impone ante ellos.

De importancia crítica es la ayuda con la deuda de estos países. Mucha de su deuda, aparte de los que deban Venezuela para el aceite como parte de PetroCaribe, es deuda comercial, aunque su deuda oficial es también alta. Un cierto esfuerzo se debe hacer para ayudar a estos países a cambiar la hora de deuda a todas las fuentes en un esquema del pago que deba incluir un cierto perdón y un esquema realista del reembolso.

En este respeto, el FMI podría desempeñar un papel importante en el abastecimiento del financiamiento que (a) no está ligado necesariamente las derechas dibujo especiales de los países de'; y (b) no está conforme a la prescripción generalmente de aumentar impuestos, reduciendo el gasto del sector público; salarios que congelan, y compensar deuda exterior.

Si los gobiernos en el mundo industrializado podrían afianzar hacia fuera a algunas compañías e instituciones financieras sobre la base que sus economías no podrían permitir que se derrumben estas firmas, esto es seguramente también una base para discutir que el derrumbamiento de estados debe ser evitado.

Pero, sospecho que la región continuará siendo no hecha caso, y, tristemente, tomará caos o la agitación del sepulcro antes de que sea atención seria pagada.



caribbeannetnews


Bahamas Blog del Caribe internacional

Sir Ronald Sanders es un negocio
el Caribe ejecutivo y anterior
diplomata que publica extensamente
en estados pequeños en el global
comunidad. Reponses a:
ronaldsanders29@hotmail.com
 

Da Ronald Sanders:

Durante questo mese, sono stato invitato a trasportare una conferenza a 85 ufficiali militari di alto-posto da Europa, dall'America del Nord, dall'america latina, dall'Africa, dall'Asia e dal Medio Oriente a proposito dei rapporti degli Stati Uniti con i relativi vicini americani e caraibici centrali.











Nella preparazione della conferenza, un commento sulla debolezza dei Caraibi e la mancanza di capacità di comandare l'attenzione internazionale hanno predato alla mia mente.

L'osservazione è stata formulata dal miei amico e collega, David Jessop, del Consiglio caraibico per Europa. Nella sua colonna settimanale, la settimana prima che lui detto questo: “Preso a valore nominale la regione ha una mano molto debole. I Caraibi non hanno conflitti che minaccino di intensificare nei confronti globali; ha thankfully nè le armi nucleari nè terrorismo, né ha una presenza militare significativa o la capacità economica cambiare le correnti commerciali finanziarie o globali. In breve ha piccolo che abbia reso più grande, più ricco e più influente dichiara l'avviso dell'introito„.

Ci è molto merito nell'osservazione del Jessop e la ho usata come punto di partenza per la conferenza a questi ufficiali militari seasoned.

Durante la guerra fredda - specialmente con le truppe sovietiche ed i fissaggi militari in Cuba - i Caraibi erano strategico importanti negli Stati Uniti perché molto dei relativi requisiti dell'olio ha dovuto acque caraibiche di transito ed i Caraibi erano un passaggio importante per i rifornimenti militari degli Stati Uniti ad Europa occidentale.

Ma con il crollo dell'Unione Sovietica in 1991 e la ritirata di comunismo, i Caraibi e l'America Centrale hanno slittato giù il palo delle priorità americane.

La preoccupazione del governo di George il W Bush fra 2001 e 2008 con la partecipazione americana nell'Afghanistan e Irak ha causato l'America Centrale ed i Caraibi da cadere anche più lontano da attenzione americana tranne le edizioni si sono riferiti al traffico di droga ed all'espansione illegale.

Dai mid-1990s, il sussidio degli Stati Uniti ai Caraibi e l'America Centrale hanno diminuito, accesso preferenziale per le merci americane caraibiche e centrali al mercato degli Stati Uniti corroso e ci non era più alcuna pressione dagli Stati Uniti su Europa aiutare la regione pagando i prezzi preferenziali le relativi banane e zucchero dei prodotti particolarmente.

In questo contesto, le economie americane caraibiche e centrali hanno declinato e la loro situazione già difettosa peggiorata nella recessione globale attuale.

La prospettiva congiunturale del mondo di FMI (fondo monetario internazionale), pubblicata nell'aprile 2009, suggerisce che le economie dell'America latina si contrarranno da 1.5 per cento in 2009 prima di recuperare in 2010. Ma, la probabilità di un inizio del recupero da molte economie caraibiche, che dipendono da turismo e da servizi finanziari, è molto improbabile fino al 2011, anche se le economie degli Stati Uniti e dell'Europa estraggono della recessione questo anno.

È in questo ambiente che i Caraibi e l'America Centrale affrontano la forza di destabilizzazione più grande - il traffico di droga ed il relativo crimine relativo compresi contrabbando e distribuzione illegale di armi, robberies ed esecuzioni.

Il governo degli Stati Uniti ha potuto dare un contributo enorme a risolvere questo problema enorme passando la legislazione ed effettuando il macchinario al contrabbando di armi di controllo; rivedendo la pratica di deporting i felons condannati ai loro p#si d'origine; ed adottando le misure arrestare vendita legale delle armi di assalto.

Oltre questo, gli Stati Uniti dovrebbero prendere il comando nell'organizzazione delle disposizioni di collaborazione con Europa e l'america latina ed i Caraibi per stabilire anti-narcotici completi si programmano che richiama sia la domanda che l'offerta. Se questo non è fatto, il problema del droga-traffico e del relativo crimine alto relativo continuerà a contagiare l'America Centrale ed i Caraibi con un effetto di destabilizzazione terribile sulle piccole economie che possono il più minimo fare fronte.

Preoccupare il problema per gli Stati Uniti in America Centrale ed i Caraibi dovrebbe essere la loro situazione economica, dato che gli stati del declino economico conducono a disagio sociale e politico ed instabilità.

È semplicemente un fatto che, con poche eccezioni, i governi americani e caraibici centrali hanno limitato o nessuna capacità di finanziare le politiche per richiamare le scosse alle loro economie quale l'effetto della recessione globale corrente. Nei Caraibi specialmente, le piccole o povere popolazioni non producono il risparmio sufficiente; ci non è abbastanza accesso ad accreditamento ed i preventivi sono già nel deficit o grazioso vicino esso. In queste circostanze, i governi non hanno stanza pagare il formato dei programmi dello stimolo che sono richiesti per migliorare queste economie.

Gli Stati Uniti potrebbero essere enormemente utili a questi paesi se conducessero il senso nel consigliare alle istituzioni finanziarie internazionali ed emisferiche fornire loro i fondi monetari sulle circostanze molto onerose che hanno nel passato.

Come esempio, gli Stati Uniti dovrebbero usare la relativa influenza con altri paesi che governano la banca del mondo per invertire la graduazione di molti di questi paesi da accesso a finanziamento concessionario. Dal momento che, non hanno accesso a tali fondi monetari perché si considerano mentre paesi centrali di reddito senza riguardo per gli alti costi che il loro smallness e distanza impone loro.

Di importanza critica è l'aiuto con il debito di questi paesi. Molto del loro debito, oltre a coloro che deve il Venezuela per olio come componente di PetroCaribe, è debito commerciale, benchè il loro debito ufficiale sia inoltre alto. Un certo sforzo dovrebbe essere fatto per aiutare questi paesi a rinviare il debito a tutte le fonti su uno schema di pagamento che dovrebbe includere un certo perdono e uno schema realistico di rimborso.

A questo proposito, il FMI (fondo monetario internazionale) potrebbe svolgere un ruolo importante nel fornire il finanziamento che (a) necessariamente non è collegato diritti di disegno speciali ai paesi'; e (b) non è conforme alla prescrizione usuale di sollevare le tasse, ridurre la spesa del settore pubblico; stipendi gelidi e rimborsare debito con l'estero.

Se i governi nel mondo industrializzato potessero mettere fuori alcune aziende ed istituzioni in libertà provvisoria finanziarie sulla base che le loro economie non potrebbero permettere che queste ditte sprofondino, certamente questa è inoltre una base per sostenere che il crollo di dichiara dovrebbe essere evitato.

Ma, ritengo sospetto che la regione continuerà ad essere ignorata e, tristemente, prenderà il caos o la sollevazione della tomba prima che sia attenzione seria paid.



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Il sir Ronald Sanders è un commercio
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Durch Ronald Sanders:

Während dieses Monats wurde ich eingeladen, einen Vortrag an 85 Hochklassifizierung militärische Offiziere von Europa, von Nordamerika, von lateinischem Amerika, von Afrika, von Asien und vom Mittleren Osten bezüglich der US Relationen mit seinen zentralen amerikanischen und karibischen Nachbarn zu liefern.











Wenn sie den Vortrag vorbereiteten, preyed eine Anmerkung zur Schwäche des Karibischen Meeres und Mangel an Kapazität, internationale Aufmerksamkeit zu beherrschen auf meinem Verstand.

Die Anmerkung wurde von meinem Freund und von Kollegen, David Jessop, des karibischen Rates für Europa gebildet. In seiner wöchentlichen Spalte die Woche, bevor er besagt dieses: „Genommen am Nominalwert hat die Region eine sehr schwache Hand. Das Karibische Meer hat nicht Konflikte, die bedrohen, sich in globale Konfrontationen zu entwickeln; dankbar hat es weder Kernwaffen noch Terrorismus, noch hat es eine bedeutende militärische Anwesenheit oder die ökonomische Fähigkeit, globale finanzielle oder Handelsströme zu ändern. Kurz gesagt hat es wenig, das grösser bilden würde, wohlhabender und einflußreichere Zustände Nachricht“ nehmen.

Es gibt viel Verdienst in der Beobachtung Jessops, und ich verwendete sie als Ausgangspunkt für den Vortrag zu diesen reifen militärischen Offizieren.

Während des kalten Krieges - besonders mit sowjetischen Truppen und militärischen Kleinteilen in Kuba - das Karibische Meer war strategisch in die US wichtig, weil viel seiner ölanforderungen karibisches Wasser der Durchfahrt mußte, und das Karibische Meer war ein wichtiger Durchgang für US militärische Versorgungsmaterialien zu Westeuropa.

Aber mit dem Einsturz der Sowjetunions 1991 und dem Rückzug des Kommunismus, glitten die Karibischen Meere und das Mittelamerika hinunter den Pfosten der amerikanischen Prioritäten.

Die Hauptbeschäftigung der Regierung von George W Bush zwischen 2001 und 2008 mit amerikanischer Miteinbeziehung in Afghanistan und im Irak verursachte Mittelamerika und die Karibischen Meere, zum sogar weiter entfernt von amerikanische Aufmerksamkeit außer Ausgaben zu fallen bezogen auf dem Drogehandeln und ungültiger Migration.

Seit den Mid-1990s schwanden US Hilfsmittel für die Karibischen Meere und Mittelamerika, bevorzugter Zugang für die karibischen und zentralen amerikanischen Waren zum abgefressenen US Markt, und es gab nicht mehr jeden möglichen Druck durch die US auf Europa, der Region zu helfen, indem man Vorzugspreise für seine Bananen und Zucker der Gebrauchsgüter besonders zahlte.

In diesem Kontext sanken karibische und zentrale amerikanische Wirtschaftssysteme und ihre bereits schlechte Situation, die in der anwesenden globalen Rezession verschlechtert wurde.

Die IWF Weltökonomische Aussicht, im April 2009 veröffentlicht, schlägt vor, daß lateinamerikanische Wirtschaftssysteme durch 1.5 Prozent 2009 Vertrag abschließen, bevor sie 2010 zurückgewinnen. Aber, die Wahrscheinlichkeit eines Anfangs der Wiederaufnahme durch viele karibische Wirtschaftssysteme, die vom Tourismus und von den finanziellen Dienstleistungen abhängig sind, ist bis 2011 sehr unwahrscheinlich, selbst wenn die Wirtschaftssysteme der US und des Europas von der Rezession dieses Jahr ausziehen.

Es ist in dieser Umgebung, der die Karibischen Meere und das Mittelamerika die größte entstabilisierende Kraft - Drogehandeln und sein begleitendes Verbrechen einschließlich das ungültiges Armschmuggeln und -verteilung, Raub und Durchführungen gegenüberstellen.

Die US Regierung konnte einen enormen Beitrag zum Beheben dieses sehr großen Problems bilden, indem sie Gesetzgebung führte und Maschinerie zum Steuerarmschmuggeln einführte; durch das Wiederholen der Praxis des Verbannens der überführten Täter zu ihren Ursprungsländern; und durch das Ergreifen von Maßnahmen, zugelassenen Verkauf der Angriff Waffen zu stoppen.

Über diesem hinaus sollten die Vereinigten Staaten die Leitung nehmen, wenn sie gemeinschaftliche Vorbereitungen mit Europa organisieren und lateinisches Amerika und die Karibischen Meere, zum herzustellen komplette Anti-betäubungsmittel programmieren, das Angebot und Nachfrage adressiert. Wenn dieses nicht getan wird, fährt das Problem Droge-Handeln und seinem begleitenden hohen Verbrechen fort, Mittelamerika und die Karibischen Meere mit einem schrecklichen entstabilisierenden Effekt auf die kleinen Wirtschaftssysteme zu quälen, die wenig sind fertig zu werden.

Das Sorgen des Problems für die US in Mittelamerika und in den Karibischen Meeren sollte ihre wirtschaftliche Lage sein, denn Zustände der ökonomischen Abnahme führen zu Sozial- und politisches Unbehagen und Instabilität.

Es ist einfach eine Tatsache, daß, mit wenigen Ausnahmen, zentrale amerikanische und karibische Regierungen entweder oder keine Kapazität, politische Richtlinien zu finanzieren, um Schläge an ihre Wirtschaftssysteme wie den Effekt der gegenwärtigen globalen Rezession zu adressieren begrenzt haben. In den Karibischen Meeren besonders, produzieren kleine oder arme Bevölkerungen nicht genügende Sparungen; es gibt nicht genügend Zugang zur Gutschrift, und Etats sind bereits im Defizit oder hübsch nah an ihm. Unter diesen Umständen haben Regierungen keinen Raum, für die Größe der Anregungprogramme zu zahlen, die angefordert werden, um diese Wirtschaftssysteme zu verbessern.

Die US konnten zu diesen Ländern enorm nützlich sein, wenn er die Weise führte, wenn er die internationalen und hemisphärischen Geldinstitute anregte, sie mit Kapitaln auf weit weniger lästigen Bedingungen, als zu versehen sie haben in der Vergangenheit.

Als Beispiel sollten die US seinen Einfluß mit anderen Ländern verwenden, die die Weltbank regeln, um die Staffelung von vielen dieser Länder vom Zugang zur Bewilligungsfinanzierung aufzuheben. In dem Augenblick als, sie nicht Zugang zu so Kapital haben, weil sie während mittlere Einkommenländer ohne Respekt für die hohen Kosten betrachtet werden, die ihr Smallness und Entferntheit nach ihnen auferlegt.

Vom kritischen Wert ist Hilfe bei der Schuld dieser Länder. Viel ihrer Schuld, abgesehen von denen, die Venezuela für öl als Teil PetroCaribe verdanken, ist Warenschuld, obwohl ihre amtliche Schuld auch hoch ist. Etwas Bemühung sollte gebildet werden, um diesen Ländern zu helfen, Schuld zu allen Quellen auf einem Zahlung Entwurf neu festzulegen, der etwas Verzeihen und einen realistischen Rückzahlungentwurf einschließen sollte.

In dieser Hinsicht könnte der IWF eine wichtige Rolle spielen, wenn er Finanzierung zur Verfügung stellte, daß (a) nicht notwendigerweise mit den Ländern' spezielle zeichnende Rechte verbunden wird; und (b) ist nicht abhängig von der üblichen Verordnung des Aufwerfens von Steuern und verringert Ausgabe des allgemeinen Sektors; einfrierende Löhne und Zurückerstatten von Auslandsschuld.

Wenn Regierungen in der industrialisierten Welt einige Firmen und Geldinstitute auf der Grundlage heraus bürgen konnten, daß ihre Wirtschaftssysteme nicht diese Unternehmen einstürzen lassen konnten, sicher ist dieses auch eine Grundlage für das Argumentieren, daß der Einsturz der Zustände vermieden werden sollte.

Aber, ich vermute, daß die Region fortfährt ignoriert zu werden und traurig sie Chaos oder Grabumwälzung nimmt, bevor es zahlende ernste Aufmerksamkeit ist.



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Sir Ronald Sanders ist ein Geschäft
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Por Ronald Sanders:

Durante este mês, eu fui convidado entregar um lecture a 85 oficiais militares do elevado-ranking de Europa, de America do Norte, de América Latin, de África, de Ásia e do Middle-East no assunto de relações dos E.U. com seus vizinhos americanos e do Cararibe centrais.











Em preparar o lecture, um comentário na fraqueza das Caraíbas e a falta da capacidade comandar a atenção internacional rapinaram em minha mente.

O comentário foi feito por meus amigo e colega, David Jessop, do conselho do Cararibe para Europa. Em sua coluna semanal, a semana antes que ele dito isto: “Feito exame no valor de cara a região tem uma mão muito fraca. As Caraíbas não têm os conflitos que ameaçam escalar em confrontations globais; thankfully tem nem armas nucleares nem terrorismo, nem tem uma presença militar significativa ou a abilidade econômica mudar fluxos financeiros ou de comércio globais. No short tem pouco que faria mais grande, mais rico e os estados mais influential fazem exame da observação”.

Há muito mérito na observação de Jessop, e eu usei-a como um ponto de partida para o lecture a estes oficiais militares seasoned.

Durante a guerra fria - particularmente com tropas soviéticas e ferragem militar em Cuba - as Caraíbas eram estratègica importantes para os E.U. porque muita de suas exigências do óleo teve que águas do Cararibe do trânsito, e as Caraíbas eram um passageway importante para fontes militares dos E.U. a Europa ocidental.

Mas com o colapso da União Soviética em 1991 e o recuo do communism, as Caraíbas e a América Central deslizaram abaixo o pólo de prioridades americanas.

O preoccupation do governo de George W Bush entre 2001 e 2008 com participação americana em Afeganistão e em Iraq causou América Central e as Caraíbas a cair mesmo mais adicional longe da atenção americana à exceção das edições relacionaram-se a traficar de droga, e à migração ilegal.

Desde os mid-1990s, o dae (dispositivo automático de entrada) dos E.U. às Caraíbas e América Central dwindled, acesso preferential para bens americanos do Cararibe e centrais ao mercado dos E.U. corroído, e havia já não toda a pressão pelos E.U. em Europa ajudar à região pagando preços preferential por seus bananas e açúcar dos productos especialmente.

Neste contexto, as economias americanas do Cararibe e centrais declinaram, e sua situação já má worsened no recession global atual.

O Outlook econômico do mundo do IMF, publicado em abril 2009, sugere que latin - as economias americanas contrair-se-ão por 1.5 por cento em 2009 antes de recuperar em 2010. Mas, a probabilidade de um começo da recuperação por muitas economias do Cararibe, que são dependentes do tourism e dos serviços financeiros, é muito improvável até 2011, mesmo se as economias dos E.U. e da Europa puxarem fora do recession este ano.

Está neste milieu que as Caraíbas e a América Central enfrentam a força destabilising a mais grande - traficar de droga e seu crime assistente including smuggling e distribuição ilegal dos braços, robberies e execuções.

O governo dos E.U. podia fazer uma contribuição enorme a resolver este problema enorme passando a legislação e executando a maquinaria a smuggling dos braços de controle; revendo a prática de deporting criminosos convicted a seus países de origem; e adotando medidas parar a venda legal de armas do assalto.

Além desta, os Estados Unidos devem fazer exame da ligação em organizar arranjos collaborative com Europa e América Latin e as Caraíbas para estabelecer anti-narcotics detalhados programam que se dirige à fonte e à demanda. Se isto não for feito, o problema de droga-traficar e de seu crime elevado assistente continuará a flagelar América Central e as Caraíbas com um efeito destabilising terrível nas economias pequenas que podem o mais menos lidar.

Preocupar o problema para os E.U. em América Central e nas Caraíbas deve ser sua situação econômica, porque as condições do declínio econômico conduzem ao unease social e político, e a instabilidade.

É simplesmente um fato que, com poucas exceções, os governos americanos e do Cararibe centrais limitaram ou nenhuma capacidade financiar políticas para se dirigir aos choques a suas economias tais como o efeito do recession global atual. Nas Caraíbas particularmente, as populações pequenas ou pobres não produzem economias suficientes; não há bastante acesso ao crédito, e os orçamentos estão já no deficit ou bonito perto dele. Nestas circunstâncias, os governos não têm nenhum quarto pagar pelo tamanho dos programas do stimulus que são requeridos para melhorar estas economias.

Os E.U. poderiam ser enormemente úteis a estes países se conduzissem à maneira em incentivar as instituições financeiras internacionais e hemispheric as fornecer com os fundos em circunstâncias distante mais menos onerous do que eles têm no passado.

Como um exemplo, os E.U. devem usar sua influência com outros países que governam o banco de mundo para inverter a graduação de muitos destes países do acesso ao financiamento concessionary. No momento em que, não têm o acesso a tais fundos porque estão considerados enquanto países médios da renda com nenhuma consideração para os custos elevados que seus smallness e remoteness impõem em cima deles.

Da importância crítica é a ajuda com o débito destes países. Muito de seu débito, aparte daqueles que devem Venezuela para o óleo como parte de PetroCaribe, é débito comercial, embora seu débito oficial é também elevado. Algum esforço deve ser feito para ajudar a estes países reschedule o débito a todas as fontes em um esquema do pagamento que deva incluir algum forgiveness e um esquema realístico do reembolso.

Nesta consideração, o IMF poderia jogar um papel importante em fornecer o financiamento que (a) não é ligado necessariamente direitas extraindo especiais aos países'; e (b) não é sujeito à prescrição usual de levantar impostos, reduzir a despesa do setor público; salários congelando-se, e reembolsar o débito extrangeiro.

Se os governos no mundo industrialised poderiam afiançar para fora algumas companhias e instituições financeiras na base que suas economias não poderiam permitir que estas empresa desmoronem, certamente esta é também uma base para discutir que o colapso dos estados deve ser evitado.

Mas, eu suspeito que a região continuará a ser ignorada, e, sadly, fará exame do caos ou do upheaval da sepultura antes que esteja atenção séria paga.



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Bahamas Blog do Cararibe internacional

O senhor Ronald Sanders é um negócio
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Vid Ronald Slipmaskin:

Under denna månad var jag inbjuden att leverera en föreläsa till 85 denrang som militären kommenderar från Europa, Nordamerika, Latinamerika, Afrika, Asien och Middlen-East på betvinga av US-förbindelse med dess centralamerikan och karibiska grann.











I att förbereda föreläsa, preyed en kommentar på Caribbean'sens svaghet och brist av kapacitet att befalla landskampuppmärksamhet på mitt varar besvärad.

Kommentaren gjordes av min vän och kollega, David Jessop, av det karibiska rådet för Europa. I hans veckokolonn veckan, för honom som är said detta: ”Taget på nominellt värde har regionen ett mycket svagt att räcka. Det karibiskt har inte konflikter som hotar för att eskalera in i globala konfrontationer; thankfully har det neither kärnvapen nor terrorism, nor har det en viktig militär närvaro, eller den ekonomiska kapaciteten att ändra globalt finansiellt eller handel flödar. I kort stavelse har det lite som skulle gör större, mer förmögen, och mer inflytelserik påstår taken märker”.

Det finns mycket merit i Jessops observation, och jag använde den, som en peka av avvikelsen för föreläsa till dessa kryddade militär kommenderar.

Under kalla kriget - bestämt med sovjetiska soldater och militär maskinvara i Kuba - det karibiskt var strategiskt viktigt till USEN, därför att mycket av dess olje- krav måste att genomresa karibiskt bevattnar, och det karibiskt var en viktig passageway för militära tillförsel för US till västra Europa.

Men med kollapsen av den sovjetiska unionen i 1991 och reträtten av kommunism, besegrar det karibiskt och centralen halkade Amerika polen av amerikanprioriteter.

Preoccupationen av regeringen av George W Bush mellan 2001 och 2008 med amerikanmedverkan i Afghanistan och Irak som orsakas centralen Amerika och det karibiskt till nedgången som även är mer ytterligare i väg från amerikanuppmärksamhet bortsett från, utfärdar släkt till droghandelen och olaglig flyttning.

Efter midna-1990s bistår US till det karibiskt och centralen förminskas Amerika, preferens- ta fram för karibiskt, och centralamerikangodor till USEN marknadsför eroderat, och det fanns några pressar ej längre vid USEN på Europa för att hjälpa regionen, genom att betala som var preferens-, prissätter för dess bananer och socker för artiklar speciellt.

I detta sammanhang gick ned karibiska och centralamerikanekonomier, och deras bjöd redan läget som försämrades i den närvarande globala nedgången.

Den ekonomiska framtidsutsikten för IMF-världen som publiceras i April 2009, föreslår att latin - ska amerikanekonomier avtalar vid 1.5 procent i 2009, innan de återställer i 2010. Men är sannolikheten av en start av återställningen av många karibiska ekonomier, som är anhörigen på turism och finansiell rådgivning, mycket osannolik till 2011, om även ekonomierna av USEN och det Europa handtag ut ur nedgång detta år.

Det är i denna milieu som det karibiskt och centralen Amerika vänder mot den mest stora destabilising styrkan - droghandelen och dess medfölja brotts- inklusive olagligt beväpnar att smuggla och fördelning, röveriar och utföranden.

Us-regeringen kunde göra ett jättelikt bidrag till att lösa detta enorma problem vid bortgånglagstiftning, och genomföra maskineri för att kontrollera beväpnar att smuggla; genom att granska öva av att deportera beslog grov förbrytare till deras ursprungsländer; och genom att adoptera, mäter för att stoppa laglig rea av angreppsvapen.

Det okända detta, Förenta staterna bör ta det bly- i uppläggningsamarbetskonstellationer med Europa, och Latinamerikan och det karibiskt som upprättar omfattande anti-narkotiskt preparat, programmerar som tilltalar båda tillgång och efterfrågan. Om detta inte göras, fortsätter problemet av förgifta-människohandeln och dess medfölja ska kickbrott för att besvära centralen Amerika, och det karibiskt med en ruskig destabilising verkställer på de små ekonomierna som är least kompetent att klara av.

Det mest oroande problemet för USEN i centralen Amerika och det karibiskt bör vara deras ekonomiska läge, for villkorar av ekonomisk nedgång som är bly- till social och politisk unease och ostadighet.

Det är enkelt ett faktum som, med få undantag, centralamerikanen och karibiska regeringar endera har begränsat, eller ingen kapacitet att finansiera politik för att tilltala chockar till deras ekonomier liksom verkställa av den globala nedgången för strömmen. I det karibiskt bestämt, lilla eller fattiga befolkningar inte tillräckliga besparingar för jordbruksprodukter; det finns inte nog tar fram för att kreditera, och budgetar är redan i underskott eller nätt nästan det. I dessa omständigheter har regeringar inget rum att betala för storleksanpassa av stimulusen programmerar som krävs att förbättra dessa ekonomier.

Usen kunde vara oerhört hjälpsam till dessa länder, om den ledde långt in uppmuntran landskampen, och hemispheric ekonomisk institution som ger dem med fonder på långt mindre betungande, villkorar, än dem har i förflutnan.

Som ett exempel bör USEN använda dess påverkan med andra länder som reglera världsbankenen för att vända om avläggande av examen av många av dessa länder från tar fram till koncessions- finansiering. På ögonblicket har de inte att ta fram till sådan fonder, därför att de betraktas som mellersta inkomstländer med inget hänseende för kicken kostar som deras smallness och avlägsenhet lägger på på dem.

Av kritisk betydelse är hjälp med skulden av dessa länder. Mycket av deras skuld, frånsett de, som varar skyldig Venezuela för olja som del av PetroCaribe, är reklamfilmskulden, fast deras officiella skuld är också kicken. Något försök bör göras för att hjälpa dessa länder att reschedule skuld till alla källor på en betalningintrig som bör inkludera någon förlåtelse och en realistisk återbetalningintrig.

I detta hänseende kunde IMFEN leka en viktig roll, i att ge finansiering som (a) inte anknytas nödvändigtvis sakkunniga till för länderna som' drar rätter; och (b) inte är att betvinga till det vanliga recept av att lyfta skatter, förminskande offentlig sektorutgifter; frysa timpenningar och att återbetala utländsk skuld.

Om regeringar i den industrialised världen kunde bail ut några företag och ekonomisk institution på basen att deras ekonomier inte kunde låta dessa firmor kollapsa, säkert är denna också en bas för att argumentera att kollapsen av påstår bör undvikas.

Men misstänker jag den ska regionen fortsätter för att ignoreras, och, SAD, ska den takekaos eller gravomstörtning, för det är betalad allvarlig uppmärksamhet.



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HerrnRonald slipmaskiner är en affär
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gemenskap. Reponses till:
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Рональд Sanders:

Во время этого месяца, я был приглашен поставить лекцию до 85 офицеров высок-ранжировки воинских от Europe, Северной Америки, латинской америки, Африки, Азии и Middle-East on the subject of отношения США с своими центральными американскими и карибскими соседями.











В подготовлять лекцию, комментарий на слабости Caribbean и отсутсвие емкости дать команду на проведение международного внимания хищничали на моем разуме.

Комментарий был сделан моими другом и коллегаом, Дэвид Jessop, карибского совета для Europe. В его еженедельной колонке, неделя прежде чем он сказанный это: «После того как я принята на нарицательную стоимость зона имеет очень слабую руку. Caribbean не имеет конфликты угрожают escalate в глобальные конфронтации; thankfully оно имеет ни ядерные оружия ни террорисм, ни оно имеет значительно военное присутствие или хозяйственную способность изменить глобальные финансовохозяйственные или trade подачи. Вкратце оно имеет маленькое что сделал больш, состоятельно и более влиятельные положения принимают извещение».

Будет много заслуга в замечании Jessop, и я использовал его как отправной пункт для лекции к этим seasoned воинским офицерам.

Во время холодной войны - определенно с советскими войсками и военной аппаратурой в Кубе - Caribbean был стратегически важн к США потому что много из своих требований к масла воды перехода карибские, и Caribbean был важным переходным люком для поставк США воинских к западному Europe.

Но с сбросом давления советского союза в 1991 и отступления коммунизма, Caribbean и Центральная Америка сместили вниз с полюса американских приоритетов.

Озабоченность правительства George W. Bush между 2001 и 2008 с американской запутанностью в Афганистане и Ираке причинила Центральную Америку и Caribbean, котор нужно упасть даже further away from американское внимание за исключением вопросов отнесли к наркоторговли, и противозаконное переселению.

С mid-1990s, помощь США к Caribbean и Центральная Америка dwindled, преференциальный доступ для карибских и центральных американских товаров к выветренному рынку США, и не было no longer любого давления США на Europe помочь зоне путем оплачивать льготные цен для своих бананов и сахара товаров специально.

В этом смысле, карибские и центральные американские экономии просклоняли, и их уже плохая ситуация ухудшитая в присытствыющей глобальной рецессии.

Перспективы развития мировой экономики IMF, опубликованное в апреле 2009, предлагает что латино-американские экономии заключат контракт 1.5 процентами в 2009 перед брать в 2010. Но, вероятие старта спасения много карибских экономий, которые зависят на туризме и финансовых обслуживаниях, очень маловероятно до 2011, even if экономии США и Europe pull out рецессии этот год.

Оно находится в этом milieu Caribbean и Центральная Америка смотрят на большое дестабилизируя усилие - наркоторговли и свое сопровождающее злодеяние включая противозаконные smuggling и распределение рукояток, разбойничества и исполнения.

Правительство США было в состоянии сделать преогромный вклад к разрешать эту огромную проблему путем проходить законодательство и снабжать машинное оборудование к рукояткам управления smuggling; путем рассматривать практику deporting осуженные felons к их странам происхождения; и путем устанавливать правилаа остановить законное сбывание оружий штурма.

За этим, Соединенные Штаты должны принять руководство в организовать сотруднические расположения с Europe и латинская америка и Caribbean для того чтобы установить всесторонние anti-narcotics программируют которое адресует оба спрос и предложение. Если это не сделано, то проблема снадобь-торговать и свое сопровождающее высокое злодеяния будет продолжаться plague Центральная Америка и Caribbean с ужасным дестабилизирующим влиянием на малых экономиях которые могут наиболее меньше справиться.

Тревожиться проблема для США в Центральной Америке и Caribbean должно быть их экономическим положением, потому что условия хозяйственного склонения водят к социальной и политической дискомфортности, и нестабильности.

Будет просто фактом что, с немногими исключениями, центральные американские и карибские правительства или ограничивались или никакая емкость профинансировать политики для того чтобы адресовать удары к их экономиям such as влияние в настоящее время глобальной рецессии. В Caribbean определенно, малые или плохие населенности не производят достаточно сбереженияа; не будет достаточного доступа к кредиту, и бюджети находятся уже в дефиците или мило close to он. В этих обстоятельствах, правительства не имеют никакую комнату оплатить для размера программ стимула которые необходимо, что улучшают эти экономии.

США смогли быть преогромно полезны к этим странам если они вели дорогу в ободрять международные и полушаровые финансовые институты обеспечить их с фондами на далеко более менее onerous условиях, то чем они имеют в прошлом.

Как пример, США должны использовать свое влияние с другими странами которые управляют Всемирным Банком для того чтобы обратить градацию много из этих стран от доступа к concessionary финансированию. At the moment, они не имеют доступ к таким фонды потому что они сосчитаны по мере того как средние страны дохода без отношения для высоких цен которые их теснота и дистанционность наводят на их.

критически важности помощь с задолженностью этих стран. Много из их задолженностью, отдельно от тех которые задолжают Венесуэле для масла как часть PetroCaribe, будет коммерчески задолженность, хотя их официальная задолженность также высока. Некоторое усилие должно быть сделано для того чтобы помочь этим странам reschedule задолженность к всем источникам на схеме компенсации должна включить некоторое прощение и реалистическую схему возмещения.

В этом отношении, IMF смог сыграть важную роль в обеспечивать финансирование которое (a) обязательно не соединяет к специальные права заимствования странам'; и (b) не subject to обычный рецепт вздорныа налоги, уменьшение траты общественного сечтора; замерзая зарплаты, и отплачивать внешния долги.

Если правительства в индустриализированном мире смогли заложить вне некоторые компании и финансовые институты на основание, то что их экономии не смогли позволить эти фирмы обрушиться, уверенно это будет также основа для спорить что сброс давления положений SLEDUET избежать.

Но, я подозрюю зона будет продолжаться быть проигнорированным, и, уныло, она примет беспорядок или upheaval могилы прежде чем будет paid серьезным вниманием.



caribbeannetnews


Багамы карибское Blog международное

Господином Рональд Sanders будет дело
executive и бывшие Caribbean
дипломат опубликовывает широко
на малых положениях в глобальном
община. Reponses к:
ronaldsanders29@hotmail.com
 

Door Ronald Sanders:

Tijdens deze maand, werd ik verzocht om een lezing aan 85 high-ranking militaire ambtenaren van Europa, Noord-Amerika, Latijns Amerika, Afrika, Azië en het Midden-Oosten voor wat betreft de relaties van de V.S. met zijn buren Van Centraal-Amerika te leveren en Caraïbische.











Bij het voorbereiden van de lezing, preyed een commentaar op de zwakheid van de Caraïben en het gebrek aan capaciteit om internationale aandacht te bevelen op mijn mening.

De commentaar werd gemaakt door mijn vriend en collega, David Jessop, van de Caraïbische Raad voor Europa. In zijn wekelijkse kolom, de week alvorens hij dit zei: „Genomen bij gezichtswaarde heeft het gebied een zeer zwakke hand. De Caraïben hebben geen conflicten die om in globale confrontaties dreigen te stijgen; thankfully heeft het noch kernwapens noch terrorisme, noch heeft het een significante militaire aanwezigheid of de economische capaciteit om globale financiële of handelsstromen te veranderen. In het kort heeft het weinig die groter zou maken, rijker en de invloedrijkere staten nemen bericht“.

Er is veel verdienste in de observatie van Jessop, en ik gebruikte het als punt van vertrek voor de lezing aan deze gekruide militaire ambtenaren.

Tijdens de Koude oorlog - in het bijzonder met Sovjettroepen en militaire hardware in Cuba - de Caraïben waren strategisch belangrijk voor de V.S. omdat veel van zijn olievereisten Caraïbische wateren moest doortrekken, en de Caraïben waren een belangrijke gang voor de militaire levering van de V.S. aan Westelijk Europa.

Maar met de instorting van de Sowjetunie in 1991 en de terugtocht van communisme, gleden de Caraïben en Midden-Amerika onderaan de pool van Amerikaanse prioriteiten uit.

De zorg van de overheid van George W Bush tussen 2001 en 2008 met Amerikaanse betrokkenheid in Afghanistan en Irak veroorzaakte Midden-Amerika en de Caraïben om zelfs verder weg van Amerikaanse aandacht behalve kwesties met betrekking tot drugshandel, en onwettige migratie te vallen.

Sinds de medio-jaren '90, nam de hulp van de V.S. aan de Caraïben en Midden-Amerika af, preferentiële toegang voor Caraïbische en Van Centraal-Amerika goederen tot de geërodeerdee markt van de V.S., en er was niet meer om het even welke druk door de V.S. op Europa om het gebied te helpen door preferentiële prijzen voor zijn goederen vooral bananen en suiker te betalen.

In deze context, daalden de Caraïbische en Van Centraal-Amerika economieën, en hun reeds slechte situatie verergerde in de huidige globale recessie.

De economische Vooruitzichten van de Wereld van het IMF, die in April 2009 worden gepubliceerd, stellen voor dat de Latijns-Amerikaanse economieën door 1.5 percenten in 2009 alvorens in 2010 terug te krijgen zullen aangaan. Maar de waarschijnlijkheid van een begin van terugwinning door vele Caraïbische economieën, die van toerisme en de financiële diensten afhankelijk zijn, is zeer onwaarschijnlijk tot 2011, zelfs als de economieën van de V.S. en Europa zich van recessie dit jaar terugtrekken.

Het is in dit milieu dat de Caraïben en Midden-Amerika de grootste destabiliseren kracht - drugshandel en zijn begeleidende misdaad met inbegrip van het onwettige wapens smokkelen en distributie, diefstallen en uitvoeringen onder ogen zien.

De overheid van de V.S. kon een enorme bijdrage leveren tot het oplossen van dit reusachtige probleem door de wetgeving over te gaan en machines uit te voeren aan controlewapens het smokkelen; door de praktijk te herzien van het deporteren van veroordeelde misdadigers aan hun landen van herkomst; en door maatregelen goed te keuren om wettelijke verkoop van aanvalswapens tegen te houden.

Voorbij dit, zouden de Verenigde Staten het lood moeten nemen in het organiseren van samenwerkingsregelingen met Europa en Latijns Amerika en de Caraïben om een uitvoerig anti-narcotics programma te vestigen dat zowel levering als de vraag richt. Als dit niet wordt gedaan, zal het probleem van drughandel en zijn begeleidende hoge misdaad Midden-Amerika en de Caraïben met een vreselijk destabiliseren effect op de kleine economieën blijven teisteren die meest minst kunnen het hoofd bieden.

Het meest ongerust makende probleem voor de V.S. in Midden-Amerika en de Caraïben zou hun economische situatie moeten zijn, want de voorwaarden van economische daling tot sociale en politieke ongerustheid, en instabiliteit leiden.

Het is eenvoudig een feit dat, met weinig uitzonderingen, overheden Van Centraal-Amerika en de Caraïbische of of geen capaciteit hebben beperkt om beleid te financieren om schokken aan hun economieën zoals het effect van de huidige globale recessie te richten. In de Caraïben in het bijzonder, veroorzaken de kleine of slechte bevolkingsaantallen geen voldoende besparingen; er is niet genoeg toegang tot krediet, en de begrotingen zijn reeds in tekort of mooi dicht bij het. In deze omstandigheden, hebben de overheden geen ruimte om voor de grootte van stimulusprogramma's te betalen die worden vereist om deze economieën te verbeteren.

De V.S. zouden enorm nuttig aan deze landen kunnen zijn als het de manier in het aanmoedigen van de internationale en hemispheric financiële instellingen om hen van fondsen op veel minder zware voorwaarden leidde te voorzien dan zij in het verleden hebben.

Als voorbeeld, zouden de V.S. zijn invloed met andere landen moeten gebruiken die de Wereldbank regeren om de graduatie van veel van deze landen van toegang om te keren tot concessionaire financiering. Op het ogenblik, hebben zij geen toegang tot dergelijke fondsen omdat zij als landen met een gemiddeld inkomen zonder achting voor de hoge kosten worden beschouwd die hun kleinheid en ver verwijderd zijn aan hen opleggen.

Van kritiek belang is de hulp met de schuld van deze landen. Veel van hun schuld, behalve zij die Venezuela voor olie als deel van PetroCaribe verschuldigd zijn, is commerciële schuld, hoewel hun officiële schuld ook hoog is. Één of andere inspanning zou moeten worden geleverd om deze landen te helpen om schuld aan alle bronnen opnieuw te programmeren over een betalingsregeling die wat vergiffenis en een realistische terugbetalingsregeling zou moeten omvatten.

In dit verband, kon het IMF een belangrijke rol spelen in het verstrekken van financiering dat (a) niet noodzakelijk verbonden met de landen' Bijzondere trekkingsrechten is; en (b) is niet onderworpen aan het gebruikelijke voorschrift van het opheffen van belastingen, die openbare sector het besteden verminderen; bevriezende lonen, en het terugbetalen van buitenlandse schuld.

Als de overheden in de geïndustrialiseerdee wereld sommige bedrijven en financiële instellingen op de basis konden opkopen dat hun economieën niet deze firma's konden toestaan om in te storten, zeker is dit ook een basis om te stellen dat de instorting van staten zou moeten worden vermeden.

Maar ik verdenk het gebied zal blijven worden genegeerd, en, droevig, het chaos of ernstige omwenteling zal nemen alvorens het ernstige aandacht wordt besteed.



caribbeannetnews


De Bahamas Caraïbische Internationale Blog

De heer Ronald Sanders is zaken
de uitvoerende en vroegere Caraïben
diplomaat die wijd publiceert
op kleine staten in globaal
gemeenschap. Reponses aan:
ronaldsanders29@hotmail.com
 

ب [رونلد] [سندرس]:

أثناء هذا شهر, دعات أنا كان أن يسلّم محاضرة إلى 85 [هيغ-رنكينغ] ضابطات عسكريّة من أوروبا, [نورث مريك], [لتين مريك], إفريقيا, آسيا [ميدّل-ست] [أن ث سوبجكت وف] [أوس] علاقات مع ه مركزية أمريكيّة وجار [كريبّن].











في يعدّ المحاضرة, افترس تعليق على [كريبّن] حالة ضعف وافتقار القدرة أن يأمر إنتباه دوليّة على عقلي.

جعلت التعليق كان ب ي صديقة وزميلة, دايفيد [جسّوب], من المجلس [كريبّن] لأوروبا. في عموده أسبوعيّة, الأسبوع قبل أن هو يقول هذا: "يأخذ في [فس فلو] يتلقّى المنطقة يد ضعيفة جدّا. لا يتلقّى [كريبّن] نزاعات أنّ يهدّد أن يصعد داخل مواجهة شاملة; [ثنكفولّي] يتلقّى هو لا سلاح نوويّ ولا إرهاب, ولا هو يتلقّى وجود هامّة عسكريّة أو القدرة اقتصاديّة أن يغيّر شاملة ماليّة أو دفقات تجاريّة. في قصيرة يتلقّى هو بعض أنّ جعل كبير, غنيّة وأكثر دول مؤثّرة يأخذون إشعار".

هناك كثير إستحقاق في [جسّوب] بطاقة, واستعمل أنا هو ك [بوينت وف دبرتثر] للمحاضرة إلى هذا يمهر ضابطات عسكريّة.

أثناء الحرب باردة - بشكل خاصّ مع قوات سوفييتيّة وجهاز عسكريّة في كوبا - كان [كريبّن] استراتيجيّا مهمّة إلى ال [أوس] لأنّ كثير من ه زيت متطلبات اضطرّ عمليّة عبور مياه [كريبّن], [كريبّن] كان ممر مهمّة ل [أوس] إمداد تموين عسكريّة إلى [وسترن يوروب].

غير أنّ مع الانهيار من [سفيت ونيون] في 1991 والإنسحاب الشيوعيّة, ال انزلق [كريبّن] و [سنترل مريك] نزولا إلى العمود من أولويات أمريكيّة.

سبّب الانهماك من الحكومة جورج ث بوش بين 2001 و2008 مع تورط أمريكيّة في أفغانستان والعراق [سنترل مريك] [كريبّن] أن يسقط حتّى [فورثر وي فروم] إنتباه أمريكيّة باستثناء إصدارات ارتبط إلى عقار [ترفّيك], وهجرة غير شرعيّ.

منذ المنتصف التسعينات, [أوس] تضاءل معونة إلى [كريبّن] و [سنترل مريك], منفذة تفضيليّة ل [كريبّن] وبضائع مركزية أمريكيّة إلى ال [أوس] سوق يحتّ, وهناك كان [نو لونجر] أيّ ضغطة ب ال [أوس] على أوروبا أن يساعد المنطقة ب يدفع [برفرنتيل بريس] ل ه بضائع خصوصا موز وسكر.

في هذا سياق, [كريبّن] وانخفض اقتصادات مركزية أمريكيّة, وحالتهم سيّئة سابقا يتأزّم في الفترة ركود حاضرة شاملة.

الصندوق النقد الدوليّ عالم يقترح دلائل مستقبليّة اقتصاديّة, ينشر في أبريل - نيسان 2009, أنّ اقتصادات [لتين-مريكن] سيتعاقدون ب 1.5 نسبة مئويّة في 2009 قبل يستردّ في 2010. غير أنّ, الاحتماليّة من بداية الإستعادة ب كثير اقتصادات [كريبّن], أيّ يكون متدلّية على سياحة و [فيننسل سرفيس], جدّا بعيد احتمال حتّى 2011, [إفن يف] الاقتصادات من ال [أوس] وأوروبا يقتلعون من فترة ركود هذا سنة.

هو في هذا وسط أنّ [كريبّن] و [سنترل مريك] يواجه العظيمة يفقد قوة - عقار [ترفّيك] وجريمته حاضرة بما في ذلك غير شرعيّ [أرمس] يهرّب وتوزيع, سرقات وتنفيذات.

ال [أوس] حكومة استطاع جعلت مساهمة ضخمة إلى يحلّ هذا مشكلة ضخمة ب يمرّ تشريع ويطبّق معدّ آليّ إلى [كنترول رمس] يهرّب; ب يراجع الممارسة من يرحّل يحكم مجرمات إلى [كونتري وف وريجن] هم; وب يتبنّى إجراءات أن يتوقّف جائز عمليّة بيع من هجوم أسلحة.

إلى ما بعد هذا, الولايات المتّحدة الأمريكيّة سوفت أخذت الرصاص في ينظّم ترتيبات تعاونيّة مع أوروبا ويبرمج [لتين مريك] [كريبّن] أن يؤسّس [أنتي-نركتيكس] شاملة أنّ يخاطب على حدّ سواء إمداد تموين وطلب. إن هذا يكون لا يتمّ, سيستمرّ المشكلة من [دروغ-ترفّيكينغ] وجريمته حاضرة عال أن يزعج [سنترل مريك] [كريبّن] مع رهيبة يفقد تأثير على الاقتصادات صغيرة أنّ يكون على الأقلّ يمكن أن يواجه.

ال أكثر يقلق مشكلة ل ال [أوس] في [سنترل مريك] [كريبّن] سوفت كنت [إكنوميك ستثأيشن] هم, لأنّ يقود شروط من انحدار اقتصاديّة إلى اجتماعيّة وقلق سياسيّة, وحالة عدم إستقرار.

هو ببساطة حقيقة أنّ, مع قليل من استثناء, مركزية أمريكيّة ويحدّد حكومات [كريبّن] يتلقّى إمّا أو ما من قدرة أن يموّل سياسات أن يخاطب صدمات إلى اقتصاداتهم مثل التأثير من الفترة ركود حاليّة شاملة. في [كريبّن] بشكل خاصّ, صغيرة أو لا ينتج السّكان فقيرة توفيرات كاف; هناك ليس بما فيه الكفاية منفذة إلى اعتماد, وميزانيات سابقا في عجز أو جميلة [كلوس تو] هو. في هذا ظروف, يتلقّى حكومات ما من غرفة أن يدفع للحجم من منبه برامج أنّ يكون تطلّبت أن يحسن هذا اقتصادات.

ال [أوس] استطاع كنت بجسامة مفيدة إلى هذا بلد إن هو قاد الطريق في مشجّع الدوليّة ومنظمة مالية [هميسفريك] أن يزوّدهم مع أموال على شروط شاقّة بعيدا أقلّ من هم يتلقّى في الماض.

كمثال, ال [أوس] سوفت استعملت تأثيره مع أخرى بلاد الذي يحكم ال [وورلد بنك] أن يعكس التدرج من كثير من هذا بلاد من منفذة إلى تمويل امتيازيّ. [أت ث مومنت], لا يتلقّى هم منفذة إلى مثل هذا أموال لأنّ هم يكون اعتبرت بما أنّ متوسّطة دخل بلاد بلا إحترام للتكاليف عال أيّ هم [سملّنسّ] وبعد يفرض على هم.

من أهمية حرجة مساعدة مع الدين من هذا بلاد. كثير من دينهم, [أبرت فروم] أنّ الذي يستدين فنزويلا لزيت كجزء [بتروكريب], [كمّرسل دبت] [, ثوو] دينهم رسميّة يكون أيضا عال. بعض جهد سوفت كنت جعلت أن يساعد هذا بلاد أن يدرج دين إلى كلّ مصادر على دفع خطة أنّ سوفت تضمّنت بعض مغفرة وواقعيّة تعويض خطة.

في هذا إحترام, الصندوق النقد الدوليّ استطاع لعبت دور مهمّة في يزوّد تمويل أنّ اقترنت [()] لا بالضّرورة إلى البلاد' خاصّة يسحب حقوق; وليس [(ب)] [سوبجكت تو] الوصف معتادة من يرفع ضرائب, يقلّد القطاع العامّ إنفاق; يجمّد أجور, ويسدّد [فورين دبت].

إن حكومات في ال يصنع عالم استطاع كفلت خارجا بعض شركات ومنظمة مالية على الأساس أنّ اقتصاداتهم استطاع لم يسمح هذا شركات أن ينهار, بالتّأكيد هذا أيضا أساس ل يجادل أنّ الانهيار الدول سوفت كنت تفاديت.

غير أنّ, يشكّ أنا المنطقة سيستمرّ أن يكون تجاهلت, و, بحزن, هو سيأخذ حالة فوضى أو قبر إنقلاب قبل أن هو إنتباه بمقابل جدّيّة.



[كريبّنّتنوس]


باهاماس [بلوغ] [كريبّن] دوليّة

سيد [رونلد] [سندرس] عمل
تنفيذيّة و [كريبّن] سابقة
ديبلوماسيّة الذي ينشر على نحو واسع
على دول صغيرة في الشاملة
جماعة. [ربونسس] إلى:
[رونلدسندرس29هوتميل.كم]
 

September 18, 2009 | 1:12 PM Comments  {num} comments



Washington's double standard on Cuba
Related to country: Cuba

Translations available in: English (original) | French | Spanish | Italian | German | Portuguese | Swedish | Russian | Dutch | Arabic


By Brandon Bloch
COHA Research Associate

The recent lifting of Cuba’s suspension from membership in the Organization of American States indicates that Washington’s domination of the Inter-American system has passed. The preconditions set by the OAS for Cuba’s readmission were far weaker than those Secretary of State Hillary Clinton originally had demanded, demonstrating the power of regional consensus among Latin American leaders, which marked their initial step away from the repudiated policies of the Obama administration.

The controversy surrounding the readmission of Cuba to the OAS also shows that Havana will be the most critical point of contention amidst hopes for improved US-Latin America ties. If the new administration decides to rapidly move toward normalized relations with Cuba, it will vastly improve the US’s standing in the region; but if Washington insists on maintaining the traditional hostilities it has for decades fielded against Havana, it will almost certainly find itself politically isolated among the increasingly autonomous and frequently left-leaning Latin American states.

Consistently apparent in Washington’s policy toward Cuba is its lietmotif of holding irrational double standards: the US habitually acts toward the island nation with spite and reflexive antagonism, in a manner inconsistent with US policies toward more formidable and economically powerful, although even more nondemocratic, states than Cuba. This attitude is clearly manifested in Cuba’s continued inclusion on the State Department’s annual list of “State Sponsors of Terrorism.” This is an amorphous indictment against the Castro government grounded in Washington’s habitual acquiescence to the anti-Castro lobby run from Miami. The State Department’s failure to remove Cuba from its most recently compiled list of “terrorism” sponsors marks yet another sign of the inconsistencies and false starts being displayed by the Obama administration’s recent Cuba initiatives. It must be judged as a serious setback to the possible future normalization of relations between the two ancient foes.

Cuba has remained on the State Department’s terrorism blacklist since March 1, 1982, when it was added at a time of allegations that the Castro regime had been funding and training armed revolutionaries throughout Latin America and Africa. However, in 1992 after the collapse of the Soviet Union, Fidel Castro renounced his government’s previous policy of supporting terrorist organizations. Since that time, Cuba is not known to have provided financial or logistical support to any such groups, which makes it inexcusable that Cuba remains hostilely branded by Washington, especially in light of the recent removals of Libya and North Korea from the terrorism list. Despite the serious problems posed by the Cuban government’s suppression of democratic freedoms, Cuba cannot convincibly be compared to Iran or Syria as an alleged terrorist-backing state, or, for that matter, also China, Lybia and North Korea.

The Case for Cuba’s Inclusion: a Self-Defeating Argument
Each year by April 30, the State Department is mandated to present to Congress a thorough report on the terrorist activities that have occurred throughout the world, with several paragraphs devoted to each country designated a State Sponsor of Terrorism. The following description was given of Cuba in the “Country Reports on Terrorism 2008”:

Although Cuba no longer actively supports armed struggle in Latin America and other parts of the world, the Cuban government continued to provide safe haven to several terrorists. Members of ETA, the FARC, and the ELN remained in Cuba during 2008, some having arrived in Cuba in connection with peace negotiations with the governments of Spain and Colombia. Cuban authorities continued to publicly defend the FARC. However, on July 6, 2008, former Cuban President Fidel Castro called on the FARC to release the hostages they were holding without preconditions. He has also condemned the FARC’s mistreatment of captives and of their abduction of civilian politicians who had no role in the armed conflict.

The United States has no evidence of terrorist-related money laundering or terrorist financing activities in Cuba, although Cuba has one of the world’s most secretive and non-transparent national banking systems. Cuba has no financial intelligence unit. Cuba’s Law 93 Against Acts of Terrorism provides the government authority to track, block, or seize terrorist assets.

The Cuban government continued to permit some US fugitives—including members of US militant groups such as the Boricua Popular, or Macheteros, and the Black Liberation Army to live legally in Cuba. In keeping with its public declaration, the government has not provided safe haven to any new US fugitives wanted for terrorism since 2006.

Ironically, this very explanation precisely explains why Cuba should not be listed as a State Sponsor of Terrorism. The first sentence states that Cuba no longer “actively” supports terrorism, a clear contradiction to the State Department’s contention that countries on the list “have repeatedly provided support for acts of international terrorism.” The contention that Cuba’s banking system is “secret and non-transparent” does little to call into question the reality that the US intelligence agencies have not produced a single piece of credible evidence proving that Cuba is financing terrorists.

In fact, there is ample evidence that the Cuban government has taken significant measures against terrorism. Law 93, enacted in December 2001, provides a legal basis for Cuba’s counterterrorism policy, and although not stated in this report, Cuba is a signatory to all twelve of the UN conventions and protocols against terrorism. The State Department’s allegations that Cuba “continued to publicly defend” the Colombian terrorist network FARC do not hold up against Fidel Castro’s State Department-acknowledged public rebuke of its tactics. Additionally, in 2005, Fidel Castro declared to end his practice of offering refuge to fugitives of US justice, including fugitives wanted for terrorism, representing a clear shift from Cuba’s Cold War policies. In September 2006, the Cuban government upheld Castro’s declaration by deporting an American man who had kidnapped his son and flown him to Cuba, the only recent case in which a US fugitive has sought safe haven in Cuba.

One of the State Department’s principal arguments in the report is that because Cuba “continued to provide a safe haven” to Colombian and Basque terrorists, it is a “State Sponsor of Terrorism.” This claim at first did not appear in the draft that the relevant State Department agency sent to Congress for its preliminary review by the legislative body. After Miami-area members of Congress had furiously reacted to the State Department’s actions in not listing Cuba as a State Sponsor of Terrorism, the review was hastily recalled by the State Department, where it bowed to the House. The State Department took this action even though the Basque and Colombian terrorists had been given refuge on Cuban territory at the request of the Spanish and Colombian governments respectively, in order to expedite a pending hostage release that they requested on humanitarian grounds. However, while nobody denies that there are members of foreign terrorist organizations living in Cuba, a remnant of Cuba’s previous involvement in occasionally arming international revolutionaries, there has been no credible evidence for years that Cuba currently supports or condones the activities of these groups. These ex-guerrillas certainly are not known to conduct terrorist activities or launch terrorist attacks out of Cuba, and in fact, as the State Department report states that in fear, some “have arrived in Cuba in connection with peace negotiations.” In 2002 and 2003, the government of Colombia publicly announced that peace negotiations were being held with the ELN rebel group in Cuba, and it sought the “continued mediation” of Cuba in these talks. Colombia, Cuba, and the UN have recognized six rounds of negotiations with the rebels since 2005. Moreover, the Council on Foreign Relations reports that the FARC and ELN have a presence in many capitals throughout Europe and Latin America. Thus, the presence of such guerrillas in Cuba cannot be used to constitute Cuba as a supporter of international terrorism.

The other common argument for Cuba being posted on the state terrorism list, persistently reiterated over the past decade, is the government’s providing hospitality for an estimated 70 fugitives of US justice, some connected with US-based terrorist organizations. In particular, the Cuban government provides refuge to Joanne Chesimard, who was a member of the Black Liberation Army wanted for the 1973 murder of a New Jersey State Trooper and viewed as notorious by US authorities. She is among other wanted fugitives connected to Black and Puerto Rican liberation movements. Cuba has refused the vast majority of US requests that these fugitives be turned over, on the grounds that “political” fugitives would not receive a fair trial in the US.

However, in most of these situations, to use the above cases as arguments for Cuba’s designation as a terrorist state would be seen by some as reeking with hypocrisy. The US is itself holding several fugitives of Cuban justice, most significantly Luis Posada Carriles, an anti-Castro terrorist implicated in the bombing of a Cubana Airlines plane in 1976, as well as a series of 1997 bombings in Havana, and an assassination attempt on Fidel Castro in 2000. Washington has refused repeated Cuban and Venezuelan requests for the extradition of Posada Carriles, claiming that he would face torture in these countries, despite assurances otherwise. The Posada Carriles case strikingly contradicts Washington’s usual anti-terrorism stance and appears to violate UN Security Council Resolution 1373, a product of the US War on Terror, which states that “claims of political motivation” cannot be used as grounds for “refusing the extradition requests of alleged terrorists.” The US also has refused to extradite Orlando Bosch, another terrorist accused of masterminding the 1976 Cuban aircraft bombing.

In response to Washington’s demands for the release of the US fugitives, the Cuban government demands the release of five alleged Cuban spies currently imprisoned in the US and whose punishments have been deemed by a number of human rights groups as excessively harsh, who were the victims of significant bias during their heavily politicized trial. This situation was exacerbated in June, when the Supreme Court declined to review the decision of a federal appeals court that had upheld the initial trial in Miami as fair. Thus, Cuba’s retention of US fugitives is a result of the reciprocal hostilities between the two governments, and does not necessarily indicate that Cuba supports international terrorism. Moreover, Mexico and El Salvador are both known to be holding several fugitives of US justice. In January 2004, the Washington Times reported the cases of several Mexicans wanted for violent crimes committed in the Southwestern US, stating that Mexico City authorities have refused US requests for the extradition of these suspects. Such evidence adds to the hypocrisy of Cuba’s unique designation as a terrorist state.

Significantly, the most bellicose language employed against Cuba in previous State Department reports has been removed from this year’s Country Reports on Terrorism. Under the Bush administration, the State Department, using ritualized rhetoric, repeatedly accused Cuba of refusing to cooperate with the US-led War on Terror. While the State Department would use these examples as primary evidence that Cuba was a State Sponsor of Terrorism, this is in fact an entirely spurious conclusion. Cuba could not have been expected to forthrightly back Washington’s counterterrorism initiatives, given the legacy of enmity between these countries and Washington’s perennial attempts to destabilize the Cuban government. President Bush’s assumption that every country in the world must support the American-led response to terrorism, and that not to do so by following its model, necessarily determines whether a country should be considered a terrorist state, points to an extremely arrogant stance that fortunately has been somewhat mitigated by the Obama Administration. The Miami Herald noted that the Obama administration, by removing the most outlandish of the allegations from the Bush era, may have taken a definitive step leading to the removal of Cuba from the list altogether.

North Korea and Libya: The Terrorism List as Political Lever
Ultimately, the list of “State Sponsors of Terrorism” is often employed by Washington as a political lever, a carrot or a stick to be used on a country that abjectly follows or definitely renounces US policies, and not as a legitimate measure of a country’s attitude toward international terrorism. This becomes most clear in the case of North Korea, a country that unlike Cuba, is actually likely to be sponsoring terrorism. North Korea was removed from the list of State Sponsors in October 2008, after the government of Kim Jong Il agreed to continue the disabling of its plutonium processing plant at Yongbyon and to allow for limited inspections of its nuclear facilities. In this case, pure expedience was at works.

The removal of North Korea was little more than a purely political act, the product of a desire to demonstrate results of the Six-Party talks that had sought an end to the country’s nuclear program since 2003 and a blundered attempt to placate a real security threat. In June 2008, after the US first announced North Korea’s removal from the terrorism list and proposed a strict system of inspection of its nuclear facilities, Kim immediately reversed himself by threatening to resume his nuclear program. Only when the US backed down and proposed more limited inspections did Kim agree and his government was removed from the State Sponsors list. Such use of the terrorism list as a political device by the State Department under Secretary of State Rice and the White House’s National Security Council, ignores the very definition of terrorism on which it is ostensibly based. Whether or not North Korea is processing plutonium does not necessarily provide convincing proof, nor has much to do, with whether or not it is arming international terrorist groups.

It is particularly ironic, then, that despite the removal of North Korea from the US list, over the past years there have been continual allegations of North Korea’s support of terrorist networks. French, Japanese, and South Korean newspapers and the Israeli foreign intelligence service have alleged evidence that Kim’s regime is actively involved in the arming and training of Hizballah in Lebanon; the Japan media and the foreign intelligence service in Bangkok found that North Korea has armed the Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka. Both of these groups have been designated Foreign Terrorist Organizations by the US Such reports seriously undermine the claim of the State Department that North Korea has “not sponsored any terrorist act” since 1987, which was sustained by the Rice State Department to push forward with its nuclear disarmament programs despite the putative evidence otherwise. The notion that North Korea is no longer designated as a State Sponsor of Terrorism, while Cuba remains on the list, is absurd.

The case of Libya further highlights the use of Washington’s State Sponsors list as a political tool. The Libyan government was linked to various terrorist attacks in the 1980s and did not conform to the US counterterrorism standards until 2003, when the Libyan head of state Muammar al-Gaddafi agreed to allow United Nations inspectors to oversee the dismantling of Libya’s nuclear weapons program and accepted legal responsibility for the 1986 bombing of a Pan Am flight over Lockerbie. His reward for cooperation was Libya’s removal from the State Sponsors of Terrorism list in May 2006 and the normalization of diplomatic and trade relations.

When Libya opened its arms to the West and endorsed Washington’s unilateral counterterrorism policies, it received a prize; when Cuba fails to do so, it remains blacklisted. Yet despite this, Cuba certainly is no more a terrorist state than Libya. While Libya renounced its former policies in 2003, Cuba renounced its support of terrorist revolutionaries in 1992, and has not been shown to fund them since. Although the anti-Castro lobby alleges that the Cuban government is backing the training of guerillas in Venezuela, neither the State Department nor the intelligence community has produced evidence to back these contentions. In fact, demonstrably, Cuba poses far less a threat to the international security than does Libya, considering the continued presence of al-Qa’ida and other terrorist groups in Libya, despite al-Gaddafi’s current willingness to play into Washington’s hands.

Cuba, Iran, and Syria
Cuba’s designation as a state sponsor of terror becomes further discredited when Cuba is compared to two of its counterparts on the list, Iran and Syria, both of which are verifiable terrorist states. Iran is designated on the State Sponsors list primarily due to the functions of the Qods Force of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Group, a branch of the Iranian military, which has financed and trained Hamas, Hizballah, the Islamic Jihad, as well as radical militants in Iraq. Iran’s government is also holding members of al-Qa’ida, whom it refuses to identify or put on trial.

According to the State Department, Syria “provided political and military support to Hizballah” and its President Bashar al-Assad openly “expressed support” for many Palestinian militant groups. Several groups designated as Foreign Terrorist Organizations actively operate and train militants on Syrian territory, often with the tacit approval of the Syrian government. These allegations are not easily debunked as is the State Department’s far less evidenced language against Cuba.

Cuba’s inclusion on the terrorism list has often been justified by other countries on the State Sponsors list. In particular, the anti-Cuban lobby cites Fidel Castro’s May 2001 visit to Iran, Syria, and Libya as evidence that his government backs terrorism, often recalling Castro’s reported comment to Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khameini: “Iran and Cuba, in cooperation with each other, can bring America to its knees. The U.S. regime is very weak, and we are witnessing this weakness from close up.”

Given the entrenched hostilities between the US and Cuba, it is no surprise that Castro would find an ideological ally in the Islamic Republic, also a government born out of a revolution against an American client state. But there is no evidence that Castro’s rhetoric has materialized into cooperation in backing terrorists. While Cuba and Iran signed a banking agreement in early 2006, which facilitated trade between the two nations and provided for increased economic and scientific cooperation in the future, the US has not been able to prove that this agreement went beyond what it was publicly stated to be. Significantly, Cuban-Iranian relations have not been mentioned in the Country Reports on Terrorism for the past three years, a sign that Cuba cannot be deemed a terrorist state solely on the basis of association.

Conclusions: Moving Forward
As with many other aspects of US-Cuba relations, the Obama administration has so far not enacted the significant policy shifts hoped for by supporters of a rational and respectful approach to Latin America. When Hillary Clinton was questioned by Senator Richard Lugar during her confirmation hearings as to Cuba’s placement on the terrorism list, her vague response suggested the potential for change: “We anticipate a review of US policy regarding Cuba and look forward to working with members of the Committee and other members of Congress as we move forward to the consideration of appropriate steps to take to help advance US interests and values in the context of relations with Cuba.” But clearly her State Department has failed to produce an objective review and, at least up to now, instead has succumbed to the demands of the anti-Castro lobby which, despite fifty years of proof that isolation will not bring about democracy in Cuba, continues to put forth its same confrontational tactics.

The terrorism list is more than a symbol of an anachronistic policy; in an era when the lifting of the trade embargo appears to be a real possibility, Cuba’s designation as a terrorist state has practical implications for the potential extent of trade between the two nations. As it stands, even if the embargo were lifted, there would still exist significant impediments to full bilateral trade and other links between the two countries. The US would be forced to deny tax-free treatment of imported goods coming from Cuba; US citizens wanting to trade with Cuba would first need to seek a license from the Treasury Department; and the US would be forced to oppose any World Bank or IMF loans to the country. These stipulations of the US laws and regulations, under which Cuba is considered a terrorist state, would stall the country’s economic development and the growth of meaningful US-Cuba trading relations.

However, the removal of Cuba from the list of State Sponsors of Terrorism would be a simple procedure: President Obama would only have to present Congress with a statement at least 45 days before the proposed removal, ascertaining that Cuba has not supported international terrorism in the past six months and that it has pledged not to do so in the future. There are two precedents in recent years for the use of such Presidential authority and no precedents for Congress to block a President’s decision.

Such a move would signal the reprioritization of consistency and rationality in Cuba policy over domestic political jockeying. This is a clear sign to the likes of sharply tongued ideologues such as South Florida Reps. Ileana Ros-Lehtinen and Lincoln Diaz-Balart that the administration will no longer allow their ad hoc sense of history to prevent the US from improving its relations with Cuba. Moreover, this action would mark a decisive step toward the full normalization of relations with Cuba, a sign of goodwill to governments throughout Latin America that would have no negative impact on the security of the United States, yet prompt a surge of amity. The removal of Cuba from the list of State Sponsors of Terror is a matter of simple consistency, honesty, and integrity: these are the values Obama vowed to bring to policymaking during his campaign, and Latin Americans as well as North Americans are waiting to see if he will live up to his promises.



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The Council on Hemispheric Affairs, founded in 1975, is an independent, non-profit, non-partisan, tax-exempt research and information organization. It has been described on the Senate floor as being “one of the nation’s most respected bodies of scholars and policy makers.” For more information, visit www.coha.org




Par Brandon Bloch
Associé de recherches de COHA

La levée récente de la suspension du Cuba de l'adhésion dans l'organisation des états américains indique que la domination de Washington du système Inter-Américain a passé. Les conditions préalables réglées par les OAS pour la réadmission du Cuba étaient bien plus faibles que ces le secrétaire d'état Hillary Clinton à l'origine avait exigé, démontrant la puissance du consensus régional parmi les chefs latino-américains, qui ont marqué leur mesure initiale loin des politiques niées de l'administration d'Obama.

La polémique entourant la réadmission du Cuba aux OAS prouve également que La Havane sera le point le plus critique de controverse parmi des espoirs pour les cravates Nous-Latines améliorées de l'Amérique. Si la nouvelle administration décide de se déplacer rapidement vers des relations normales avec le Cuba, il améliorera énormément la position des USA dans la région ; mais si Washington insiste pour maintenir les hostilités traditionnelles qu'il a pendant des décennies fielded contre La Havane, il se trouvera presque certainement politiquement d'isolement parmi les états latino-américains de plus en plus autonomes et gauche-se penchants fréquemment.

Uniformément évident dans la politique de Washington vers le Cuba est son lietmotif de tenir de doubles normes irrationnelles : les USA agissent habituellement vers la nation d'île avec le dépit et l'antagonisme réfléchi, en quelque sorte contradictoires avec des politiques des USA vers plus formidable et économiquement puissant, bien que bien plus nondemocratic, des états que le Cuba. Cette attitude est clairement manifestée dans l'inclusion continue du Cuba sur la liste annuelle du département d'état de « commanditaires d'état de terrorisme. » C'est un acte d'accusation amorphe contre le gouvernement de Castro fondé dans le consentement habituel de Washington à l'entrée d'anti-Castro courue de Miami. Le manque du département d'état d'enlever le Cuba de sa liste le plus récemment compilée de commanditaires de « terrorisme » marque encore un autre signe des contradictions et des débuts faux montré par les initiatives récentes du Cuba de l'administration d'Obama. Il doit être jugé comme recul sérieux à la future normalisation possible des relations entre les deux ennemis antiques.

Le Cuba a resté allumé la liste noire du terrorisme du département d'état depuis le 1er mars 1982, quand on l'a ajouté à la fois des allégations que le régime de Castro avait été plaçant et formant les révolutionnaires armés dans l'ensemble de l'Amérique latine et de l'Afrique. Cependant, en 1992 après que l'effondrement de l'Union Soviétique, Fidel Castro ait renoncé à la politique précédente de son gouvernement des organismes de support de terroriste. Depuis cette époque, le Cuba n'est pas connu pour avoir un appui financier ou logistique fourni à des tels groupes, qui le rend inexcusable que des restes du Cuba hostilement marqués par Washington, particulièrement à la lumière des déplacements récents de la Libye et de la Corée du Nord de la liste de terrorisme. En dépit des problèmes sérieux a posé par la suppression du gouvernement cubain des libertés démocratiques, le Cuba ne peut pas convincibly être comparé à l'Iran ou à la Syrie comme état allégué de terroriste-support, ou, pour à ces matière, aussi Chine, Libye et Corée du Nord.

La caisse pour l'inclusion du Cuba : un argument de Individu-Défaite
Tous les ans pour le 30 avril, le département d'état est exigé pour présenter au congrès un rapport complet sur les activités de terroriste qui se sont produites dans le monde entier, avec plusieurs paragraphes consacrés à chaque pays indiqué un commanditaire d'état de terrorisme. La description qui suit a été donnée du Cuba dans les « rapports de pays sur le terrorisme 2008 » :

Bien que les appuis du Cuba plus activement n'aient armé la lutte en Amérique latine et d'autres régions du monde, le gouvernement cubain a continué à fournir l'asile sûr à plusieurs terroristes. Les membres de l'ETA, du FARC, et de l'ELN sont demeurés au Cuba pendant 2008, certains étant arrivé au Cuba en liaison avec des négociations de paix avec les gouvernements de l'Espagne et en Colombie. Autorités cubaines continuées pour défendre publiquement le FARC. Cependant, le 6 juillet 2008, l'ancien Président cubain Fidel Castro a invité le FARC pour libérer les otages qu'ils se tenaient sans conditions préalables. Il a également condamné le traitement du FARC des captifs et de leur abduction des politiciens civils qui n'ont eu aucun rôle en conflit armé.

Les Etats-Unis n'ont aucune évidence d'argent terroriste-connexe blanchir ou des activités de financement de terroriste au Cuba, bien que le Cuba ait un du monde les systèmes bancaires nationaux les plus réservés et les plus non-transparent. Le Cuba n'a aucune unité d'intelligence financière. La loi 93 du Cuba contre des actes de terrorisme fournit l'autorité de gouvernement à la voie, bloc, ou saisit des capitaux de terroriste.

Le gouvernement cubain a continué à permettre aux quelques USA fugitif-y compris des membres des groupes militants des USA tels que le Boricua populaire, ou Macheteros, et l'armée noire de libération pour habiter légalement au Cuba. En accord avec sa déclaration publique, le gouvernement n'a fourni l'asile sûr à aucun nouveau fugitif des USA voulu pour le terrorisme depuis 2006.

Ironiquement, cette explication même explique avec précision pourquoi le Cuba ne devrait pas être énuméré car un commanditaire d'état de terrorisme. La première phrase déclare que le Cuba plus « activement » ne soutient le terrorisme, une contradiction claire à la controverse du département d'état que les pays sur la liste « ont à plusieurs reprises fourni l'appui pour des actes de terrorisme international. » La controverse que le système bancaire du Cuba est « secret et non-transparent » fait peu pour mettre en question la réalité que les agences d'intelligence des USA n'ont pas produit une d'une seule pièce d'évidence croyable montrant que le Cuba est des terroristes de financement.

En fait, il y a d'évidence suffisante que le gouvernement cubain a pris des mesures significatives contre le terrorisme. La loi 93, décrétée en décembre 2001, fournit une base juridique pour la politique de l'anti-terrorisme du Cuba, et bien que non indiqué dans ce rapport, le Cuba est un signataire à chacun des douze des conventions et de protocoles de l'ONU contre le terrorisme. Les allégations du département d'état que le Cuba « continué pour défendre publiquement » le réseau colombien FARC de terroriste ne supportent pas contre l'état de Fidel Castro Département-ont reconnu le reproche public de sa tactique. En plus, en 2005, Fidel Castro avoué pour finir sa pratique de refuge de offre aux fugitifs de la justice des USA, y compris des fugitifs voulus pour le terrorisme, représentant un décalage clair des politiques de la guerre froide du Cuba. En septembre 2006, le gouvernement cubain a confirmé la déclaration de Castro en expulsant un homme américain qui avait enlevé son fils et l'avait volé au Cuba, le seul cas récent dans lequel un fugitif des USA a cherché l'asile sûr au Cuba.

Un arguments du département d'état des principaux dans le rapport est que parce que le Cuba « a continué à fournir un asile sûr » aux terroristes colombiens et Basques, c'est un « commanditaire d'état de terrorisme. » Cette réclamation au début n'était pas évident dans l'ébauche que l'agence compétente de département d'état a envoyé au congrès pour sa revue préliminaire par le corps législatif. Après que les membres de Miami-secteur du congrès aient furieusement réagi aux actions du département d'état en n'énumérant pas le Cuba en tant que commanditaire d'état de terrorisme, la revue a été rappelée à la hâte par le département d'état, où elle a cintré à la Chambre. Le département d'état a pris cette mesure quoique les terroristes Basques et colombiens aient été donnés le refuge sur le territoire cubain sur demande des gouvernements espagnols et colombiens respectivement, afin d'expédier un dégagement en attente d'otage qu'ils ont demandé pour les raisons humanitaires. Cependant, alors que personne ne nie qu'il y a des membres des organismes étrangers de terroriste habitant au Cuba, un reste de l'intervention précédente du Cuba en armant de temps en temps les révolutionnaires internationaux, là n'a été aucune évidence croyable pendant des années que des appuis du Cuba actuellement ou pardonne les activités de ces groupes. Ces ex-guérilleros certainement ne sont pas connus pour conduire des activités de terroriste ou pour lancer des attaques de terroriste hors du Cuba, et en fait, car le rapport de département d'état déclare que dans la crainte, certains « sont arrivés au Cuba en liaison avec des négociations de paix. » En 2002 et 2003, le gouvernement de la Colombie a publiquement annoncé que des négociations de paix étaient tenues avec le groupe rebelle d'ELN au Cuba, et il a cherché « la médiation continue » du Cuba dans ces entretiens. La Colombie, le Cuba, et l'ONU ont identifié six séries des négociations avec les rebelles depuis 2005. D'ailleurs, le Conseil sur des relations étrangères rapporte que les FARC et les ELN ont une présence dans beaucoup de capitales dans l'ensemble de l'Europe et de l'Amérique latine. Ainsi, la présence de tels guérilleros au Cuba ne peut pas être employée pour constituer le Cuba comme défenseur de terrorisme international.

L'autre argument commun pour le Cuba étant signalé sur la liste de terrorisme d'état, excédent constamment réitéré la décennie passée, est l'hospitalité fournissante du gouvernement pour les 70 fugitifs environ de la justice des USA, une partie liée aux organismes basés aux EU de terroriste. En particulier, le gouvernement cubain fournit le refuge à Joanne Chesimard, qui était un membre de l'armée noire de libération voulue pour le meurtre 1973 d'un soldat de la cavalerie d'état de New Jersey et vue comme notoire par des autorités des USA. Elle est parmi autre les fugitives voulues reliées des mouvements de noir et de Puerto Rican à libération. Le Cuba a refusé la grande majorité des USA demande que ces fugitifs soient retournés, parce que les fugitifs « politiques » ne recevraient pas une épreuve juste aux USA.

Cependant, dans la plupart de ces situations, pour employer les cas ci-dessus car des arguments pour la désignation du Cuba comme état de terroriste seraient vus par certains comme sentant avec l'hypocrisie. Les USA lui-même tiennent plusieurs fugitifs de la justice cubaine, le plus de manière significative Luis Posada Carriles, un terroriste d'anti-Castro impliquée dans le bombardement des lignes aériennes d'un Cubana surfacent en 1976, aussi bien qu'une série de 1997 bombardements à La Havane, et une tentative d'assassinat sur Fidel Castro en 2000. Washington a refusé des demandes cubaines et vénézuéliennes répétées de l'extradition de Posada Carriles, réclamant qu'il ferait face à la torture dans ces pays, en dépit des assurances autrement. Le cas de Posada Carriles contredit de façon saisissante la position habituelle du l'anti-terrorisme de Washington et semble violer la résolution 1373, un produit du Conseil de sécurité de l'ONU de la guerre des USA sur la terreur, qui déclare que des « réclamations de la motivation politique » ne peuvent pas être employées comme raisons pour « refuser les demandes d'extradition des terroristes allégués. » Les USA également ont refusé d'extrader Orlando Bosch, un autre terroriste accusé de diriger le bombardement d'avion de 1976 Cubains.

En réponse aux demandes de Washington du dégagement des fugitifs des USA, le gouvernement cubain exige le dégagement de cinq a allégué les espions cubains actuellement emprisonnés aux USA et dont les punitions ont été considérées par un certain nombre de groupes de droits de l'homme comme excessivement dures, qui étaient les victimes de la polarisation significative pendant leur épreuve fortement politisée. Cette situation a été aggravée en juin, quand la cour suprême a refusé de passer en revue la décision d'une cour d'appels fédérale qui avait confirmé l'épreuve initiale à Miami comme juste. Ainsi, la conservation du Cuba des fugitifs des USA est un résultat des hostilités réciproques entre les deux gouvernements, et n'indique pas nécessairement que le Cuba soutient le terrorisme international. D'ailleurs, le Mexique et le Salvador tous les deux sont connus tenir plusieurs fugitifs de justice des USA. En janvier 2004, les temps de Washington ont rapporté aux cas des plusieurs le Mexicain voulu pour des crimes violents commis aux USA du sud-ouest, déclarant que les autorités de Mexico ont refusé des demandes des USA de l'extradition de ces suspects. Une telle évidence s'ajoute à l'hypocrisie de la désignation unique du Cuba comme état de terroriste.

De manière significative, la langue la plus belliqueuse utilisée contre le Cuba dans des rapports précédents de département d'état a été enlevée des rapports de cette année de pays sur le terrorisme. Sous l'administration de Bush, le département d'état, employant ritualized la rhétorique, Cuba à plusieurs reprises accusé de refuser de coopérer avec la guerre menée par les EU sur la terreur. Tandis que le département d'état emploierait ces exemples en tant qu'évidence primaire que le Cuba était un commanditaire d'état de terrorisme, c'est en fait une conclusion entièrement fausse. Le Cuba ne pourrait pas avoir été prévu aux initiatives de l'anti-terrorisme de Washington direct arrière, données le legs de l'hostilité entre ces pays et les tentatives éternelles de Washington déstabilisent le gouvernement cubain. La prétention du Président Bush que chaque pays dans le monde doit soutenir la réponse Américain-menée au terrorisme, et que pour ne pas faire ainsi en suivant son modèle, détermine nécessairement si un pays devrait être considéré un état de terroriste, des points à une position extrêmement arrogante qui heureusement a été légèrement atténuée par l'administration d'Obama. Le héraut de Miami a noté que l'administration d'Obama, en enlevant le plus exotique des allégations de l'ère de Bush, a pu avoir pris une mesure définitive menant au déplacement du Cuba de la liste tout à fait.

La Corée du Nord et la Libye : La liste de terrorisme en tant que levier politique
Finalement, la liste de « commanditaires d'état de terrorisme » est souvent utilisée par Washington comme levier politique, carotte ou bâton à employer sur un pays qui suit avec servilité ou renonce certainement à des politiques des USA, et pas comme mesure légitime de l'attitude d'un pays vers le terrorisme international. Ceci devient le plus clair dans le cas de la Corée du Nord, un pays qui à la différence du Cuba, est susceptible réellement de commanditer le terrorisme. La Corée du Nord a été enlevée de la liste de commanditaires d'état en octobre 2008, après que le gouvernement de Kim Jong Il ait accepté de continuer la neutralisation de son installation de transformation de plutonium chez Yongbyon et de tenir compte des inspections limitées de ses installations nucléaires. Dans ce cas-ci, la convenance pure était aux travaux.

Le déplacement de la Corée du Nord était peu plus qu'un acte purement politique, le produit d'un désir de démontrer des résultats des entretiens six-partite qui avaient cherché une extrémité au programme nucléaire du pays depuis 2003 et une tentative blundered de calmer une menace de vraie sécurité. En juin 2008, après que les USA aient annoncé le déplacement de la Corée du Nord de la liste de terrorisme et aient proposé la première fois un système strict de l'inspection de ses installations nucléaires, Kim s'est immédiatement renversé en menaçant de reprendre son programme nucléaire. Seulement quand les USA ont soutenu vers le bas et les inspections plus limitées proposées ont fait Kim conviennent et son gouvernement a été enlevé de l'état commandite la liste. Une telle utilisation de la liste de terrorisme comme dispositif politique par le département d'état sous le secrétaire d'état le riz et le Conseil de sécurité nationale de la Maison Blanche, ignore la définition même du terrorisme sur laquelle il est en apparence basé. Si la Corée du Nord traite le plutonium ne fournit pas nécessairement convaincre la preuve, ni a beaucoup à faire, avec si lui arme les groupes internationaux de terroriste.

Il est particulièrement ironique, puis, qu'en dépit du déplacement de la Corée du Nord de la liste des USA, au cours des dernières années il y a eu des allégations continuelles de l'appui de la Corée du Nord des réseaux de terroriste. Les journaux coréens français, japonais, et du sud et le service d'intelligence étrangère israélien ont allégué l'évidence que le régime de Kim est activement impliqué dans armer et former de Hizballah au Liban ; les médias du Japon et le service d'intelligence étrangère à Bangkok ont constaté que la Corée du Nord a armé les tigres tamoul au Sri Lanka. Tous les deux groupes ont été indiqués des organismes étrangers de terroriste par les USA que de tels rapports minent sérieusement la réclamation du département d'état que la Corée du Nord « n'a pas commandité aucun acte de terroriste » depuis 1987, qui a été soutenu par le département d'état de riz pour pousser en avant avec ses programmes nucléaires de désarmement en dépit de l'évidence putative autrement. La notion que la Corée du Nord n'est plus indiquée en tant que commanditaire d'état de terrorisme, alors que le Cuba reste allumé la liste, est absurde.

The case of Libya further highlights the use of Washington’s State Sponsors list as a political tool. The Libyan government was linked to various terrorist attacks in the 1980s and did not conform to the US counterterrorism standards until 2003, when the Libyan head of state Muammar al-Gaddafi agreed to allow United Nations inspectors to oversee the dismantling of Libya’s nuclear weapons program and accepted legal responsibility for the 1986 bombing of a Pan Am flight over Lockerbie. His reward for cooperation was Libya’s removal from the State Sponsors of Terrorism list in May 2006 and the normalization of diplomatic and trade relations.

When Libya opened its arms to the West and endorsed Washington’s unilateral counterterrorism policies, it received a prize; when Cuba fails to do so, it remains blacklisted. Yet despite this, Cuba certainly is no more a terrorist state than Libya. While Libya renounced its former policies in 2003, Cuba renounced its support of terrorist revolutionaries in 1992, and has not been shown to fund them since. Although the anti-Castro lobby alleges that the Cuban government is backing the training of guerillas in Venezuela, neither the State Department nor the intelligence community has produced evidence to back these contentions. In fact, demonstrably, Cuba poses far less a threat to the international security than does Libya, considering the continued presence of al-Qa’ida and other terrorist groups in Libya, despite al-Gaddafi’s current willingness to play into Washington’s hands.

Cuba, Iran, and Syria
Cuba’s designation as a state sponsor of terror becomes further discredited when Cuba is compared to two of its counterparts on the list, Iran and Syria, both of which are verifiable terrorist states. Iran is designated on the State Sponsors list primarily due to the functions of the Qods Force of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Group, a branch of the Iranian military, which has financed and trained Hamas, Hizballah, the Islamic Jihad, as well as radical militants in Iraq. Iran’s government is also holding members of al-Qa’ida, whom it refuses to identify or put on trial.

According to the State Department, Syria “provided political and military support to Hizballah” and its President Bashar al-Assad openly “expressed support” for many Palestinian militant groups. Several groups designated as Foreign Terrorist Organizations actively operate and train militants on Syrian territory, often with the tacit approval of the Syrian government. These allegations are not easily debunked as is the State Department’s far less evidenced language against Cuba.

Cuba’s inclusion on the terrorism list has often been justified by other countries on the State Sponsors list. In particular, the anti-Cuban lobby cites Fidel Castro’s May 2001 visit to Iran, Syria, and Libya as evidence that his government backs terrorism, often recalling Castro’s reported comment to Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khameini: “Iran and Cuba, in cooperation with each other, can bring America to its knees. The U.S. regime is very weak, and we are witnessing this weakness from close up.”

Given the entrenched hostilities between the US and Cuba, it is no surprise that Castro would find an ideological ally in the Islamic Republic, also a government born out of a revolution against an American client state. But there is no evidence that Castro’s rhetoric has materialized into cooperation in backing terrorists. While Cuba and Iran signed a banking agreement in early 2006, which facilitated trade between the two nations and provided for increased economic and scientific cooperation in the future, the US has not been able to prove that this agreement went beyond what it was publicly stated to be. Significantly, Cuban-Iranian relations have not been mentioned in the Country Reports on Terrorism for the past three years, a sign that Cuba cannot be deemed a terrorist state solely on the basis of association.

Conclusions: Moving Forward
As with many other aspects of US-Cuba relations, the Obama administration has so far not enacted the significant policy shifts hoped for by supporters of a rational and respectful approach to Latin America. When Hillary Clinton was questioned by Senator Richard Lugar during her confirmation hearings as to Cuba’s placement on the terrorism list, her vague response suggested the potential for change: “We anticipate a review of US policy regarding Cuba and look forward to working with members of the Committee and other members of Congress as we move forward to the consideration of appropriate steps to take to help advance US interests and values in the context of relations with Cuba.” But clearly her State Department has failed to produce an objective review and, at least up to now, instead has succumbed to the demands of the anti-Castro lobby which, despite fifty years of proof that isolation will not bring about democracy in Cuba, continues to put forth its same confrontational tactics.

The terrorism list is more than a symbol of an anachronistic policy; in an era when the lifting of the trade embargo appears to be a real possibility, Cuba’s designation as a terrorist state has practical implications for the potential extent of trade between the two nations. As it stands, even if the embargo were lifted, there would still exist significant impediments to full bilateral trade and other links between the two countries. The US would be forced to deny tax-free treatment of imported goods coming from Cuba; US citizens wanting to trade with Cuba would first need to seek a license from the Treasury Department; and the US would be forced to oppose any World Bank or IMF loans to the country. These stipulations of the US laws and regulations, under which Cuba is considered a terrorist state, would stall the country’s economic development and the growth of meaningful US-Cuba trading relations.

However, the removal of Cuba from the list of State Sponsors of Terrorism would be a simple procedure: President Obama would only have to present Congress with a statement at least 45 days before the proposed removal, ascertaining that Cuba has not supported international terrorism in the past six months and that it has pledged not to do so in the future. There are two precedents in recent years for the use of such Presidential authority and no precedents for Congress to block a President’s decision.

Such a move would signal the reprioritization of consistency and rationality in Cuba policy over domestic political jockeying. This is a clear sign to the likes of sharply tongued ideologues such as South Florida Reps. Ileana Ros-Lehtinen and Lincoln Diaz-Balart that the administration will no longer allow their ad hoc sense of history to prevent the US from improving its relations with Cuba. Moreover, this action would mark a decisive step toward the full normalization of relations with Cuba, a sign of goodwill to governments throughout Latin America that would have no negative impact on the security of the United States, yet prompt a surge of amity. The removal of Cuba from the list of State Sponsors of Terror is a matter of simple consistency, honesty, and integrity: these are the values Obama vowed to bring to policymaking during his campaign, and Latin Americans as well as North Americans are waiting to see if he will live up to his promises.



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The Council on Hemispheric Affairs, founded in 1975, is an independent, non-profit, non-partisan, tax-exempt research and information organization. It has been described on the Senate floor as being “one of the nation’s most respected bodies of scholars and policy makers.” For more information, visit www.coha.org




Por Brandon Bloch
Asociado de la investigación de COHA

La elevación reciente de la suspensión de Cuba de calidad de miembro en la organización de estados americanos indica que la dominación de Washington del sistema Inter-Americano ha pasado. Las condiciones previas fijadas por el OAS para el readmission de Cuba eran lejos más débiles que eso la secretaria del estado Hillary Clinton había exigido originalmente, demostrando la energía del consenso regional entre los líderes latinoamericanos, que marcaron su paso inicial lejos de las políticas negadas de la administración de Obama.

La controversia que rodea el readmission de Cuba al OAS también demuestra que La Habana será el punto más crítico de la contención en medio de las esperanzas de los lazos Nosotros-Latinos mejorados de América. Si la nueva administración decide moverse rápidamente hacia relaciones normalizadas con Cuba, mejorará sumamente la situación de los E.E.U.U. en la región; pero si Washington insiste en mantener las hostilidades tradicionales que tiene por décadas fielded contra La Habana, él casi ciertamente se encontrará aislado político entre los estados latinoamericanos cada vez más autónomos y con frecuencia izquierdo-que se inclinaban.

Constantemente evidente en la política de Washington hacia Cuba es su lietmotif de llevar a cabo estándares dobles irracionales: los E.E.U.U. habitual actúan hacia la nación de la isla con el rencor y el antagonismo reflexivo, de una forma contrarios con políticas de los E.E.U.U. hacia más formidable y económicamente de gran alcance, aunque aún más son nondemocratic, los estados que Cuba. Esta actitud se manifiesta claramente en la inclusión continuada de Cuba en la lista anual del departamento del estado de los “patrocinadores del estado del terrorismo.” Esto es una acusación amorfa contra el gobierno de Castro puesto a tierra en el asentimiento habitual de Washington al pasillo del anti-Castro funcionado de Miami. La falta del departamento del estado de quitar Cuba de su lista lo más recientemente posible compilada de los patrocinadores del “terrorismo” marca otra muestra de las inconsistencias y del comienzo falso que son exhibidos por las iniciativas recientes de Cuba de la administración de Obama. Debe ser juzgado como revés serio a la normalización futura posible de relaciones entre los dos enemigos antiguos.

Cuba ha quedado orientada la lista negra del terrorismo del departamento del estado desde el 1 de marzo de 1982, cuando fue agregado a la vez de las alegaciones esas el Castro que el régimen había sido de financiamiento y de entrenamiento de revolucionarios armados a través de América latina y de África. Sin embargo, en 1992 después de que el derrumbamiento de la Unión Soviética, Fidel Castro renunciara la política anterior de su gobierno de las organizaciones de soporte del terrorista. Desde ese tiempo, Cuba no se conoce para tener ayuda financiera o logística proporcionada a cualesquiera grupos, que hace imperdonable que restos de Cuba calificado hostil por Washington, especialmente a la luz de los retiros recientes de Libia y de Corea del norte de la lista del terrorismo. A pesar de los problemas serios se presentó por la supresión del gobierno cubano de freedoms democráticos, Cuba no se puede convincibly comparar a Irán o a Siria como estado alegado del terrorista-forro, o, para a esa materia, también China, Libia y Corea del norte.

La caja para la inclusión de Cuba: una discusión Uno mismo-Que derrota
Cada año antes del 30 de abril, el departamento del estado se asigna por mandato para presentar al congreso un informe cuidadoso sobre las actividades del terrorista que han ocurrido a través del mundo, con varios párrafos dedicados a cada país señalado un patrocinador del estado del terrorismo. La descripción siguiente fue dada de Cuba en los “informes del país sobre el terrorismo 2008”:

Aunque las ayudas de Cuba armaron no más activamente lucha en América latina y otras partes del mundo, el gobierno cubano continuó proporcionando el asilo seguro a varios terroristas. Seguía habiendo los miembros de ETA, del FARC, y del ELN en Cuba durante 2008, algo que llegaba en Cuba con respecto a negociaciones de la paz con los gobiernos de España y Colombia. Autoridades cubanos continuadas para defender público el FARC. Sin embargo, el 6 de julio de 2008, presidente cubano anterior Fidel Castro invitó el FARC para lanzar a los rehenes que sostenían sin condiciones previas. Él también ha condenado el maltratamiento del FARC de cautivos y de su abducción de los políticos civiles que no tenían ningún papel en el conflicto armado.

Los Estados Unidos no tienen ninguna evidencia del dinero terrorista-relacionado el lavar planchar o las actividades del financiamiento del terrorista en Cuba, aunque Cuba tiene uno del mundo los sistemas de actividades bancarias nacionales más reservados y más non-transparent. Cuba no tiene ninguna unidad de inteligencia financiera. La ley 93 de Cuba contra actos del terrorismo proporciona la autoridad del gobierno a la pista, bloque, o agarra activos del terrorista.

El gobierno cubano continuó permitiendo los algunos E.E.U.U. fugitivo-incluyendo miembros de los grupos militantes de los E.E.U.U. tales como el Boricua popular, o Macheteros, y el ejército negro de la liberación para vivir legalmente en Cuba. En armonía con su declaración público, el gobierno no ha proporcionado el asilo seguro a ninguna nueva fugitivos de los E.E.U.U. deseada para el terrorismo desde 2006.

Irónico, esta misma explicación explica exacto porqué Cuba no se debe enumerar pues un patrocinador del estado del terrorismo. La primera oración indica que Cuba apoya no más “activamente” terrorismo, una contradicción clara a la contención del departamento del estado que los países en la lista “han proporcionado en varias ocasiones la ayuda para los actos del terrorismo internacional.” La contención que el sistema de actividades bancarias de Cuba es “secreto y non-transparent” hace poco para llamar en la pregunta la realidad que las agencias de inteligencia de los E.E.U.U. no han producido una pieza única de la evidencia creíble que probaba que Cuba es terroristas del financiamiento.

De hecho, hay evidencia amplia que el gobierno cubano ha tomado medidas significativas contra terrorismo. La ley 93, decretada en diciembre de 2001, proporciona una base jurídica para la política del counterterrorism de Cuba, y aunque no está indicada en este informe, Cuba es signatario a los doce de las convenciones y de los protocolos de la O.N.U contra terrorismo. Las alegaciones del departamento del estado que Cuba “continuada para defender público” la red colombiana FARC del terrorista no soporta contra el estado de Fidel Castro Departamento-reconocieron la reprimenda pública de sus táctica. Además, en 2005, Fidel Castro declaró para terminar su práctica del refugio de ofrecimiento a los fugitivos de la justicia de los E.E.U.U., incluyendo los fugitivos deseados para el terrorismo, representando una cambio clara de las políticas de la guerra fría de Cuba. En septiembre de 2006, el gobierno cubano mantuvo el declaración de Castro deportando a un hombre americano que había secuestrado a su hijo y lo había volado a Cuba, el único caso reciente en el cual un fugitivo de los E.E.U.U. ha buscado el asilo seguro en Cuba.

Una de las discusiones principales del departamento del estado en el informe es que porque Cuba “continuó proporcionando un asilo seguro” a los terroristas colombianos y vascos, es un “patrocinador del estado del terrorismo.” Esta demanda no aparecía al principio en el bosquejo que la agencia relevante del departamento del estado envió al congreso para su revisión preliminar por el cuerpo legislativo. Después de que los miembros del Miami-área del congreso furiosamente hubieran reaccionado a las acciones del departamento del estado en no enumerar Cuba como patrocinador del estado del terrorismo, la revisión fue recordada precipitado por el departamento del estado, donde arqueó a la casa. El departamento del estado tomó a esta acción aun cuando el vasco y habían dado los terroristas colombianos el refugio en territorio cubano a petición de los gobiernos españoles y colombianos respectivamente, para apresurar un lanzamiento pendiente del rehén que solicitaron en los argumentos humanitarios. Sin embargo, mientras que nadie niega que hay miembros de las organizaciones extranjeras del terrorista que viven en Cuba, un remanente de la implicación anterior de Cuba en de vez en cuando armar a revolucionarios internacionales, allí no ha sido ninguna evidencia creíble por años que las ayudas de Cuba actualmente ni perdona las actividades de estos grupos. No conocen a estos ex-guerrillas ciertamente para conducir actividades del terrorista o para lanzar ataques del terrorista de Cuba, y de hecho, pues el informe del departamento del estado indica que en miedo, algo “ha llegado en Cuba con respecto a negociaciones de la paz.” En 2002 y 2003, el gobierno de Colombia anunció público que las negociaciones de la paz eran llevadas a cabo con el grupo rebelde de ELN en Cuba, y buscó la “mediación continuada” de Cuba en estas negociaciones. Colombia, Cuba, y la O.N.U han reconocido seis redondos de negociaciones con los rebeldes desde 2005. Por otra parte, el consejo sobre relaciones extranjeras divulga que los FARC y los ELN tienen una presencia en muchos capitales a través de Europa y de América latina. Así, la presencia de tales guerrillas en Cuba no se puede utilizar para constituir Cuba como partidario del terrorismo internacional.

La otra discusión común para Cuba que es fijada en la lista del terrorismo del estado, excedente persistente reiterado la última década, es la hospitalidad de abastecimiento del gobierno para los 70 fugitivos estimados de la justicia de los E.E.U.U., algo conectada con organizaciones Nosotros-basadas del terrorista. Particularmente, el gobierno cubano proporciona el refugio a Joanne Chesimard, que era un miembro del ejército negro de la liberación deseado para el asesinato 1973 de un estado Trooper de New Jersey y visto como notorio por autoridades de los E.E.U.U. Ella es entre otra fugitivos deseados conectados con los movimientos de la liberación del negro y de Puerto Rican. Cuba ha rechazado a mayoría extensa de los E.E.U.U. solicita que estos fugitivos turned over, considerando que los fugitivos “políticos” no recibirían un ensayo justo en los E.E.U.U.

Sin embargo, en la mayor parte de estas situaciones, utilizar los casos antedichos pues las discusiones para la designación de Cuba como estado del terrorista serían consideradas por alguno como apestando con hipocresía. Los E.E.U.U. sí mismo están sosteniendo a varios fugitivos de la justicia cubano, lo más perceptiblemente posible posada Carriles de Luis, un terrorista del anti-Castro implicada en el bombardeo de las líneas aéreas de un Cubana acepillan en 1976, así como una serie de 1997 bombardeos en La Habana, y una tentativa del asesinato en Fidel Castro en 2000. Washington ha rechazado los pedidos cubanos y venezolanos repetidos la extradición de la posada Carriles, demandando que él haría frente a tortura en estos países, a pesar de aseguramientos de otra manera. El caso de Carriles de la posada contradice llamativo la postura generalmente del contra-terrorismo de Washington y aparece violar la resolución 1373, un producto del consejo de seguridad de la O.N.U de la guerra de los E.E.U.U. en el terror, que indica que las “demandas de la motivación política” no se pueden utilizar como argumentos para “rechazar las peticiones de la extradición de terroristas alegados.” Los E.E.U.U. también han rechazado extradite Orlando Bosch, otro terrorista acusado de masterminding el bombardeo del avión de 1976 cubanos.

En respuesta a las demandas de Washington para el lanzamiento de los fugitivos de los E.E.U.U., el gobierno cubano exige el lanzamiento de cinco alegó a espías cubanos encarcelados actualmente en los E.E.U.U. y que castigos han sido juzgados por un número de grupos de los derechos humanos como excesivamente ásperos, que eran las víctimas del diagonal significativo durante su ensayo pesadamente politizado. Esta situación fue exacerbada en junio, cuando el Tribunal Supremo declinó repasar la decisión de una corte de súplicas federal que había mantenido el ensayo inicial en Miami como justa. Así, la retención de Cuba de los fugitivos de los E.E.U.U. es un resultado de las hostilidades recíprocas entre los dos gobiernos, y no indica necesariamente que Cuba apoya terrorismo internacional. Por otra parte, México y El Salvador ambos se conocen para sostener a varios fugitivos de la justicia de los E.E.U.U. En enero de 2004, los tiempos de Washington divulgaron a casos de varios el mexicano deseado para los crímenes violentos confiados en los E.E.U.U. al sudoeste, indicando que las autoridades de Ciudad de México han rechazado los pedidos de los E.E.U.U. la extradición de estos sospechosos. Tal evidencia agrega a la hipocresía de la designación única de Cuba como estado del terrorista.

Perceptiblemente, la lengua más bellicose empleada contra Cuba en informes anteriores del departamento del estado se ha quitado de informes relativos a este año del país sobre terrorismo. Bajo administración de Bush, el departamento del estado, usando ritualized el retórico, Cuba en varias ocasiones acusada del rechazo cooperar con la guerra Nosotros-conducida en terror. Mientras que el departamento del estado utilizaría estos ejemplos como evidencia primaria que Cuba era un patrocinador del estado del terrorismo, esto es de hecho una conclusión enteramente falsa. Cuba no se habría podido esperar a las iniciativas del counterterrorism de Washington directo trasero, dadas la herencia de la enemistad entre estos países y las tentativas perennes de Washington desestabilizan el gobierno cubano. La asunción de presidente Bush que cada país en el mundo debe apoyar la respuesta Americano-conducida al terrorismo, y que no hacer tan siguiendo su modelo, se determina necesariamente si un país se debe considerar un estado del terrorista, los puntos a una postura extremadamente arrogante que ha sido atenuada afortunadamente algo por la administración de Obama. El Herald de Miami observó que la administración de Obama, quitando el más extraño de las alegaciones a partir de la era de Bush, pudo haber tomado una medida definitiva que conduce al retiro de Cuba de la lista en conjunto.

Corea del norte y Libia: La lista del terrorismo como palanca política
En última instancia, la lista de los “patrocinadores del estado del terrorismo” es empleada a menudo por Washington como una palanca política, una zanahoria o palillo que se utilizarán en un país que siga despreciablemente o renuncie definitivamente políticas de los E.E.U.U., y no como medida legítima de la actitud de un país hacia terrorismo internacional. Esto llega a estar la más claro en el caso de Corea del norte, un país que desemejante de Cuba, sea realmente probable patrocinar terrorismo. Corea del norte fue quitada de la lista de los patrocinadores del estado en octubre de 2008, después de que el gobierno de Kim Jong Il acordara continuar inhabilitar de su impianto del plutonio en Yongbyon y permitir inspecciones limitadas de sus instalaciones nucleares. En este caso, el expedience puro estaba en los trabajos.

El retiro de Corea del norte era poco más que un acto puramente político, el producto de un deseo de demostrar los resultados de las negociaciones del Seis-Partido que habían buscado un extremo al programa nuclear del país desde 2003 y una tentativa blundered de aplacar una amenaza de la seguridad verdadera. En junio de 2008, después de que los E.E.U.U. primero anunciaran el retiro de Corea del norte de la lista del terrorismo y propusieran un sistema terminante de la inspección de sus instalaciones nucleares, Kim se invirtió inmediatamente amenazando reasumir su programa nuclear. Solamente cuando los E.E.U.U. movieron hacia atrás abajo y las inspecciones más limitadas propuestas hicieron a Kim convienen y su gobierno fue quitado del estado patrocina la lista. Tal uso de la lista del terrorismo como un dispositivo político por el departamento del estado debajo de la secretaria del arroz del estado y del consejo de la seguridad nacional de la casa blanca, no hace caso de la misma definición del terrorismo en la cual aparentemente se basa. Si o Corea no del norte está procesando el plutonio no proporciona necesariamente el convencimiento de la prueba, ni tiene mucho a hacer, con si o no está armando a grupos internacionales del terrorista.

Es particularmente irónico, después, que a pesar de el retiro de Corea del norte de la lista de los E.E.U.U., sobre los últimos años ha habido alegaciones continuas de la ayuda de Corea del norte de las redes del terrorista. Los periódicos coreanos franceses, japoneses, y del sur y el servicio de inteligencia extranjera israelí han alegado evidencia que el régimen de Kim está implicado activamente en armarse y el entrenamiento de Hizballah en Líbano; los medios de Japón y el servicio de inteligencia extranjera en Bangkok encontraron que Corea del norte ha armado los tigres del Tamil en Sri Lanka. Los E.E.U.U. han señalado ambos grupos las organizaciones extranjeras del terrorista que tales informes minan seriamente la demanda del departamento del estado que Corea del norte “no ha patrocinado ningún acto del terrorista” desde 1987, que fue sostenido por el departamento del estado del arroz para empujar adelante con sus programas nucleares del desarme a pesar de la evidencia supuesta de otra manera. La noción que Corea del norte está señalada no más como patrocinador del estado del terrorismo, mientras que queda orientada Cuba la lista, es absurda.

The case of Libya further highlights the use of Washington’s State Sponsors list as a political tool. The Libyan government was linked to various terrorist attacks in the 1980s and did not conform to the US counterterrorism standards until 2003, when the Libyan head of state Muammar al-Gaddafi agreed to allow United Nations inspectors to oversee the dismantling of Libya’s nuclear weapons program and accepted legal responsibility for the 1986 bombing of a Pan Am flight over Lockerbie. His reward for cooperation was Libya’s removal from the State Sponsors of Terrorism list in May 2006 and the normalization of diplomatic and trade relations.

When Libya opened its arms to the West and endorsed Washington’s unilateral counterterrorism policies, it received a prize; when Cuba fails to do so, it remains blacklisted. Yet despite this, Cuba certainly is no more a terrorist state than Libya. While Libya renounced its former policies in 2003, Cuba renounced its support of terrorist revolutionaries in 1992, and has not been shown to fund them since. Although the anti-Castro lobby alleges that the Cuban government is backing the training of guerillas in Venezuela, neither the State Department nor the intelligence community has produced evidence to back these contentions. In fact, demonstrably, Cuba poses far less a threat to the international security than does Libya, considering the continued presence of al-Qa’ida and other terrorist groups in Libya, despite al-Gaddafi’s current willingness to play into Washington’s hands.

Cuba, Iran, and Syria
Cuba’s designation as a state sponsor of terror becomes further discredited when Cuba is compared to two of its counterparts on the list, Iran and Syria, both of which are verifiable terrorist states. Iran is designated on the State Sponsors list primarily due to the functions of the Qods Force of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Group, a branch of the Iranian military, which has financed and trained Hamas, Hizballah, the Islamic Jihad, as well as radical militants in Iraq. Iran’s government is also holding members of al-Qa’ida, whom it refuses to identify or put on trial.

According to the State Department, Syria “provided political and military support to Hizballah” and its President Bashar al-Assad openly “expressed support” for many Palestinian militant groups. Several groups designated as Foreign Terrorist Organizations actively operate and train militants on Syrian territory, often with the tacit approval of the Syrian government. These allegations are not easily debunked as is the State Department’s far less evidenced language against Cuba.

Cuba’s inclusion on the terrorism list has often been justified by other countries on the State Sponsors list. In particular, the anti-Cuban lobby cites Fidel Castro’s May 2001 visit to Iran, Syria, and Libya as evidence that his government backs terrorism, often recalling Castro’s reported comment to Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khameini: “Iran and Cuba, in cooperation with each other, can bring America to its knees. The U.S. regime is very weak, and we are witnessing this weakness from close up.”

Given the entrenched hostilities between the US and Cuba, it is no surprise that Castro would find an ideological ally in the Islamic Republic, also a government born out of a revolution against an American client state. But there is no evidence that Castro’s rhetoric has materialized into cooperation in backing terrorists. While Cuba and Iran signed a banking agreement in early 2006, which facilitated trade between the two nations and provided for increased economic and scientific cooperation in the future, the US has not been able to prove that this agreement went beyond what it was publicly stated to be. Significantly, Cuban-Iranian relations have not been mentioned in the Country Reports on Terrorism for the past three years, a sign that Cuba cannot be deemed a terrorist state solely on the basis of association.

Conclusions: Moving Forward
As with many other aspects of US-Cuba relations, the Obama administration has so far not enacted the significant policy shifts hoped for by supporters of a rational and respectful approach to Latin America. When Hillary Clinton was questioned by Senator Richard Lugar during her confirmation hearings as to Cuba’s placement on the terrorism list, her vague response suggested the potential for change: “We anticipate a review of US policy regarding Cuba and look forward to working with members of the Committee and other members of Congress as we move forward to the consideration of appropriate steps to take to help advance US interests and values in the context of relations with Cuba.” But clearly her State Department has failed to produce an objective review and, at least up to now, instead has succumbed to the demands of the anti-Castro lobby which, despite fifty years of proof that isolation will not bring about democracy in Cuba, continues to put forth its same confrontational tactics.

The terrorism list is more than a symbol of an anachronistic policy; in an era when the lifting of the trade embargo appears to be a real possibility, Cuba’s designation as a terrorist state has practical implications for the potential extent of trade between the two nations. As it stands, even if the embargo were lifted, there would still exist significant impediments to full bilateral trade and other links between the two countries. The US would be forced to deny tax-free treatment of imported goods coming from Cuba; US citizens wanting to trade with Cuba would first need to seek a license from the Treasury Department; and the US would be forced to oppose any World Bank or IMF loans to the country. These stipulations of the US laws and regulations, under which Cuba is considered a terrorist state, would stall the country’s economic development and the growth of meaningful US-Cuba trading relations.

However, the removal of Cuba from the list of State Sponsors of Terrorism would be a simple procedure: President Obama would only have to present Congress with a statement at least 45 days before the proposed removal, ascertaining that Cuba has not supported international terrorism in the past six months and that it has pledged not to do so in the future. There are two precedents in recent years for the use of such Presidential authority and no precedents for Congress to block a President’s decision.

Such a move would signal the reprioritization of consistency and rationality in Cuba policy over domestic political jockeying. This is a clear sign to the likes of sharply tongued ideologues such as South Florida Reps. Ileana Ros-Lehtinen and Lincoln Diaz-Balart that the administration will no longer allow their ad hoc sense of history to prevent the US from improving its relations with Cuba. Moreover, this action would mark a decisive step toward the full normalization of relations with Cuba, a sign of goodwill to governments throughout Latin America that would have no negative impact on the security of the United States, yet prompt a surge of amity. The removal of Cuba from the list of State Sponsors of Terror is a matter of simple consistency, honesty, and integrity: these are the values Obama vowed to bring to policymaking during his campaign, and Latin Americans as well as North Americans are waiting to see if he will live up to his promises.



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The Council on Hemispheric Affairs, founded in 1975, is an independent, non-profit, non-partisan, tax-exempt research and information organization. It has been described on the Senate floor as being “one of the nation’s most respected bodies of scholars and policy makers.” For more information, visit www.coha.org




Da Brandon Bloch
Socio di ricerca di COHA

La sospensione recente della sospensione della Cuba dall'insieme dei membri nell'organizzazione dell'americano dichiara indica che la dominazione de Washington del sistema Inter-Americano ha passato. I presupposti regolati dal OAS per il readmission della Cuba erano ben più deboli di quel il ministro Hillary Clinton originalmente aveva richiesto, dimostrando l'alimentazione del consenso regionale fra i capi dell'America latina, che hanno contrassegnato il loro passo iniziale via dalle politiche rinnegate della gestione di Obama.

La polemica che circonda il readmission della Cuba al OAS inoltre indica che Avana sarà il punto più critico del conflitto in mezzo delle speranze per i legami Noi-Latini migliorati dell'America. Se la nuova gestione decide muoversi velocemente verso i rapporti normalizzati con la Cuba, migliorerà notevolmente la condizione degli Stati Uniti nella regione; ma se Washington insiste sull'effettuare le ostilità che tradizionali ha per le decadi fielded contro Avana, quasi certamente si troverà isolato politicamente fra sempre più l'autonomo e frequentemente di sinistra-appoggiarsi dell'America latina dichiara.

Costantemente apparente nella politica de Washington verso la Cuba è il relativo lietmotif campioni irrazionali della tenuta di doppi: gli Stati Uniti habitually si comportano verso la nazione dell'isola con dispetto e l'antagonismo riflessivo, in un modo contradditorio con le politiche degli Stati Uniti verso più arduo ed economicamente potente, anche se ancor più nondemocratic, dichiara che la Cuba. Questo atteggiamento è manifestato chiaramente nell'inclusione continuata della Cuba sulla lista annuale dello State Department di “dichiara i garanti di terrorismo.„ Ciò è un atto d'accusa amorfo contro il governo del Castro a terra nell'acquiescenza habitual de Washington all'ingresso di anti-Castro allontanato da Miami. L'omissione dello State Department di rimuovere la Cuba dalla relativa lista il più recentemente compilata dei garanti “di terrorismo„ contrassegna ancora un altro segno delle contraddizioni e degli inizio falsi che sono visualizzati dalle iniziative recenti della Cuba della gestione di Obama. Deve essere giudicato come battuta d'arresto seria alla normalizzazione futura possibile dei rapporti fra i due nemici antichi.

La Cuba ha la lista nera di terrorismo dello State Department rimasto acces dal 1° marzo 1982, quando è stato aggiunto alla volta delle allegazioni quelle il Castro che il regime era stato costituente un fondo per ed addestrante i rivoluzionari muniti durante l'america latina e l'Africa. Tuttavia, in 1992 dopo che il crollo dell'Unione Sovietica, Fidel Castro rinunci alla politica precedente del suo governo delle organizzazioni di sostegno del terrorista. Da quel tempo, la Cuba non è conosciuta per avere supporto finanziario o logistico fornito a qualsiasi gruppi, che lo rende ingiustificabile che remains della Cuba bollato ostile da Washington, particolarmente alla luce delle rimozioni recenti della Libia e del Korea di Nord dalla lista di terrorismo. Malgrado i problemi serii ha proposto tramite la soppressione del governo Cuban dei freedoms democratici, la Cuba non può convincibly essere confrontata nell'Iran o la Siria mentre una terrorista-protezione presunta dichiara, o, per la quei materia, anche Cina, Libia e Korea di Nord.

La cassa per l'inclusione della Cuba: una discussione diSconfitta
Ogni anno entro il 30 aprile, State Department è affidato per presentare al congresso un rapporto completo sulle attività del terrorista che hanno accaduto nel mondo intero, con parecchi paragrafi dedicati ad ogni paese indicato un garante di dichiarare di terrorismo. La descrizione seguente è stata data della Cuba “nei rapporti del paese su terrorismo 2008„:

Anche se i supporti della Cuba più attivamente muniti non lottano in america latina ed altre parti del mondo, il governo Cuban ha continuato a fornire il porto sicuro a parecchi terroristi. I membri di ETA, del FARC e del ELN sono rimasto in Cuba durante il 2008, alcuna che arrivano in Cuba in relazione alle trattative di pace con i governi della Spagna ed in Colombia. Autorità Cuban continuate per difendere pubblicamente il FARC. Tuttavia, il 6 luglio 2008, l'ex presidente Cuban Fidel Castro ha invitato il FARC per liberare gli ostaggi che erano tenuta senza presupposti. Inoltre ha condannato il maltrattamento del FARC dei prigionieri e della loro abduzione dei politici civili che non hanno avuti ruolo in conflitto munito.

Gli Stati Uniti non hanno prova di soldi terrorista-relativi lavare e lavare e o attività di finanziamento del terrorista in Cuba, anche se la Cuba ha uno del mondo sistemi bancari nazionali più secretivi e più non-transparent. La Cuba non ha unità di intelligenza finanziaria. La legge 93 della Cuba contro le Leggi di terrorismo fornisce l'autorità di governo alla pista, blocco, o grippa i beni del terrorista.

Il governo Cuban ha continuato a consentire gli alcuni Stati Uniti fuggitivo-compreso i membri dei gruppi del militante degli Stati Uniti quale il Boricua popolare, o Macheteros e l'esercito nero di liberazione per vivere legalmente in Cuba. In armonia con la relativa dichiarazione pubblica, il governo non ha fornito il porto sicuro ad alcuni nuovi fuggitivi degli Stati Uniti desiderati per terrorismo dal 2006.

Ironicamente, questa spiegazione stessa spiega precisamente perchè la Cuba non dovrebbe essere elencata poichè un garante di dichiarare di terrorismo. La prima frase dichiara che la Cuba più “attivamente„ non sostiene il terrorismo, una contraddizione libera al conflitto dello State Department che i paesi sulla lista “hanno fornito ripetutamente il supporto per gli atti di terrorismo internazionale.„ Il conflitto che il sistema bancario della Cuba è “segreto e non-transparent„ fa piccolo per mettere in dubbio la realtà che le agenzie di servizio segreto degli Stati Uniti non hanno prodotto un pezzo unico di prova credibile che dimostra che la Cuba è terroristi di finanziamento.

Infatti, ci è prova ampia che il governo Cuban ha approntato le misure significative contro terrorismo. La legge 93, promulgata nel dicembre 2001, fornisce una base giuridica per la politica di counterterrorism della Cuba ed anche se non dichiarato in questo rapporto, la Cuba è un firmatario a tutti e dodici le delle convenzioni e dei protocolli di NU contro terrorismo. Le allegazioni dello State Department che la Cuba “continuata per difendere pubblicamente„ la rete colombiana FARC del terrorista non sostiene contro Fidel Castro dichiarano il rimprovero pubblico Reparto-riconosciuto delle relative tattiche. Ulteriormente, in 2005, Fidel Castro dichiarato per concludere la sua pratica del rifugio d'offerta ai fuggitivi della giustizia degli Stati Uniti, compreso i fuggitivi desiderati per terrorismo, rappresentando uno spostamento libero dalle politiche di guerra fredda della Cuba. Nel settembre 2006, il governo Cuban ha sostenuto la dichiarazione del Castro deporting un uomo americano che aveva rapinato il suo figlio e lo aveva volato in Cuba, l'unico caso recente in cui un fuggitivo degli Stati Uniti ha cercato il porto sicuro in Cuba.

Una delle discussioni principali dello State Department nel rapporto è che perché la Cuba “ha continuato a fornire un porto sicuro„ ai terroristi di basco e del Colombian, è “dichiara il garante di terrorismo.„ Questo reclamo inizialmente non è sembrato nella brutta copia che l'agenzia competente di State Department trasmettesse al congresso per la relativa revisione preliminare dall'ente legislativo. Dopo che i membri di Miami-zona del congresso furiously reagiscano alle azioni dello State Department nell'elenco della Cuba un garante di dichiarare di terrorismo, la revisione è stato ricordato frettolosamente da State Department, dove ha piegato alla Camera. State Department ha intrapreso questa azione anche se il basco ed i terroristi colombiani erano stati dati il rifugio sul territorio Cuban su richiesta dei governi spagnoli e colombiani rispettivamente, per accellerare di un rilascio in attesa dell'ostaggio che hanno chiesto per i motivi umanitari. Tuttavia, mentre nessuno nega che ci sono membri delle organizzazioni straniere del terrorista che vivono in Cuba, un resto della partecipazione precedente della Cuba occasionalmente a munire i rivoluzionari internazionali, là è stato prova credibile per gli anni che supporti della Cuba attualmente o perdona le attività di questi gruppi. Questi ex-guerriglieri certamente non sono conosciuti per condurre le attività del terrorista o per lanciare gli attacchi del terrorista dalla Cuba ed infatti, poichè il rapporto di State Department dichiara quello nel timore, alcuni “sono arrivato in Cuba in relazione alle trattative di pace.„ In 2002 e in 2003, il governo della Colombia ha annunciato pubblicamente che le trattative di pace stavano tenende con il gruppo ribelle di ELN in Cuba ed ha cercato “la mediazione continuata„ della Cuba in questi colloqui. La Colombia, la Cuba ed il NU hanno riconosciuto sei tondi delle trattative con i ribelli dal 2005. Inoltre, il Consiglio sui rapporti stranieri segnala che i FARC e i ELN hanno una presenza in molti capitali durante Europa e l'america latina. Quindi, la presenza di tali guerriglieri in Cuba non può essere usata per costituire la Cuba come sostenitore di terrorismo internazionale.

L'altra discussione comune per la Cuba che è inviata sulla lista di terrorismo di dichiarare, eccedenza con insistenza ripetuta la decade passata, è l'ospitalità fornente del governo per 70 fuggitivi valutati della giustizia degli Stati Uniti, alcuna relativa a Noi-ha basato le organizzazioni del terrorista. In particolare, il governo Cuban fornisce il rifugio a Joanne Chesimard, che era un membro dell'esercito nero di liberazione desiderato per i 1973 che l'omicidio del New Jersey dichiara Trooper e che osservato come rinomato dalle autorità degli Stati Uniti. È fra altra fuggitivi desiderati collegati movimenti a liberazione di Puerto e di nero Rican. La Cuba ha rifiutato la vasta maggioranza degli Stati Uniti chiede che questi fuggitivi sono girati, considerando che i fuggitivi “politici„ non riceverebbero una prova giusta negli Stati Uniti.

Tuttavia, in la maggior parte di queste situazioni, usare i suddetti argomenti come discussioni per l'indicazione della Cuba come terrorista dichiari sarebbe visto da alcuno come reeking con l'ipocrisia. Gli Stati Uniti sono il più significativamente in se tenuta parecchi fuggitivi di giustizia Cuban, il Posada Carriles del Luis, un terrorista di anti-Castro implicata nel bombardamento delle linee aeree di Cubana spianano in 1976, così come una serie di 1997 bombardamenti a Avana ed in un tentativo di assassinio su Fidel Castro in 2000. Washington ha rifiutato le richieste Cuban e venezuelane ripetute per il extradition del Posada Carriles, sostenente che affronterebbe la tortura in questi paesi, malgrado le assicurazioni al contrario. Il caso di Carriles del Posada contraddice in maniera sconvolgente la posizione usuale di anti-terrorismo de Washington e sembra violare la risoluzione 1373, un prodotto del Consiglio di sicurezza di NU della guerra degli Stati Uniti con terrore, che dichiara che “i reclami della motivazione politica„ non possono essere usati come motivi per “il rifiuto delle richieste di extradition dei terroristi presunti.„ Gli Stati Uniti inoltre hanno rifiutato di extradite Orlando Bosch, un altro terrorista accusato di masterminding il bombardamento del velivolo dei 1976 cubani.

In risposta alle richieste de Washington del rilascio dei fuggitivi degli Stati Uniti, il governo Cuban richiede attualmente il rilascio di cinque spie Cuban dichiarate incarcerate negli Stati Uniti e di cui le punizioni sono state ritenute da un certo numero di gruppi di diritti dell'uomo come eccessivamente dure, che erano le vittime di polarizzazione significativa durante la loro prova pesante politicized. Questa situazione è stata esacerbata in giugno, quando la Corte suprema ha rifiutato di rivedere la decisione di una corte di appelli federale che aveva sostenuto la prova iniziale a Miami come giusta. Quindi, il ritegno della Cuba dei fuggitivi degli Stati Uniti è un risultato delle ostilità reciproche fra i due governi e necessariamente non indica che la Cuba sostiene il terrorismo internazionale. Inoltre, il Messico ed il El Salvador entrambi sono conosciuti per essere tenuta parecchi fuggitivi della giustizia degli Stati Uniti. Nel gennaio 2004, i tempi de Washington hanno segnalato ai casi dei parecchi il Mexicans desiderato per i crimini violenti commessi negli Stati Uniti del sud-ovest, dichiarando che le autorità de Messico City hanno rifiutato le richieste degli Stati Uniti per il extradition di questi sospetti. Tale prova aggiunge all'ipocrisia dell'indicazione unica della Cuba mentre un terrorista dichiara.

Significativamente, la lingua più bellicose impiegata contro la Cuba nei rapporti precedenti di State Department è stata rimossa dai rapporti relativi a quest'anno del paese su terrorismo. Sotto la gestione di Bush, State Department, usando ritualized la retorica, Cuba ripetutamente accusata di rifiuto cooperare con la guerra condotta dagli Stati Uniti con terrore. Mentre State Department userebbe questi esempi come prova primaria che la Cuba era un garante di dichiarare di terrorismo, questa è in effetti una conclusione interamente spuria. La Cuba non potrebbe essere prevista alle iniziative di counterterrorism de Washington diretto posteriore, date l'eredità del enmity fra questi paesi ed i tentativi perenni de Washington destabilizzano il governo Cuban. Il presupposto del presidente Bush che ogni paese nel mondo deve sostenere la risposta Americano-condotta a terrorismo e che non fare così quanto segue il relativo modello, necessariamente determina se un paese dovrebbe essere considerato un terrorista dichiari, punti ad una posizione estremamente arrogante che si è attenuata fortunatamente piuttosto tramite la gestione di Obama. Il Herald de Miami ha notato che la gestione di Obama, rimuovendo il più outlandish delle allegazioni dall'era di Bush, può prendere una misura definitiva che conduce alla rimozione della Cuba dalla lista complessivamente.

Il Korea di Nord e la Libia: La lista di terrorismo come leva politica
Infine, la lista di “dichiara i garanti di terrorismo„ spesso è impiegata da Washington come una leva politica, una carota o bastone da usare su un paese che segue abjectly o definitivamente rinuncia alle politiche degli Stati Uniti e non come misura legittima dell'atteggiamento del paese verso terrorismo internazionale. Ciò diventa la più chiara nel caso del Korea di Nord, un paese che diverso della Cuba, è realmente probabile patrocinare il terrorismo. Il Korea di Nord è stato rimosso dalla lista di dichiara i garanti nell'ottobre 2008, dopo che il governo di Kim Jong Il accosentisse per continuare inabilitare del relativo impianto di lavorazione del plutonio a Yongbyon e per tenere conto i controlli limitati dei relativi impianti nucleari. In questo caso, il expedience puro era agli impianti.

La rimozione del Korea di Nord era poco più di un atto puramente politico, del prodotto di un desiderio dimostrare i risultati dei colloqui del Sei-Partito che avevano cercato un'estremità al programma nucleare del paese dal 2003 e di un tentativo blundered a placate una minaccia di sicurezza reale. Nel giugno 2008, dopo che gli Stati Uniti in primo luogo annunciassero la rimozione del Korea di Nord dalla lista di terrorismo e proponessero un sistema rigoroso di controllo dei relativi impianti nucleari, Kim immediatamente si è invertito minacciando di riprendere il suo programma nucleare. Soltanto quando gli Stati Uniti hanno sostenuto giù ed i controlli più limitati proposti hanno fatto Kim accosentono ed il suo governo è stato rimosso dal dichiarare patrocina la lista. Tale uso della lista di terrorismo come dispositivo politico da State Department sotto il ministro il riso ed il Consiglio di sicurezza nazionale della Casa Bianca, ignora la definizione stessa di terrorismo su cui è basato apparentemente. Se o non il Korea di Nord sta procedendo il plutonio necessariamente non fornisce convincere la prova, né ha molto da fare, con se o non sta munendo i gruppi internazionali del terrorista.

È particolarmente ironico, quindi, che malgrado la rimozione del Korea di Nord dalla lista degli Stati Uniti, nel corso degli anni scorsi ci sono stati allegazioni continue del supporto del Korea di Nord delle reti del terrorista. I giornali coreani francesi, giapponesi e del sud ed il servizio di intelligenza straniera israeliano hanno dichiarato la prova che il regime del Kim attivamente è coinvolto nella munizione e nell'addestramento di Hizballah nel Libano; i mezzi del Giappone ed il servizio di intelligenza straniera a Bangkok hanno trovato che il Korea di Nord ha munito le tigri del Tamil in Sri Lanka. Entrambi gruppi sono stati indicati organizzazioni straniere del terrorista dagli Stati Uniti che tali rapporti insidiano seriamente il reclamo di State Department che il Korea di Nord “non ha patrocinato alcun atto del terrorista„ dal 1987, che è stato sostenuto dal riso State Department per fare avanzare al contrario con i relativi programmi nucleari di disarmo malgrado la prova presunta. La nozione che il Korea di Nord più non è indicato come garante di dichiarare di terrorismo, mentre la Cuba rimane accea la lista, è irragionevole.

The case of Libya further highlights the use of Washington’s State Sponsors list as a political tool. The Libyan government was linked to various terrorist attacks in the 1980s and did not conform to the US counterterrorism standards until 2003, when the Libyan head of state Muammar al-Gaddafi agreed to allow United Nations inspectors to oversee the dismantling of Libya’s nuclear weapons program and accepted legal responsibility for the 1986 bombing of a Pan Am flight over Lockerbie. His reward for cooperation was Libya’s removal from the State Sponsors of Terrorism list in May 2006 and the normalization of diplomatic and trade relations.

When Libya opened its arms to the West and endorsed Washington’s unilateral counterterrorism policies, it received a prize; when Cuba fails to do so, it remains blacklisted. Yet despite this, Cuba certainly is no more a terrorist state than Libya. While Libya renounced its former policies in 2003, Cuba renounced its support of terrorist revolutionaries in 1992, and has not been shown to fund them since. Although the anti-Castro lobby alleges that the Cuban government is backing the training of guerillas in Venezuela, neither the State Department nor the intelligence community has produced evidence to back these contentions. In fact, demonstrably, Cuba poses far less a threat to the international security than does Libya, considering the continued presence of al-Qa’ida and other terrorist groups in Libya, despite al-Gaddafi’s current willingness to play into Washington’s hands.

Cuba, Iran, and Syria
Cuba’s designation as a state sponsor of terror becomes further discredited when Cuba is compared to two of its counterparts on the list, Iran and Syria, both of which are verifiable terrorist states. Iran is designated on the State Sponsors list primarily due to the functions of the Qods Force of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Group, a branch of the Iranian military, which has financed and trained Hamas, Hizballah, the Islamic Jihad, as well as radical militants in Iraq. Iran’s government is also holding members of al-Qa’ida, whom it refuses to identify or put on trial.

According to the State Department, Syria “provided political and military support to Hizballah” and its President Bashar al-Assad openly “expressed support” for many Palestinian militant groups. Several groups designated as Foreign Terrorist Organizations actively operate and train militants on Syrian territory, often with the tacit approval of the Syrian government. These allegations are not easily debunked as is the State Department’s far less evidenced language against Cuba.

Cuba’s inclusion on the terrorism list has often been justified by other countries on the State Sponsors list. In particular, the anti-Cuban lobby cites Fidel Castro’s May 2001 visit to Iran, Syria, and Libya as evidence that his government backs terrorism, often recalling Castro’s reported comment to Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khameini: “Iran and Cuba, in cooperation with each other, can bring America to its knees. The U.S. regime is very weak, and we are witnessing this weakness from close up.”

Given the entrenched hostilities between the US and Cuba, it is no surprise that Castro would find an ideological ally in the Islamic Republic, also a government born out of a revolution against an American client state. But there is no evidence that Castro’s rhetoric has materialized into cooperation in backing terrorists. While Cuba and Iran signed a banking agreement in early 2006, which facilitated trade between the two nations and provided for increased economic and scientific cooperation in the future, the US has not been able to prove that this agreement went beyond what it was publicly stated to be. Significantly, Cuban-Iranian relations have not been mentioned in the Country Reports on Terrorism for the past three years, a sign that Cuba cannot be deemed a terrorist state solely on the basis of association.

Conclusions: Moving Forward
As with many other aspects of US-Cuba relations, the Obama administration has so far not enacted the significant policy shifts hoped for by supporters of a rational and respectful approach to Latin America. When Hillary Clinton was questioned by Senator Richard Lugar during her confirmation hearings as to Cuba’s placement on the terrorism list, her vague response suggested the potential for change: “We anticipate a review of US policy regarding Cuba and look forward to working with members of the Committee and other members of Congress as we move forward to the consideration of appropriate steps to take to help advance US interests and values in the context of relations with Cuba.” But clearly her State Department has failed to produce an objective review and, at least up to now, instead has succumbed to the demands of the anti-Castro lobby which, despite fifty years of proof that isolation will not bring about democracy in Cuba, continues to put forth its same confrontational tactics.

The terrorism list is more than a symbol of an anachronistic policy; in an era when the lifting of the trade embargo appears to be a real possibility, Cuba’s designation as a terrorist state has practical implications for the potential extent of trade between the two nations. As it stands, even if the embargo were lifted, there would still exist significant impediments to full bilateral trade and other links between the two countries. The US would be forced to deny tax-free treatment of imported goods coming from Cuba; US citizens wanting to trade with Cuba would first need to seek a license from the Treasury Department; and the US would be forced to oppose any World Bank or IMF loans to the country. These stipulations of the US laws and regulations, under which Cuba is considered a terrorist state, would stall the country’s economic development and the growth of meaningful US-Cuba trading relations.

However, the removal of Cuba from the list of State Sponsors of Terrorism would be a simple procedure: President Obama would only have to present Congress with a statement at least 45 days before the proposed removal, ascertaining that Cuba has not supported international terrorism in the past six months and that it has pledged not to do so in the future. There are two precedents in recent years for the use of such Presidential authority and no precedents for Congress to block a President’s decision.

Such a move would signal the reprioritization of consistency and rationality in Cuba policy over domestic political jockeying. This is a clear sign to the likes of sharply tongued ideologues such as South Florida Reps. Ileana Ros-Lehtinen and Lincoln Diaz-Balart that the administration will no longer allow their ad hoc sense of history to prevent the US from improving its relations with Cuba. Moreover, this action would mark a decisive step toward the full normalization of relations with Cuba, a sign of goodwill to governments throughout Latin America that would have no negative impact on the security of the United States, yet prompt a surge of amity. The removal of Cuba from the list of State Sponsors of Terror is a matter of simple consistency, honesty, and integrity: these are the values Obama vowed to bring to policymaking during his campaign, and Latin Americans as well as North Americans are waiting to see if he will live up to his promises.



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The Council on Hemispheric Affairs, founded in 1975, is an independent, non-profit, non-partisan, tax-exempt research and information organization. It has been described on the Senate floor as being “one of the nation’s most respected bodies of scholars and policy makers.” For more information, visit www.coha.org




Durch Brandon Bloch
COHA Forschung Teilnehmer

Das neue Anheben von Aufhebung Kubas von der Mitgliedschaft in der Organisation der amerikanischen Zustände zeigt an, daß Herrschaft Washingtons des Zwischen-Amerikanischen Systems überschritten hat. Die Vorbedingungen, die durch das OAS für readmission Kubas eingestellt wurden, waren weit schwächer, als jenes Staatssekretär Hillary Clinton ursprünglich verlangt hatte und die Energie der regionalen übereinstimmung unter lateinamerikanischen Führern demonstriert, die ihren Ausgangsschritt weg von der abgelehnten Politik der Obama Leitung kennzeichneten.

Die Kontroverse, die das readmission von Kuba zum OAS zeigt umgibt auch, daß Havana der kritischste Punkt der Absicht unter Hoffnungen für verbesserte Uns-Lateinische Amerika Riegel ist. Wenn die neue Leitung entscheidet, in Richtung zu normalisierten Relationen mit Kuba schnell zu bewegen, verbessert es in beträchtlichem Ausmaß die Stellung der US in der Region; aber, wenn Washington auf dem Beibehalten der traditionellen Feindseligkeiten besteht, hat es für die Dekaden, die gegen Havana aufgefangen werden, findet sich es fast zweifellos politisch lokalisiert unter den in zunehmendem Maße autonomen und häufig link-lehnenden lateinamerikanischen Zuständen.

In der Politik Washingtons in Richtung zu Kuba ist sein lietmotif des Haltens der vernunftwidrigen doppelter Moralkodexe durchweg offensichtlich: die US fungieren gewohnheitsmäßig in Richtung zur Inselnation mit der Bosheit und Reflexivantagonismus, in gewissem Sinne inkonsequent mit US politischen Richtlinien in Richtung zu beeindruckenderem und ökonomisch leistungsfähig, obgleich sogar nondemocratic, Zustände als Kuba. Diese Haltung wird verkündet offenbar in Kubas anhaltender Einbeziehung auf der jährlichen Liste der Zustand-Abteilung „der Zustand-Förderer von Terrorismus.“ Dieses ist eine formlose Anklage gegen die Castro Regierung, die Washingtons im gewohnheitsmäßigen Einwilligung zur anti-Castro Vorhalle geerdet wird, die von Miami laufen gelassen wird. Die Störung der Zustand-Abteilung, Kuba von seiner vor kurzem kompilierten Liste „der Terrorismus“ Förderer zu entfernen kennzeichnet dennoch ein anderes Zeichen der Unbeständigkeiten und der falschen Anfänge, die durch die der Obama neuen Initiativen Kuba Leitung angezeigt werden. Es muß als ernstes Hindernis zur möglichen zukünftigen Normalisierung von Relationen zwischen den zwei alten Feinden beurteilt werden.

Kuba ist auf der der Zustand-Terrorismusschwarzen liste Abteilung seit dem 1. März 1982 geblieben, als es hintereinander von den diesen Behauptungen der Castro hinzugefügt wurde, den Regime gewesen war, ausbildend finanzierend und bewaffnete Revolutionäre in lateinischem Amerika und Afrika. Jedoch 1992, nachdem der Einsturz der Sowjetunions, Fidel Castro auf vorhergehende Politik seiner Regierung der stützenden Terroristorganisationen verzichtete. Seit dieser Zeit bekannt Kuba nicht, um gegebene finanzielle oder logistische Unterstützung zu irgend solchen Gruppen zu haben, die es unentschuldbar daß des Kuba Remains bildet, der feindlich durch Washington, besonders im Licht des neuen Abbaus von Libyen und von Nordkorea von der Terrorismusliste eingebrannt wird. Trotz der ernsten Probleme warf durch den kubanischen Ausgleich der Regierung der demokratischen freedoms auf, kann Kuba nicht nach den Iran oder Syrien als angeblicher Terroristschutzträger Zustand oder, für diese Angelegenheit, auch China, Libyen und Nordkorea convincibly verglichen werden.

Der Kasten für Einbeziehung Kubas: ein Selbst-Besiegendes Argument
Jedes Jahr für den 30. April, wird der Zustand-Abteilung unterstellt, um Kongreß einen vollständigen Bericht über die Terroristtätigkeiten, die weltweit aufgetreten sind, wenn einige Punkte vorzulegen jedem Land gewidmet sind, das einen Zustand-Förderer von Terrorismus gekennzeichnet wird. Die folgende Beschreibung wurde von Kuba in den „Land-Berichten über Terrorismus 2008“ gegeben:

Obgleich die gebewaffneten Kuba nicht mehr aktiv Unterstützungen in lateinischem Amerika und in anderen Teilen der Welt kämpfen, fuhr die kubanische Regierung fort, sicheren Hafen zu einigen Terroristen zur Verfügung zu stellen. Mitglieder von ETA, von FARC und von ELN blieben in Kuba während 2008, in einigem, das in Kuba in Zusammenhang mit Friedensvermittlungen mit den Regierungen von Spanien angekommen wurden und in Kolumbien. Kubanische Behörden fortgesetzt, um das FARC öffentlich zu verteidigen. Jedoch am 6. Juli 2008 ersuchte ehemaliger kubanischer Präsident Fidel Castro um das FARC, um die Geiseln zu befreien, die sie ohne Vorbedingungen hielten. Er hat auch die Mißhandlung des FARCS der Gefangener und ihrer Abduktion der Zivilpolitiker verurteilt, die keine Rolle im bewaffneten Konflikt hatten.

Die Vereinigten Staaten haben keinen Beweis des Terrorist-in Verbindung stehenden Geldes zu waschen oder Terroristfinanzierung Tätigkeiten in Kuba, obgleich Kuba ein der verschwiegenste und non-transparent Welt nationale Banksysteme hat. Kuba hat keine finanzielle Intelligenzmaßeinheit. Gesetz 93 Kubas gegen Terrorakte stellt die Regierung Berechtigung zur Schiene, Block zur Verfügung oder ergreift Terroristwerte.

Die kubanische Regierung fuhr fort, einige US Flüchtling-einschließlich Mitglieder US der militanten Gruppen wie das populäre Boricua zu ermöglichen oder Macheteros und die schwarze Befreiung-Armee, um in Kuba erlaubterweise zu wohnen. In Uebereinstimmung mit seiner allgemeinen Erklärung hat die Regierung sicheren Hafen nicht zu irgendwelchen neuen US Flüchtlingen zur Verfügung gestellt, die für Terrorismus seit 2006 gewünscht werden.

Ironisch erklärt diese Erklärung genau, warum Kuba nicht verzeichnet werden sollte da ein Zustand-Förderer von Terrorismus. Der erste Satz gibt, daß Kuba nicht mehr „aktiv“ Terrorismus stützt, ein freier Widerspruch zur Absicht der Zustand-Abteilung an, daß Länder auf der Liste „haben wiederholt gegeben Unterstützung für Taten des internationalen Terrorismus.“ Die Absicht, daß Banksystem Kubas „geheim und“ non-transparent ist, tut wenig, um in Frage die Wirklichkeit stell, daß die US Nachrichtendienste nicht ein Einzelstück des glaubwürdigen Beweises prüfend produziert haben, daß Kuba Finanzierung Terroristen ist.

Tatsächlich gibt es reichlichen Beweis, daß die kubanische Regierung bedeutende Maßnahmen gegen Terrorismus ergriffen hat. Das Gesetz 93, im Dezember 2001 verordnet, stellt eine Gesetzesgrundlage für Politik counterterrorism Kubas zur Verfügung, und obgleich angegeben nicht in diesem Report, ist Kuba ein Unterzeichner bis alle zwölf der der UNO Vereinbarungen und Protokolle gegen Terrorismus. Die Behauptungen der Zustand-Abteilung, daß Kuba „, das fortgesetzt wird, um das kolumbianische Terroristnetz FARC öffentlich zu verteidigen“, nicht gegen Zustand Fidel Castros halten, Abteilung-bestätigten allgemeine Rüge seiner Taktiken. Zusätzlich 2005, erklärte Fidel Castro, um seine Praxis des anbietenschutz zu den Flüchtlingen von US Gerechtigkeit zu beenden, einschließlich die Flüchtlinge gewünscht für Terrorismus, eine freie Verschiebung Kubas von den politischen Richtlinien des kalten Krieges darstellend. Im September 2006 unterstützte die kubanische Regierung Erklärung Castros, indem sie einen amerikanischen Mann, der seinen Sohn entführt und ihn nach Kuba geflogen hatte, den einzigen neuen Fall verbannte, in dem ein US Flüchtling sicheren Hafen in Kuba gesucht hat.

Eins der Hauptargumente der Zustand-Abteilung im Report ist, daß, weil Kuba „fortfuhr, einen sicheren Hafen“ zu den kolumbianischen und baskischen Terroristen zur Verfügung zu stellen, es ist ein „Zustand-Förderer von Terrorismus.“ Dieser Anspruch anfangs schien nicht im Entwurf, daß die relevante Zustand-Abteilung Agentur dem Kongreß für seinen einleitenden Bericht durch den gesetzgebenden Körper sendete. Nachdem Miami-Bereich Mitglieder des Kongresses wütend zu den Tätigkeiten der Zustand-Abteilung reagiert hatten, wenn sie nicht Kuba als Zustand-Förderer von Terrorismus verzeichneten, wurde der Bericht eilig durch die Zustand-Abteilung zurückgerufen, in der er zum Haus beugte. Die Zustand-Abteilung ergriff diese Maßnahmen, obwohl den baskischen und kolumbianischen Terroristen Schutz auf kubanischer Gegend auf Bitten von den spanischen und kolumbianischen Regierungen beziehungsweise gegeben worden waren, um um eine schwebende Geiselfreigabe zu beschleunigen, die sie auf humanitärem Boden baten. Jedoch während niemand verweigert, daß es die Mitglieder der fremden Terroristorganisationen wohnend in Kuba gibt, ist ein Rest von Kubas vorhergehender Miteinbeziehung, wenn er gelegentlich internationale Revolutionäre, dort bewaffnete, kein glaubwürdiger Beweis für Jahre daß Kuba z.Z. Unterstützungen gewesen oder den Tätigkeiten dieser Gruppen verzeiht. Diese Exbandenkämpfer zweifellos bekannt nicht, um Terroristtätigkeiten zu leiten oder Terroristangriffe aus Kuba heraus auszustoßen, und tatsächlich, da der Zustand-Abteilung Report angibt, daß in der Furcht, einige „sind angekommen in Kuba in Zusammenhang mit Friedensvermittlungen.“ 2002 und 2003 verkündete die Regierung von Kolumbien öffentlich, daß Friedensvermittlungen mit der ELN rebellischen Gruppe in Kuba gehalten wurden, und es suchte die „anhaltende Vermittlung“ von Kuba in diesen Gesprächen. Kolumbien, Kuba und die UNO hat sechs Umläufe von Vermittlungen mit den Aufrührern seit 2005 erkannt. Außerdem berichtet der Rat auf fremden Relationen, daß die FARC und die ELN eine Anwesenheit in vielen Kapitalien in Europa und lateinischem Amerika haben. So kann die Anwesenheit solcher Bandenkämpfer in Kuba nicht verwendet werden, um Kuba als Verfechter des internationalen Terrorismus festzusetzen.

Das andere allgemeine Argument für Kuba, das auf der Zustandterrorismusliste, hartnäckig reiterierter überschuß die letzte Dekade bekanntgegeben wird, ist die zur Verfügung stellende Gastfreundschaft der Regierung für geschätzte 70 Flüchtlinge von US Gerechtigkeit, einige, die mit Uns-gegründeten Terroristorganisationen angeschlossen wird. Insbesondere stellt die kubanische Regierung Schutz zu Joanne Chesimard zur Verfügung, der ein Mitglied der schwarzen Befreiung-Armee war, die für den Mord 1973 an einem New-Jersey Zustand Trooper gewünscht wurde und durch US Behörden angesehen war, wie notorisch. Sie gehört zu anderer die gewünschten Flüchtlinge, die an Schwarz- und PuertoRican Befreiung Bewegungen angeschlossen werden. Kuba hat die beträchtliche Mehrheit einen US verlangt abgelehnt, daß diese Flüchtlinge umgedreht werden, mit der Begründung daß „politische“ Flüchtlinge nicht einen angemessenen Versuch in den US empfangen würden.

Jedoch in die meisten diesen Situationen, die oben genannten Fälle benutzen, da Argumente für Kennzeichnung Kubas als Terroristzustand durch einiges gesehen würden, wie reeking mit Hypokrisie. Die US selbst halten einige Flüchtlinge der kubanischen Gerechtigkeit, erheblich Luis Posada Carriles, ein anti-Castro Terrorist impliziert in der Bombardierung ein Cubana der Fluglinien planieren 1976, sowie eine Reihe von 1997 Bombardierungen in Havana und einen Ermordung Versuch auf Fidel Castro 2000. Washington hat wiederholte kubanische und venezuelanische Anträge für die Auslieferung von Posada Carriles abgelehnt und, daß er Folterung in diesen Ländern gegenüberstellen würde, trotz der Versicherungen anders behauptet. Der Posada Carriles Fall widerspricht auffallend übliche Position Anti-terrorismus Washingtons und scheint, UNO Sicherheit Rat-Auflösung 1373, ein Produkt zu verletzen des US Krieges auf Terror, der angibt, daß „Ansprüche des politischen Beweggrundes“ nicht als Boden für „das Ablehnen der Auslieferunganträge der angeblichen Terroristen verwendet werden können.“ Die US auch haben abgelehnt, Orlando Bosch, ein anderer Terrorist auszuliefern, der vom Leiten der Flugzeugbombardierung mit 1976 Kubanern beschuldigt wird.

In Erwiderung auf Nachfragen Washingtons nach der Freigabe der US Flüchtlinge, verlangt die kubanische Regierung die Freigabe von fünf behauptete die kubanischen Spione, die z.Z. in den US eingesperrt werden und dessen Bestrafungen durch eine Anzahl von Gruppen der menschlichen Rechte gemeint worden sind, wie übermäßig rauh, die die Opfer der bedeutenden Vorspannung während ihres schwer politisierten Versuches waren. Diese Situation wurde im Juni verbittert, als das Höchste Gericht sank, die Entscheidung eines Bundesberufungsgerichts zu wiederholen, das den Ausgangsversuch in Miami unterstützt hatte, wie angemessen. So ist Zurückhalten Kubas der US Flüchtlinge ein Resultat der wechselseitigen Feindseligkeiten zwischen den zwei Regierungen und nicht notwendigerweise zeigt an, daß Kuba internationalen Terrorismus stützt. Außerdem bekannt Mexiko und El-Salvador beide, einige Flüchtlinge von US Gerechtigkeit zu halten. Berichteten die Washington Zeiten über den Fällen von einigen den Mexikaner, der für die heftigen Verbrechen, die gewünscht wurde in den südwestlichen US festgelegt wurden, im Januar 2004 angebend, daß Mexiko-City Behörden US Anträge für die Auslieferung dieser Verdächtigen abgelehnt haben. Solcher Beweis fügt der Hypokrisie von Kubas einzigartiger Kennzeichnung als Terroristzustand hinzu.

Erheblich ist die streitsüchtigste Sprache, die gegen Kuba in den vorhergehenden Zustand-Abteilung Reports eingesetzt wird, von den diesjährigen Land-Berichten über Terrorismus entfernt worden. Unter der Bush Leitung ritualized die Zustand-Abteilung, verwendend Rhetorik, wiederholt beschuldigtes Kuba vom Ablehnen, mit dem Uns-führenden Krieg auf Terror zusammenzuarbeiten. Während die Zustand-Abteilung diese Beispiele als Primärbeweis verwenden würde, daß Kuba ein Zustand-Förderer von Terrorismus war, ist dieses tatsächlich eine völlig unechte Zusammenfassung. Kuba könnte nicht zu den Initiativen counterterrorism gerad rückseitigen Washingtons erwartet worden sein, das Vermächtnis des übelwollens zwischen diesen Ländern gegeben worden und Washingtons beständige Versuche entstabilisieren die kubanische Regierung. Präsident Bushs Annahme, daß jedes Land in der Welt die Amerikanisch-führende Antwort zum Terrorismus stützen muß und daß nicht durch das Folgen seines Modells so tun, stellt notwendigerweise, ob einem Land gelten sollte als einen Terroristzustand, Punkte zu einer extrem arroganten Position fest, die glücklicherweise ein wenig durch die Obama Leitung abgeschwächt worden ist. Der Miami Verkünder merkte, daß die Obama Leitung, indem sie das sonderbarste der Behauptungen von der Bush ära entfernt, einen endgültigen Schritt unternommen haben kann, der zusammen zu den Abbau von Kuba von der Liste führt.

Nordkorea und Libyen: Die Terrorismus-Liste als politischer Hebel
Schließlich wird die Liste „der Zustand-Förderer von Terrorismus“ häufig durch Washington als politischer auf einem Land verwendet zu werden Hebel, eingesetzt Karotte oder Stock, das abjectly folgt oder definitiv auf US politischen Richtlinien verzichtet, und nicht als gesetzmaßiges Maß der Haltung eines Landes in Richtung zum internationalen Terrorismus. Dieses wird im Falle Nordkoreas, ein Land am freiesten, das anders als Kuba, wirklich wahrscheinlich ist, Terrorismus zu fördern. Nordkorea wurde von der Liste der Zustand-Förderer im Oktober 2008 entfernt, nachdem die Regierung von Kim Jong Il, die Sperrung seiner Verarbeitungsanlage des Plutoniums bei Yongbyon fortzusetzen damit einverstanden war und begrenzte Kontrollen seiner Atomkraftwerke zuzulassen. In diesem Fall war reine Zweckdienlichkeit an den Arbeiten.

Der Abbau von Nordkorea war wenig mehr als eine lediglich politische Tat, das Produkt eines Wunsches, Resultate der Sechs-Partei Gespräche, die ein Ende zum Kernprogramm des Landes seit 2003 und gesucht hatten ein verpfuschter Versuch zum placate zu demonstrieren eine dingliche Sicherheit Drohung. Im Juni 2008 nachdem die US zuerst Abbau Nordkoreas von der Terrorismusliste verkündeten und ein strenges System der Kontrolle seiner Atomkraftwerke vorschlugen, hob sich Kim sofort auf, indem er bedrohte, sein Kernprogramm wieder aufzunehmen. Nur als die US zurücktraten und vorgeschlagene begrenztere Kontrollen taten Kim zustimmen und seine Regierung wurde vom Zustand fördert Liste entfernt. Solcher Gebrauch von der Terrorismusliste wie eine politische Vorrichtung durch die Zustand-Abteilung unter Staatssekretär Reis und den Rat Staatssicherheit des Weißen Hauses, ignoriert die Definition von Terrorismus, auf der sie anscheinend basiert. Ob oder nicht Nordkorea Plutonium nicht notwendigerweise zur Verfügung stellt das Überzeugen des Beweises verarbeitet noch viel hat, zum, mit zu tun ob oder, nicht es bewaffnet internationale Terroristgruppen.

Es ist dann besonders ironisch daß trotz des Abbaus von Nordkorea von der US Liste, über den letzten Jahren es kontinuierliche Behauptungen von Unterstützung Nordkoreas der Terroristnetze gegeben hat. Französische, japanische und koreanische Südzeitungen und der israelische Auslandsnachrichtenservice haben Beweis behauptet, daß Regime Kims aktiv im Bewaffnen und in der Ausbildung von Hizballah im Libanon miteinbezogen wird; die Japan Mittel und der Auslandsnachrichtenservice in Bangkok fanden, daß Nordkorea die Tamil-Tiger in Sri Lanka bewaffnet hat. Beide dieser Gruppen sind fremde Terrorist-Organisationen durch die US gekennzeichnet worden, die solche Reports ernsthaft den Anspruch der Zustand-Abteilung untergraben, die Nordkorea „keiner Terroristtat“ seit 1987 gefördert hat, das durch die Reis-Zustand-Abteilung unterstützt wurde, um mit seinen Kernabrüstung Programmen trotz des mutmaßlichen Beweises vorwärts anders zu drücken. Der Begriff, daß Nordkorea nicht mehr als Zustand-Förderer von Terrorismus gekennzeichnet wird, während Kuba auf der Liste bleibt, ist absurd.

The case of Libya further highlights the use of Washington’s State Sponsors list as a political tool. The Libyan government was linked to various terrorist attacks in the 1980s and did not conform to the US counterterrorism standards until 2003, when the Libyan head of state Muammar al-Gaddafi agreed to allow United Nations inspectors to oversee the dismantling of Libya’s nuclear weapons program and accepted legal responsibility for the 1986 bombing of a Pan Am flight over Lockerbie. His reward for cooperation was Libya’s removal from the State Sponsors of Terrorism list in May 2006 and the normalization of diplomatic and trade relations.

When Libya opened its arms to the West and endorsed Washington’s unilateral counterterrorism policies, it received a prize; when Cuba fails to do so, it remains blacklisted. Yet despite this, Cuba certainly is no more a terrorist state than Libya. While Libya renounced its former policies in 2003, Cuba renounced its support of terrorist revolutionaries in 1992, and has not been shown to fund them since. Although the anti-Castro lobby alleges that the Cuban government is backing the training of guerillas in Venezuela, neither the State Department nor the intelligence community has produced evidence to back these contentions. In fact, demonstrably, Cuba poses far less a threat to the international security than does Libya, considering the continued presence of al-Qa’ida and other terrorist groups in Libya, despite al-Gaddafi’s current willingness to play into Washington’s hands.

Cuba, Iran, and Syria
Cuba’s designation as a state sponsor of terror becomes further discredited when Cuba is compared to two of its counterparts on the list, Iran and Syria, both of which are verifiable terrorist states. Iran is designated on the State Sponsors list primarily due to the functions of the Qods Force of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Group, a branch of the Iranian military, which has financed and trained Hamas, Hizballah, the Islamic Jihad, as well as radical militants in Iraq. Iran’s government is also holding members of al-Qa’ida, whom it refuses to identify or put on trial.

According to the State Department, Syria “provided political and military support to Hizballah” and its President Bashar al-Assad openly “expressed support” for many Palestinian militant groups. Several groups designated as Foreign Terrorist Organizations actively operate and train militants on Syrian territory, often with the tacit approval of the Syrian government. These allegations are not easily debunked as is the State Department’s far less evidenced language against Cuba.

Cuba’s inclusion on the terrorism list has often been justified by other countries on the State Sponsors list. In particular, the anti-Cuban lobby cites Fidel Castro’s May 2001 visit to Iran, Syria, and Libya as evidence that his government backs terrorism, often recalling Castro’s reported comment to Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khameini: “Iran and Cuba, in cooperation with each other, can bring America to its knees. The U.S. regime is very weak, and we are witnessing this weakness from close up.”

Given the entrenched hostilities between the US and Cuba, it is no surprise that Castro would find an ideological ally in the Islamic Republic, also a government born out of a revolution against an American client state. But there is no evidence that Castro’s rhetoric has materialized into cooperation in backing terrorists. While Cuba and Iran signed a banking agreement in early 2006, which facilitated trade between the two nations and provided for increased economic and scientific cooperation in the future, the US has not been able to prove that this agreement went beyond what it was publicly stated to be. Significantly, Cuban-Iranian relations have not been mentioned in the Country Reports on Terrorism for the past three years, a sign that Cuba cannot be deemed a terrorist state solely on the basis of association.

Conclusions: Moving Forward
As with many other aspects of US-Cuba relations, the Obama administration has so far not enacted the significant policy shifts hoped for by supporters of a rational and respectful approach to Latin America. When Hillary Clinton was questioned by Senator Richard Lugar during her confirmation hearings as to Cuba’s placement on the terrorism list, her vague response suggested the potential for change: “We anticipate a review of US policy regarding Cuba and look forward to working with members of the Committee and other members of Congress as we move forward to the consideration of appropriate steps to take to help advance US interests and values in the context of relations with Cuba.” But clearly her State Department has failed to produce an objective review and, at least up to now, instead has succumbed to the demands of the anti-Castro lobby which, despite fifty years of proof that isolation will not bring about democracy in Cuba, continues to put forth its same confrontational tactics.

The terrorism list is more than a symbol of an anachronistic policy; in an era when the lifting of the trade embargo appears to be a real possibility, Cuba’s designation as a terrorist state has practical implications for the potential extent of trade between the two nations. As it stands, even if the embargo were lifted, there would still exist significant impediments to full bilateral trade and other links between the two countries. The US would be forced to deny tax-free treatment of imported goods coming from Cuba; US citizens wanting to trade with Cuba would first need to seek a license from the Treasury Department; and the US would be forced to oppose any World Bank or IMF loans to the country. These stipulations of the US laws and regulations, under which Cuba is considered a terrorist state, would stall the country’s economic development and the growth of meaningful US-Cuba trading relations.

However, the removal of Cuba from the list of State Sponsors of Terrorism would be a simple procedure: President Obama would only have to present Congress with a statement at least 45 days before the proposed removal, ascertaining that Cuba has not supported international terrorism in the past six months and that it has pledged not to do so in the future. There are two precedents in recent years for the use of such Presidential authority and no precedents for Congress to block a President’s decision.

Such a move would signal the reprioritization of consistency and rationality in Cuba policy over domestic political jockeying. This is a clear sign to the likes of sharply tongued ideologues such as South Florida Reps. Ileana Ros-Lehtinen and Lincoln Diaz-Balart that the administration will no longer allow their ad hoc sense of history to prevent the US from improving its relations with Cuba. Moreover, this action would mark a decisive step toward the full normalization of relations with Cuba, a sign of goodwill to governments throughout Latin America that would have no negative impact on the security of the United States, yet prompt a surge of amity. The removal of Cuba from the list of State Sponsors of Terror is a matter of simple consistency, honesty, and integrity: these are the values Obama vowed to bring to policymaking during his campaign, and Latin Americans as well as North Americans are waiting to see if he will live up to his promises.



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The Council on Hemispheric Affairs, founded in 1975, is an independent, non-profit, non-partisan, tax-exempt research and information organization. It has been described on the Senate floor as being “one of the nation’s most respected bodies of scholars and policy makers.” For more information, visit www.coha.org




Por Brandon Bloch
Associado da pesquisa de COHA

Levantar recente da suspensão de Cuba da sociedade na organização de estados americanos indica que o domination de Washington do sistema Inter-Americano passou. Os preconditions ajustados pelo OAS para o readmission de Cuba eram distante mais fracos do que aquele a secretária de estado Hillary Clinton tinha exijido originalmente, demonstrando o poder do consenso regional entre o latin - os líderes americanos, que marcaram sua etapa inicial longe das políticas repudiated da administração de Obama.

A controvérsia que cerca o readmission de Cuba ao OAS mostra também que Havana será o ponto o mais crítico da disputa entre esperanças para laços Nos-Latin melhorados de América. Se a administração nova se decidir se mover ràpidamente para relações normalizadas com Cuba, melhorará vastamente a posição dos E.U. na região; mas se Washington insistisse em manter as hostilidades que tradicionais tem por décadas fielded de encontro a Havana, ele encontrar-se-á quase certamente isolado polìtica entre o latin cada vez mais autônomo e freqüentemente esquerdo-inclinando-se - estados americanos.

Consistentemente aparente na política de Washington para Cuba é seu lietmotif de prender padrões dobro irrational: os E.U. agem habitually para a nação do console com spite e antagonism reflexivo, em uma maneira inconsistent com políticas dos E.U. para mais formidable e economicamente poderoso, embora ainda mais nondemocratic, estados do que Cuba. Esta atitude é manifestada claramente no inclusion continuado de Cuba na lista anual do departamento do estado do “de patrocinadores estado do terrorismo.” Este é um indictment amorfo de encontro ao governo de Castro aterrado no acquiescence habitual de Washington ao lobby do anti-Castro funcionado de Miami. A falha do departamento do estado remover Cuba de sua lista o mais recentemente compilada de patrocinadores do “terrorismo” marca contudo um outro sinal das inconsistências e dos começos falsos que estão sendo indicados pelas iniciativas recentes de Cuba da administração de Obama. Deve ser julgado como um setback sério ao normalization futuro possível das relações entre os dois foes antigos.

Cuba remanesceu na lista negra do terrorismo do departamento do estado desde março 1, 1982, quando se adicionou em um momento dos allegations que o regime de Castro tinha sido financiando e treinando revolucionários armados durante todo América Latin e África. Entretanto, em 1992 depois que o colapso da União Soviética, Fidel Castro renunciou a política precedente do seu governo de organizações suportando do terrorista. Desde esse tempo, Cuba não é conhecida para ter financeiro ou de apoio logístico fornecido a uns grupos, que faz inexcusable que remains de Cuba marcado hostil por Washington, especialmente na luz das remoções recentes de Líbia e de Coreia norte da lista do terrorismo. Apesar dos problemas sérios posed pela supressão do governo Cuban de freedoms democráticos, Cuba não pode convincibly ser comparada a Irã ou Syria como um estado alegado do terrorista-revestimento protetor, ou, para essas matéria, também China, Líbia e Coreia norte.

A caixa para o Inclusion de Cuba: um argumento Self-Derrotando
Todos os anos abril por 30, o departamento do estado é exijido para apresentar ao Congress um relatório completo nas atividades do terrorista que ocorreram durante todo o mundo, com diversos parágrafos devotados a cada país designado um patrocinador do estado do terrorismo. A seguinte descrição foi dada de Cuba do “nos relatórios país no terrorismo 2008”:

Embora as sustentações de Cuba já não ativamente armassem o esforço em América Latin e em outras partes do mundo, o governo Cuban continuou a fornecer o haven seguro a diversos terroristas. Os membros de ETA, do FARC, e do ELN remanesceram em Cuba durante 2008, em alguma que chegam em Cuba em relação às negociações da paz com os governos de Spain e em Colômbia. Autoridades Cuban continuadas a defender publicamente o FARC. Entretanto, julho em 6, 2008, o presidente Cuban anterior Fidel Castro convidou o FARC para liberar os reféns que prendiam sem preconditions. Condemned também o mau trato do FARC dos cativos e de seu abduction dos políticos civis que não tiveram nenhum papel no conflito armado.

Os Estados Unidos não têm nenhuma evidência de dinheiro terrorista-relacionado lavar ou atividades do financiamento do terrorista em Cuba, embora Cuba tenha um do mundo os sistemas de operação bancária nacionais os mais secretive e os mais non-transparent. Cuba não tem nenhuma unidade de inteligência financeira. A lei 93 de Cuba de encontro aos atos de terrorismo fornece a autoridade do governo à trilha, bloco, ou apreende recursos do terrorista.

O governo Cuban continuou a permitir alguns E.U. fugitives-including membros de grupos militant dos E.U. tais como o Boricua popular, ou Macheteros, e o exército preto do Liberation para viver legalmente em Cuba. De acordo com sua declaração pública, o governo não forneceu o haven seguro a nenhuns fugitives novos dos E.U. queridos para o terrorismo desde 2006.

Ironically, esta explanação very explica precisamente porque Cuba não deve ser alistada porque um patrocinador do estado do terrorismo. A primeira sentença indica que Cuba já não “ativamente” suporta o terrorismo, um contradiction desobstruído à disputa do departamento do estado que os países na lista “forneceram repetidamente a sustentação para atos do terrorismo internacional.” A disputa que o sistema de operação bancária de Cuba é “secreto e non-transparent” faz pouco para chamar na pergunta a realidade que as agências de inteligência dos E.U. não produziram uma única parte de evidência credible que prova que Cuba é terroristas do financiamento.

No fato, há uma evidência ampla que o governo Cuban fêz exame de medidas significativas de encontro ao terrorismo. A lei 93, decretada em dezembro 2001, fornece uma base legal para a política do counterterrorism de Cuba, e embora não indicado neste relatório, Cuba é um signatário a todos os doze das convenções e de protocolos dos UN de encontro ao terrorismo. Os allegations do departamento do estado que Cuba “continuada a defender publicamente” a rede Colombian FARC do terrorista não mantem levantada de encontro ao estado de Fidel Castro Departamento-reconheceram o rebuke público de suas táticas. Adicionalmente, em 2005, Fidel Castro declarou para terminar sua prática do refúgio oferecendo aos fugitives da justiça dos E.U., including os fugitives queridos para o terrorismo, representando um deslocamento desobstruído das políticas da guerra fria de Cuba. Em setembro 2006, o governo Cuban upheld a declaração de Castro deporting um homem americano que sequestrasse seu filho e o voasse a Cuba, o único caso recente em que um fugitive dos E.U. procurou o haven seguro em Cuba.

Um dos argumentos principais do departamento do estado no relatório é que porque Cuba “continuou a fornecer um haven seguro” aos terroristas Colombian e Basque, é do “um patrocinador estado do terrorismo.” Esta reivindicação no início não pareceu no esboço que a agência relevante do departamento do estado emitiu ao Congress para sua revisão preliminar pelo corpo legislativo. Depois que os membros da Miami-área do Congress tinham reagido furiously às ações do departamento do estado em não alistar Cuba como um patrocinador do estado do terrorismo, a revisão foi recordada hastily pelo departamento do estado, onde se curvou à casa. O departamento do estado fêz exame desta ação mesmo que os terroristas Basque e Colombian fossem dados o refúgio no território Cuban no pedido dos governos espanhóis e Colombian respectivamente, a fim expedir uma liberação pendente do refém que pedissem em terras humanitárias. Entretanto, quando ninguém negar que há uns membros de organizações extrangeiras do terrorista que vivem em Cuba, um resto da participação precedente de Cuba ocasionalmente em armar revolucionários internacionais, lá não foi nenhuma evidência credible por anos que sustentações de Cuba atualmente nem desculpa as atividades destes grupos. Estes ex-guerrillas não são conhecidos certamente para conduzir atividades do terrorista ou para lançar ataques do terrorista fora de Cuba, e no fato, porque o relatório do departamento do estado indica que no medo, alguns “chegaram em Cuba em relação às negociações da paz.” Em 2002 e em 2003, o governo de Colômbia anunciou publicamente que as negociações da paz estavam prendidas com o grupo rebel de ELN em Cuba, e procurou “o mediation continuado” de Cuba nestas conversas. Colômbia, Cuba, e os UN reconheceram seis círculos das negociações com os rebels desde 2005. Além disso, o conselho em relações extrangeiras relata que os FARC e os ELN têm uma presença em muitos capitais durante todo Europa e América Latin. Assim, a presença de tais guerrillas em Cuba não pode ser usada constituir Cuba como um supporter do terrorismo internacional.

O outro argumento comum para Cuba que está sendo afixada na lista do terrorismo do estado, excesso persistente reiterated a década passada, é o hospitality fornecendo do governo para 70 fugitives estimados da justiça dos E.U., alguma conectada com as organizações Nos-baseadas do terrorista. No detalhe, o governo Cuban fornece o refúgio a Joanne Chesimard, que era um membro do exército preto do Liberation querido para o assassinato 1973 de um estado Trooper de New-jersey e visto como notorious por autoridades dos E.U. É entre outra fugitives queridos conectados movimentos ao liberation do preto e do Puerto Rican. Cuba recusou a maioria vasta dos E.U. pede que estes fugitives estivessem virados, nas terras que os fugitives “políticos” não receberiam uma experimentação justa nos E.U.

Entretanto, em a maioria destas situações, para usar os casos acima porque os argumentos para a designação de Cuba como um estado do terrorista seriam vistos por algum como reeking com hypocrisy. Os E.U. próprios estão prendendo diversos fugitives da justiça Cuban, o mais significativamente Posada Carriles de Luis, um terrorista do anti-Castro implicada no bombardeio de linhas aéreas de um Cubana aplanam em 1976, as well as uma série de 1997 bombardeios em Havana, e em uma tentativa do assassination em Fidel Castro em 2000. Washington recusou pedidos Cuban e Venezuelan repetidos para o extradition do Posada Carriles, reivindicando que enfrentaria a tortura nestes países, apesar das garantias de outra maneira. O exemplo de Carriles do Posada contradicts impressionante o stance usual do anti-terrorismo de Washington e parece violate a definição 1373 do conselho de segurança dos UN, um produto da guerra dos E.U. no Terror, que indica que as “reivindicações do motivation político” não podem ser usadas como terras “recusando os pedidos do extradition de terroristas alegados.” Os E.U. também recusaram extradite Orlando Bosch, um outro terrorista acusado de masterminding o bombardeio do avião de 1976 cubanos.

Em resposta às demandas de Washington para a liberação dos fugitives dos E.U., o governo Cuban exige a liberação de cinco alegou os espiões Cuban imprisoned atualmente nos E.U. e cujas as punições foram julgadas por um número de grupos das direitas humanas como excessivamente ásperas, que eram as vítimas da polarização significativa durante sua experimentação pesadamente politicized. Esta situação exacerbated em junho, quando a corte suprema declinou rever a decisão de uma corte de apelações federal que upheld a experimentação inicial em Miami como justo. Assim, a retenção de Cuba de fugitives dos E.U. é um resultado das hostilidades recíprocas entre os dois governos, e não indica necessariamente que Cuba suporta o terrorismo internacional. Além disso, México e o Salvador de EL ambos são conhecidos prender diversos fugitives da justiça dos E.U. Em janeiro 2004, os tempos de Washington relataram aos exemplos dos diversos o mexicano querido para os crimes violentos cometidos nos E.U. do sudoeste, indicando que as autoridades de Cidade do México recusaram pedidos dos E.U. para o extradition destes suspeitos. Tal evidência adiciona ao hypocrisy da designação original de Cuba como um estado do terrorista.

Significativamente, a língua a mais bellicose empregada de encontro a Cuba em relatórios precedentes do departamento do estado foi removida dos relatórios do país deste ano no terrorismo. Sob a administração de Bush, o departamento do estado, usando-se ritualized o rhetoric, Cuba repetidamente acusada de recusar cooperar com a guerra Nos-conduzida no Terror. Quando o departamento do estado usaria estes exemplos como a evidência preliminar que Cuba era um patrocinador do estado do terrorismo, esta é no fato uma conclusão inteiramente spurious. Cuba não poderia ter-se esperado às iniciativas do counterterrorism de Washington forthrightly traseiro, dadas o legacy do enmity entre estes países e as tentativas perennial de Washington destabilize o governo Cuban. A suposição do presidente Bush que cada país no mundo deve suportar a resposta Americano-conduzida ao terrorismo, e que para não fazer assim seguindo seu modelo, determina necessariamente se um país deve ser considerado um estado do terrorista, pontos a um stance extremamente arrogante que felizmente mitigated um tanto pela administração de Obama. O Herald de Miami anotou que a administração de Obama, removendo o mais outlandish dos allegations da era de Bush, pode ter feito exame de uma etapa definitive que conduz à remoção de Cuba da lista completamente.

Coreia norte e Líbia: A lista do terrorismo como a alavanca política
Finalmente, a lista do “de patrocinadores estado do terrorismo” é empregada frequentemente por Washington como uma alavanca política, uma cenoura ou uma vara a ser usadas em um país que siga abjectly ou renuncíe definitivamente políticas dos E.U., e não como uma medida legitimate da atitude de um país para o terrorismo internacional. Isto torna-se o mais desobstruído no exemplo de Coreia norte, um país que ao contrário de Cuba, seja realmente provável patrocinar o terrorismo. Coreia norte foi removida da lista de patrocinadores do estado em outubro 2008, depois que o governo de Kim Jong Il concordou continuar incapacitar de sua planta processando do plutônio em Yongbyon e o permitir inspeçãos limitadas de suas facilidades nucleares. Neste caso, o expedience puro estava em trabalhos.

A remoção de Coreia norte era pouco mais do que um ato puramente político, o produto de um desejo demonstrar resultados das conversas do Seis-Partido que tinham procurado uma extremidade ao programa nuclear do país desde 2003 e uma tentativa blundered ao placate uma ameaça da segurança real. Em junho 2008, depois que os E.U. primeiramente anunciaram a remoção de Coreia norte da lista do terrorismo e propuseram um sistema estrito da inspeção de suas facilidades nucleares, Kim inverteu-se imediatamente himself ameaçando recomeçar seu programa nuclear. Somente quando os E.U. suportaram para baixo e as inspeçãos mais limitadas propostas fizeram Kim concordam e seu governo foi removido do estado patrocina a lista. Tal uso da lista do terrorismo como um dispositivo político pelo departamento do estado sob a secretária do arroz do estado e do conselho de segurança nacional da casa branca, ignora a definição very do terrorismo em que é baseado ostensibly. Se ou Coreia nao norte está processando o plutônio não fornece necessariamente convencer a prova, nem tem muito a fazer, com se ou não está armando grupos internacionais do terrorista.

É particularmente ironic, a seguir, que apesar da remoção de Coreia norte da lista dos E.U., sobre os anos passados houve uns allegations contínuos da sustentação de Coreia norte de redes do terrorista. Os jornais Korean franceses, japoneses, e sul e o serviço de inteligência extrangeira Israeli alegaram a evidência que o regime de Kim está envolvido ativamente em se armar e em treinar de Hizballah em Líbano; os meios de Japão e o serviço de inteligência extrangeira em Banguecoque encontraram que Coreia norte armou os tigres do Tamil em Sri Lanka. Ambos estes grupos foram designados organizações extrangeiras do terrorista pelos E.U. que tais relatórios undermine seriamente a reivindicação do departamento do estado que Coreia norte “não patrocinou nenhum ato do terrorista” desde 1987, que foi sustentado pelo departamento do estado do arroz para empurrar para a frente de outra maneira com seus programas nucleares do disarmament apesar da evidência putative. A noção que Coreia norte está designada já não como um patrocinador do estado do terrorismo, quando Cuba remanescer na lista, é absurd.

The case of Libya further highlights the use of Washington’s State Sponsors list as a political tool. The Libyan government was linked to various terrorist attacks in the 1980s and did not conform to the US counterterrorism standards until 2003, when the Libyan head of state Muammar al-Gaddafi agreed to allow United Nations inspectors to oversee the dismantling of Libya’s nuclear weapons program and accepted legal responsibility for the 1986 bombing of a Pan Am flight over Lockerbie. His reward for cooperation was Libya’s removal from the State Sponsors of Terrorism list in May 2006 and the normalization of diplomatic and trade relations.

When Libya opened its arms to the West and endorsed Washington’s unilateral counterterrorism policies, it received a prize; when Cuba fails to do so, it remains blacklisted. Yet despite this, Cuba certainly is no more a terrorist state than Libya. While Libya renounced its former policies in 2003, Cuba renounced its support of terrorist revolutionaries in 1992, and has not been shown to fund them since. Although the anti-Castro lobby alleges that the Cuban government is backing the training of guerillas in Venezuela, neither the State Department nor the intelligence community has produced evidence to back these contentions. In fact, demonstrably, Cuba poses far less a threat to the international security than does Libya, considering the continued presence of al-Qa’ida and other terrorist groups in Libya, despite al-Gaddafi’s current willingness to play into Washington’s hands.

Cuba, Iran, and Syria
Cuba’s designation as a state sponsor of terror becomes further discredited when Cuba is compared to two of its counterparts on the list, Iran and Syria, both of which are verifiable terrorist states. Iran is designated on the State Sponsors list primarily due to the functions of the Qods Force of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Group, a branch of the Iranian military, which has financed and trained Hamas, Hizballah, the Islamic Jihad, as well as radical militants in Iraq. Iran’s government is also holding members of al-Qa’ida, whom it refuses to identify or put on trial.

According to the State Department, Syria “provided political and military support to Hizballah” and its President Bashar al-Assad openly “expressed support” for many Palestinian militant groups. Several groups designated as Foreign Terrorist Organizations actively operate and train militants on Syrian territory, often with the tacit approval of the Syrian government. These allegations are not easily debunked as is the State Department’s far less evidenced language against Cuba.

Cuba’s inclusion on the terrorism list has often been justified by other countries on the State Sponsors list. In particular, the anti-Cuban lobby cites Fidel Castro’s May 2001 visit to Iran, Syria, and Libya as evidence that his government backs terrorism, often recalling Castro’s reported comment to Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khameini: “Iran and Cuba, in cooperation with each other, can bring America to its knees. The U.S. regime is very weak, and we are witnessing this weakness from close up.”

Given the entrenched hostilities between the US and Cuba, it is no surprise that Castro would find an ideological ally in the Islamic Republic, also a government born out of a revolution against an American client state. But there is no evidence that Castro’s rhetoric has materialized into cooperation in backing terrorists. While Cuba and Iran signed a banking agreement in early 2006, which facilitated trade between the two nations and provided for increased economic and scientific cooperation in the future, the US has not been able to prove that this agreement went beyond what it was publicly stated to be. Significantly, Cuban-Iranian relations have not been mentioned in the Country Reports on Terrorism for the past three years, a sign that Cuba cannot be deemed a terrorist state solely on the basis of association.

Conclusions: Moving Forward
As with many other aspects of US-Cuba relations, the Obama administration has so far not enacted the significant policy shifts hoped for by supporters of a rational and respectful approach to Latin America. When Hillary Clinton was questioned by Senator Richard Lugar during her confirmation hearings as to Cuba’s placement on the terrorism list, her vague response suggested the potential for change: “We anticipate a review of US policy regarding Cuba and look forward to working with members of the Committee and other members of Congress as we move forward to the consideration of appropriate steps to take to help advance US interests and values in the context of relations with Cuba.” But clearly her State Department has failed to produce an objective review and, at least up to now, instead has succumbed to the demands of the anti-Castro lobby which, despite fifty years of proof that isolation will not bring about democracy in Cuba, continues to put forth its same confrontational tactics.

The terrorism list is more than a symbol of an anachronistic policy; in an era when the lifting of the trade embargo appears to be a real possibility, Cuba’s designation as a terrorist state has practical implications for the potential extent of trade between the two nations. As it stands, even if the embargo were lifted, there would still exist significant impediments to full bilateral trade and other links between the two countries. The US would be forced to deny tax-free treatment of imported goods coming from Cuba; US citizens wanting to trade with Cuba would first need to seek a license from the Treasury Department; and the US would be forced to oppose any World Bank or IMF loans to the country. These stipulations of the US laws and regulations, under which Cuba is considered a terrorist state, would stall the country’s economic development and the growth of meaningful US-Cuba trading relations.

However, the removal of Cuba from the list of State Sponsors of Terrorism would be a simple procedure: President Obama would only have to present Congress with a statement at least 45 days before the proposed removal, ascertaining that Cuba has not supported international terrorism in the past six months and that it has pledged not to do so in the future. There are two precedents in recent years for the use of such Presidential authority and no precedents for Congress to block a President’s decision.

Such a move would signal the reprioritization of consistency and rationality in Cuba policy over domestic political jockeying. This is a clear sign to the likes of sharply tongued ideologues such as South Florida Reps. Ileana Ros-Lehtinen and Lincoln Diaz-Balart that the administration will no longer allow their ad hoc sense of history to prevent the US from improving its relations with Cuba. Moreover, this action would mark a decisive step toward the full normalization of relations with Cuba, a sign of goodwill to governments throughout Latin America that would have no negative impact on the security of the United States, yet prompt a surge of amity. The removal of Cuba from the list of State Sponsors of Terror is a matter of simple consistency, honesty, and integrity: these are the values Obama vowed to bring to policymaking during his campaign, and Latin Americans as well as North Americans are waiting to see if he will live up to his promises.



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The Council on Hemispheric Affairs, founded in 1975, is an independent, non-profit, non-partisan, tax-exempt research and information organization. It has been described on the Senate floor as being “one of the nation’s most respected bodies of scholars and policy makers.” For more information, visit www.coha.org




Vid Brandon Bloch
COHA-forskningbundsförvant

Nytt lyfta av Kuba upphängning från medlemskap i organisationen av amerikanen påstår indikerar att Washington dominans av Inter-Amerikanen systemet har passerat. Preconditionsna som var fastställda vid OASEN för Kuba återinträde, var långt svagare, än det utrikesministern Hillary Clinton hade begärt ursprungligen och att visa driva av den regionala konsensusen bland latin - amerikanledare, som markerade deras initialt, kliver i väg från den avfärdade politiken av den Obama administrationen.

Tvisten som omger återinträdet av Kuban till OASEN visar också, att Havana ska är det mest kritisk pekar av strid amidst hopp för förbättrade US-Latin Amerika ties. Om den nya administrationen avgör till snabbt flyttningen in mot normalized förbindelse med Kuba, ska den förbättrar vastly US'SENS anseende i regionen; men, om Washington insisterar på att underhålla de traditionella hostilitetarna som den har för årtionden som sättas in mot Havana, ska den nästan bestämt fyndet sig själv som isolerades politiskt bland det mer och mer autonomt och, vanligt lämna-benägenhet latin - amerikanen påstår.

Konsekvent påtagligt i Washington politik in mot Kuba är dess lietmotif av hållande irrationella dubbelmoraler: usen agerar habitually in mot önationen med ondska, och reflexiv motsättning, i ett sätt som är inkonsekvent med US-politik in mot mer formidabel och economically kraftigt, även om även mer nondemocratic, påstår än Kuba. Denna inställning visas klart i Kuba fortsatte medräknande på utrikesdepartementet ettårig växt listar av ”statliga sponsorer av terrorism.”, Detta är ett amorphous åtal mot den Castro regeringen grounded i Washington habitual acquiescence till anti-Castrolobbyen som körs från Miami. Utrikesdepartementet fel att ta bort Kuba från dess som sammanställas för en tid sedan, listar av ”terrorism” sponsorer markerar ännu en undertecknar av inkonsekvenserna och tjuvstarterna som visas av den Obama administrationens de nya insatserna för Kuba. Det måste bedömas som ett allvarligt bakslag till den framtida normalizationen för möjligheten av förbindelse mellan de två forntida foesna.

Kuban har återstått på utrikesdepartementet terrorism svartlistar efter mars 1, 1982, då den tillfogades i sänder av de beskyllningar Castroen som styret hade varit finansieringen, och utbildning beväpnade revolutionäralltigenomLatinamerika och Afrika. Emellertid i 1992, efter kollapsen av den sovjetiska unionen, Fidel Castro avsäga sig hans regering föregående politik av understödjes terroristorganisationar. , att efter tid, Kuba inte är bekant att ha förutsatt att finansiellt eller logistical service till några sådan grupper, som gör det oförlåtligt att Kuban återstår hostilely, brännmärkte vid Washington, speciellt i ljust av de nya borttagningarna av Libyen och Nordkorea från terrorismen lista. Illviljan allvarligt problem som poseras av kubanska regering dämpning av demokratiska freedoms, Kuba kan inte convincibly jämföras till Iran eller Syrien som en föregiven terrorist-täckning som är statlig, eller, för den materia, också porslin, Libyen och Nordkorea.

Fallet för Kuba medräknande: ettBesegra argument
Varje år vid April 30, ge någon mandat att göra någonting utrikesdepartementet för att framlägga till kongressen som en grundlig rapport på terroristaktiviteterna, som har uppstådd alltigenom världen, med flera stycker hängivet till varje land som designeras en statlig sponsor av terrorism. Beskrivningen gavs efter av Kuba i ”landsrapporterna på terrorism 2008”:

Även om beväpnad service för Kuban ej längre kämpar aktivt i Latinamerika och andra världsdelar, fortsatte den kubanska regeringen för att ge kassaskåptillflyktsorten till flera terrorister. Medlemmar av ETA, FARCEN och ELNEN återstod i Kuba under 2008, någon som hade ankommit i Kuba i anslutning med fredförhandlingar med regeringarna av Spanien, och Colombia. Kubanska myndigheter som fortsättas publicly för att försvara FARCEN. Emellertid på Juli 6, 2008, den tidigare kubanska presidenten Fidel Castro som kallades på FARCEN för att frigöra gisslorna var de, hållande utan preconditions. Han har också fördömt FARC'SENS mistreatment av fången och av deras kidnappning av civila politikar som hade ingen roll i den beväpnade konflikten.

Förenta staterna har inget att bevisa av terrorist-släkta penningtvätt- eller terroristfinansieringaktiviteter i Kuba, även om Kuban har en av den mest förtegen och ogenomskinligast världen medborgarebankrörelsesystem. Kuban har ingen finansiell intelligensenhet. Kuba lag 93 mot agerar av terrorism ger den regerings- myndigheten för att spåra, kvarteret eller griper terroristtillgångar.

Den kubanska regeringen fortsatte till tillstånd flykting-inklusive medlemmar för någon US av militant grupper för US liksom den populära Boricuaen, eller Macheteros och den svart befrielsearmén att bo lagligt i Kuba. I att hålla med dess offentliga förklaring har regeringen inte git den önskade kassaskåptillflyktsorten till några nya US-flyktingar för terrorism efter 2006.

Ironically förklarar denna very förklaring exakt varför Kuban inte bör listas som en statlig sponsor av terrorism. Första dömer påstår, att Kuban ej längre stöttar ”aktivt” terrorism, en klar motsättning till utrikesdepartementet strid att länder på lista ”har upprepade gånger git service för agerar av landskampterrorism.”, Striden, att Kuba bankrörelsesystemet är ”hemligt och ogenomskinligt”, gör till appellen in i ifrågasätter lite verkligheten att US-intelligensbyråerna inte har producerat en singel lappar av troligt bevisar att bevisa att Kuban är finansieringterrorister.

I faktum finns det fylligt bevisar att den kubanska regeringen har tagit viktigt mäter mot terrorism. Lag 93 som antas i December 2001, ger en laglig bas för Kuba counterterrorismpolitik, och, även om inte påstått i denna rapport, är Kuban en undertecknare till alla tolvna av UN-reglarna och protokoll mot terrorism. Utrikesdepartementet beskyllningar, som Kuban ”fortsatte publicly för att försvara” den colombianska terroristen, knyter kontakt FARC rymmer inte upp mot Fidel Castro statliga Avdelning-bekräftade allmänhet tillrättavisar av dess taktik. Dessutom i 2005, övar Fidel Castro som förklaras att avsluta his, av erbjudande fristad till flyktingar av US-rättvisa, inklusive flyktingar som önskas för terrorism och att föreställa en klar förskjutning från Kuba kalla krigetpolitik. I September 2006, försvarade den kubanska regeringen Castros förklaring, genom att deportera en amerikanman, som hade kidnappat hans son och hade flugit honom till Kuban, det enda nya fallet som en US-flykting har sökt i kassaskåptillflyktsorten i Kuba.

Ett av utrikesdepartementet främsta argument i rapporten är att, därför att Kuban ”fortsatte för att ge en kassaskåptillflyktsort” till colombianska och baskiska terrorister, den är ”påstår sponsorn av terrorism.”, Detta fordrar verkade som om först inte i formulera den relevant utrikesdepartementetbyrån som överförs till kongressen för dess förberedande åtgärd granskar vid den lagstiftnings- förkroppsligar. Efter Miami-område kongressledamotar hade ursinnigt reagerat till utrikesdepartementet handlingar, i att inte lista Kuba, som en statlig sponsor av terrorism, granska återkallades hastily av utrikesdepartementet, var den bugade till huset. Utrikesdepartementet tog denna handling, även om basken och de colombianska terroristerna hade givits fristaden på det kubanska territoriet på förfråganen av spanjoren och de colombianska regeringarna respektive, för att påskynda en oavgjord gisslanfrigörare som de bad på humanitär jordning. Emellertid stunden inget förnekar, att det finns medlemmar av utländska terroristorganisationar som bor i Kuba, en kvarleva av Kuba föregående medverkan i tillfälligt att beväpna landskamprevolutionärar, har det intefinnas något troligt bevisar för år som för Kuba service för närvarande eller condones aktiviteterna av dessa grupper. Dessa före detta-gerillasoldater är bestämt inte bekant att föra terroristaktiviteter eller barkassterroristattacker ut ur Kuba, och i faktum, som utrikesdepartementetrapporten påstår det i skräck, har några ”ankommit i Kuba i anslutning med fredförhandlingar.”, I 2002 och 2003 meddelade regeringen av Colombia publicly att fredavtalsförhandling rymdes med ELN-rebellgruppen i Kuba, och den sökte ”den fortsatte mediationen” av Kuban i dessa samtal. Colombia, Kuban och UNNA har känt igen sex rundor av förhandlingar med rebellerna efter 2005. Dessutom anmäler rådet på utrikesförbindelser att FARCNA och ELNNA har en närvaro i många huvudstadalltigenom Europa och Latinamerika. Således kan inte närvaroen av sådan gerillasoldater i Kuba vara van vid utgör Kuba som en supporter av landskampterrorism.

Det annat allmänningargumentet för Kuban som postas på den statliga terrorismen, listar, ihärdigt reiterated över det förgångna årtiondet, är regering geende gästfrihet för beräknade 70 flyktingar av US-rättvisa, någon förbindelse med US-baserade terroristorganisationar. I synnerhet ger den kubanska regeringen fristaden till Joanne Chesimard, som var en medlem av den svart befrielsearmén som önskades för mord 1973 av en New Jersey statliga Trooper och beskådades som beryktad av US-myndigheter. Hon är bland annan önskade flyktingar förbindelse till svart- och Puerto Rican befrielseförehavanden. Kuban har vägrat stora majoriteten av US ber, att dessa flyktingar vänds över, på jordningen som ”politiska” flyktingar som skulle för att inte motta ett mässaförsök i USEN.

Emellertid i mest av dessa lägen, att använda de ovannämnda fallen som argument för Kuba beteckning som en terrorist påstå skulle ses av något som ånga med hyckleri. Usen är sig själv hållande flera flyktingar av kubansk rättvisa, markant den Luis posadaen Carriles, en anti-Castroterrorist som blandas in i bombningen av en Cubana flygbolag, hyvlar i 1976, as well as en serie av 1997 bombningar i Havana och ett lönnmordförsök på Fidel Castro i 2000. Washington har vägrat upprepat kubanskt, och venezuelanska förfrågan för utlämningen av posadaen Carriles som fordrar, att han skulle, vänder mot tortyr i dessa länder, illviljaförsäkringar annars. Det PosadaCarriles fallet säger emott Washington vanlig anti-terrorism stance och verkar slående att överträda UN-säkerhetsrådetupplösning 1373, en produkt av USEN kriger på skräcken, som påstår att ”fordrar av politisk motivation” kan inte användas som jordning för ”att vägra utlämningförfråganna av föregav terrorister.”, Usen har vägrat också för att extradite Orlando Bosch, en annan terrorist som anklagas av att vara hjärnan bakom den 1976 kubanska flygplanbombningen.

Som svar på Washington begärningar för frigöraren av US-flyktingarna begär kubanregeringen frigöraren av fem föregav kubanska spioner som fängslas för närvarande i USEN och vars bestraffningar har ansats av ett nummer av mänsklig rättighetgrupper som överdrivet hårda, som var offren av viktig snedhet under deras tungt politicized försök. Detta läge exacerbated i Juni, då högsta domstolen gick ned för att granska beslutet av en federal vädjandomstol som hade försvarat det initiala försök i Miami som mässa. Således Kuba är indikerar kvarhållande av US-flyktingar ett resultat av de reciprocal hostilitetarna mellan de två regeringarna och inte nödvändigtvis att Kuban stöttar landskampterrorism. Dessutom är Mexico och El Salvador båda bekant som är hållande flera flyktingar av US-rättvisa. I Januari 2004, anmälde de Washington tiderna de önskade fallen av flera mexikaner för våldsamma brott som begicks i den Southwestern USEN som påstår att Mexico - stadsmyndigheter har vägrat US-förfrågan för utlämningen av dessa misstänkt person. Sådan bevisa tillfogar till hycklerit av Kuba unika beteckning som en statlig terrorist.

Markant har det mest bellicose språket som används mot Kuba i föregående utrikesdepartementetrapporter, tagits bort från detta års landsrapporter på terrorism. Under den Bush administrationen ritualized utrikesdepartementet som använder retorik, den upprepade gånger anklagade Kuban av att vägra som samarbetar med, US-ledde kriger på skräck. Fördriva utrikesdepartementet skulle bruket dessa exempel, som primärt bevisa, att Kuban var en statlig sponsor av terrorism, detta är i faktum en helt förfalskad avslutning. Kuban kunde inte ha förväntats forthrightly att dra tillbaka Washington counterterrorisminsatser som gavs legaten av enmityen mellan dessa länder, och Washington destabilize perenna försök den kubanska regeringen. PresidentBush antagande, att varje land i världen måste stötta, Amerikan-ledde svar till terrorism, och att för att inte göra så vid efter dess modellera, bestämmer nödvändigtvis huruvida ett land bör vara ansett en statlig terrorist, pekar till en extremt arrogant stance som lyckligtvis har något mildrats av den Obama administrationen. Den Miami härolden noterade att den Obama administrationen, genom att ta bort det mest outlandish av beskyllningarna från den Bush eraen, kan ha tagit ett definitivt kliver att leda till borttagningen av Kuban från lista alldeles.

Nordkorea och Libyen: Terrorismen listar, som politiskt använda påtryckning
Ultimately används lista av ”statliga sponsorer av terrorism” ofta av Washington som ett politiskt använder påtryckning, en morot eller en pinne som ska används på ett land som följer abjectly eller avsäga sig bestämt US-politik, och inte som ett legitimt mäter av ett lands inställning in mot landskampterrorism. Denna blir mest frikänd i fallet av Nordkorea, ett land som i motsats till Kuba, är faktiskt rimligt att sponsra terrorism. Nordkorea togs bort från lista av statliga sponsorer i Oktober 2008, efter regeringen av Kim Jong Il överens för att fortsätta inaktivera av dess plutonium som bearbetar växten på Yongbyon och för att låta för inskränkt kontroller av dess kärn- lättheter. I detta fall var den rena lämpligheten på arbeten.

Borttagningen av Nordkorea var lite mer, än ett renodlat politiskt agerar, Sex-Festar produkten av en lust att visa resultat av samtal, som hade sökt en avsluta till landets kärn- program efter 2003, och ett göra en tabbe försök för att försona ett hot för verklig säkerhet. I Juni 2008, efter USEN meddelade först Nordkorea borttagning från terrorismen, lista och föreslaget ett strikt system av kontroll av dess kärn- lättheter, Kim omgående vänt om självt, genom att hota till meritförteckningen hans kärn- program. När endast de drog tillbaka USNA besegrar och, föreslagna mer inskränkt kontroller gjorde Kim instämm, och hans regering togs bort från de statliga sponsorerna listar. Sådan bruk av terrorismen listar som en politisk apparat av utrikesdepartementet under utrikesministerRice, och Vita hus nationell säkerhetrådet, ignorerar den very definitionen av terrorism som den baseras på skenbart. Huruvida eller inte Nordkorea bearbetar plutonium ger inte nödvändigtvis övertygande preparerar, nor har mycket som ska göras, med huruvida, eller det inte är grupper för beväpninglandskampterrorist.

Det är bestämt ironiskt, då, att illviljan som borttagningen av Nordkorea från USEN listar, över de förgångna åren har det finnas ständiga beskyllningar av Nordkorea service av terroristen knyter kontakt. Franskan, japanen, och sydkoreanska tidningar och den israeliska utländska underrättelsetjänsten har föregett bevisar att Kims styre är aktivt involverat i beväpningen och utbildningen av Hizballah i Libanon; det Japan massmedia och den utländska underrättelsetjänsten i Bangkok grundar att Nordkorea har beväpnat Tamiltigrarna i Sri Lanka. Båda av dessa grupper har designerats utländska terroristorganisationar av USEN som sådan rapporter underminerar allvarligt fordra av utrikesdepartementet, som Nordkorean ”inte har sponsrat någon terrorist att agera” efter 1987, som tåldes av Riceutrikesdepartementet för att skjuta framåtriktat med dess kärn- nedrustningprogramillvilja, de putative bevisar annars. Aningen, att Nordkorea ej längre designeras, som en statlig sponsor av terrorism, stundKuba återstår på lista, är absurd.

The case of Libya further highlights the use of Washington’s State Sponsors list as a political tool. The Libyan government was linked to various terrorist attacks in the 1980s and did not conform to the US counterterrorism standards until 2003, when the Libyan head of state Muammar al-Gaddafi agreed to allow United Nations inspectors to oversee the dismantling of Libya’s nuclear weapons program and accepted legal responsibility for the 1986 bombing of a Pan Am flight over Lockerbie. His reward for cooperation was Libya’s removal from the State Sponsors of Terrorism list in May 2006 and the normalization of diplomatic and trade relations.

When Libya opened its arms to the West and endorsed Washington’s unilateral counterterrorism policies, it received a prize; when Cuba fails to do so, it remains blacklisted. Yet despite this, Cuba certainly is no more a terrorist state than Libya. While Libya renounced its former policies in 2003, Cuba renounced its support of terrorist revolutionaries in 1992, and has not been shown to fund them since. Although the anti-Castro lobby alleges that the Cuban government is backing the training of guerillas in Venezuela, neither the State Department nor the intelligence community has produced evidence to back these contentions. In fact, demonstrably, Cuba poses far less a threat to the international security than does Libya, considering the continued presence of al-Qa’ida and other terrorist groups in Libya, despite al-Gaddafi’s current willingness to play into Washington’s hands.

Cuba, Iran, and Syria
Cuba’s designation as a state sponsor of terror becomes further discredited when Cuba is compared to two of its counterparts on the list, Iran and Syria, both of which are verifiable terrorist states. Iran is designated on the State Sponsors list primarily due to the functions of the Qods Force of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Group, a branch of the Iranian military, which has financed and trained Hamas, Hizballah, the Islamic Jihad, as well as radical militants in Iraq. Iran’s government is also holding members of al-Qa’ida, whom it refuses to identify or put on trial.

According to the State Department, Syria “provided political and military support to Hizballah” and its President Bashar al-Assad openly “expressed support” for many Palestinian militant groups. Several groups designated as Foreign Terrorist Organizations actively operate and train militants on Syrian territory, often with the tacit approval of the Syrian government. These allegations are not easily debunked as is the State Department’s far less evidenced language against Cuba.

Cuba’s inclusion on the terrorism list has often been justified by other countries on the State Sponsors list. In particular, the anti-Cuban lobby cites Fidel Castro’s May 2001 visit to Iran, Syria, and Libya as evidence that his government backs terrorism, often recalling Castro’s reported comment to Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khameini: “Iran and Cuba, in cooperation with each other, can bring America to its knees. The U.S. regime is very weak, and we are witnessing this weakness from close up.”

Given the entrenched hostilities between the US and Cuba, it is no surprise that Castro would find an ideological ally in the Islamic Republic, also a government born out of a revolution against an American client state. But there is no evidence that Castro’s rhetoric has materialized into cooperation in backing terrorists. While Cuba and Iran signed a banking agreement in early 2006, which facilitated trade between the two nations and provided for increased economic and scientific cooperation in the future, the US has not been able to prove that this agreement went beyond what it was publicly stated to be. Significantly, Cuban-Iranian relations have not been mentioned in the Country Reports on Terrorism for the past three years, a sign that Cuba cannot be deemed a terrorist state solely on the basis of association.

Conclusions: Moving Forward
As with many other aspects of US-Cuba relations, the Obama administration has so far not enacted the significant policy shifts hoped for by supporters of a rational and respectful approach to Latin America. When Hillary Clinton was questioned by Senator Richard Lugar during her confirmation hearings as to Cuba’s placement on the terrorism list, her vague response suggested the potential for change: “We anticipate a review of US policy regarding Cuba and look forward to working with members of the Committee and other members of Congress as we move forward to the consideration of appropriate steps to take to help advance US interests and values in the context of relations with Cuba.” But clearly her State Department has failed to produce an objective review and, at least up to now, instead has succumbed to the demands of the anti-Castro lobby which, despite fifty years of proof that isolation will not bring about democracy in Cuba, continues to put forth its same confrontational tactics.

The terrorism list is more than a symbol of an anachronistic policy; in an era when the lifting of the trade embargo appears to be a real possibility, Cuba’s designation as a terrorist state has practical implications for the potential extent of trade between the two nations. As it stands, even if the embargo were lifted, there would still exist significant impediments to full bilateral trade and other links between the two countries. The US would be forced to deny tax-free treatment of imported goods coming from Cuba; US citizens wanting to trade with Cuba would first need to seek a license from the Treasury Department; and the US would be forced to oppose any World Bank or IMF loans to the country. These stipulations of the US laws and regulations, under which Cuba is considered a terrorist state, would stall the country’s economic development and the growth of meaningful US-Cuba trading relations.

However, the removal of Cuba from the list of State Sponsors of Terrorism would be a simple procedure: President Obama would only have to present Congress with a statement at least 45 days before the proposed removal, ascertaining that Cuba has not supported international terrorism in the past six months and that it has pledged not to do so in the future. There are two precedents in recent years for the use of such Presidential authority and no precedents for Congress to block a President’s decision.

Such a move would signal the reprioritization of consistency and rationality in Cuba policy over domestic political jockeying. This is a clear sign to the likes of sharply tongued ideologues such as South Florida Reps. Ileana Ros-Lehtinen and Lincoln Diaz-Balart that the administration will no longer allow their ad hoc sense of history to prevent the US from improving its relations with Cuba. Moreover, this action would mark a decisive step toward the full normalization of relations with Cuba, a sign of goodwill to governments throughout Latin America that would have no negative impact on the security of the United States, yet prompt a surge of amity. The removal of Cuba from the list of State Sponsors of Terror is a matter of simple consistency, honesty, and integrity: these are the values Obama vowed to bring to policymaking during his campaign, and Latin Americans as well as North Americans are waiting to see if he will live up to his promises.



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The Council on Hemispheric Affairs, founded in 1975, is an independent, non-profit, non-partisan, tax-exempt research and information organization. It has been described on the Senate floor as being “one of the nation’s most respected bodies of scholars and policy makers.” For more information, visit www.coha.org




Брэндон Bloch
Сподвижница исследования COHA

Недавний подниматься подвеса Кубы от членства в организации американских государств показывает что доминирование вашингтона Взаимо--Американской системы проходило. Preconditions установленные OAS для readmission Кубы были далеко слабе чем preconditionsГосударственный секретарь Hillary Клинтон первоначально потребовал, демонстрирующ силу регионарного консенсуса среди латино-американских руководителей, которые маркировали их инициативный шаг шаг далеко от repudiated политик администрации Obama.

Полемика окружая readmission Кубы к OAS также показывает что Havana будет большинств критической точкой утверждения между упованиями для улучшенных Нас-Латинских связей америки. Если новая администрация решает быстро приблизить к normalized отношения с Кубой, то она более обширно улучшит положение США в зоне; но если вашингтон настаивает на поддержании традиционных враждебностей, котор оно имеет на декады fielded против Havana, его почти некоторо счесет политически изолировано среди все больше и больше автономно и част лев-полагаясь латино-американских положений.

Последовательно явно в политике вашингтона к Кубе свое lietmotif держать нерациональные двойные стандарты: США habitually действуют к нации острова с злобностью и рефлексивным антагонизмом, in a manner сбивчивыми с политиками США к formidable и экономично мощно, хотя even more nondemocratic, положения чем Куба. Эта ориентация ясно обнародована в включении Кубы продолжаемом на перечне Государственного департамента однолетнем «рекламодатели положения террорисма.» Это будет аморфический обвинительный акт против правительства Castro заземленного в acquiescence вашингтона habitual к лоббиу anti-Castro, котор побежали от Miami. Отказ Государственного департамента извлечь Кубу от своего само недавн составленного перечня рекламодатели «террорисма» маркирует yet another знак сбивчивостей и ложных стартов будучи показыванным инициативами Кубы администрации Obama недавними. Его необходимо судить как серьезная задержка к по возможности будущему нормализации отношений между 2 стародедовскими foes.

Куба remain on blacklist террорисма Государственного департамента с 1-ого марта 1982, когда было добавлено одновременно заявлений тех режим Castro было фондирующ и тренирующ вооруженных революционеров повсеместно в латинская америка и Африка. Однако, в 1992 после того как сброс давления советского союза, Fidel Castro отречьлся от политики его правительства ранее поддерживая организаций террориста. С того времени, Куба не известна для того чтобы иметь обеспеченную финансовохозяйственную или logistical поддержку к любым группам, которая делает его неизвинительно что остаток Кубы вражески затавренный Вашингтоном, специально in light of недавние удаления Ливии и Севернаи Корея от списка террорисма. Несмотря на серьезные проблемы представил подавлением кубинского правительства демократических freedoms, Кубу нельзя convincibly сравнить к Ирану или Швеции как alleged положение террорист-затыловки, или, для тем делу, также Китаю, Ливии и Севернае Корея.

Включение Кубы аргументы за: Собственн-Нанося поражение аргумент
Each year к 30-ому апреля, mandated, что представляет Государственный департамент к съезду всестороннюю характеристику на деятельностях при террориста которые происходили повсеместно в мир, при несколько параграфов посвященных к каждой обозначенной стране рекламодателем положения террорисма. Following описание далось Кубы в «террорисме 2008 отчет о страны»:

Хотя Куба no longer активно не поддерживает вооруженную борьбу в латинской америке и других частях мира, кубинское правительство продолжалось снабдить безопасный haven несколько террористов. Члены ETA, FARC, и ELN остали в Кубе во время 2008, некотором приезжая в Кубу в связи с мирными переговоры с правительствами Испании и Колумбии. Кубинские авторитеты продолжаемые общественно для того чтобы защитить FARC. Однако, 6-ого июля 2008, бывший кубинский президент Fidel Castro call on FARC для того чтобы выпустить заложников, котор они держало без preconditions. Он также судил mistreatment FARC пленников и их увоза вольнонаемных политиканов не имели никакую роль в вооруженном конфликте.

Соединенные Штаты не имеют никакое доказательство террорист-родственной деньг laundering или деятельность при финансирования террориста в Кубе, хотя Куба имеет один из мира secretive и non-transparent национальные банковские системы. Куба не имеет никакой финансовохозяйственный блок сведении. Закон 93 Кубы против актов терроризма снабубежит правительственный орган след, блок, или заедает имущества террориста.

Кубинское правительство продолжалось позволить некоторые США беглец-включая члены групп США militant such as Boricua популярное, или Macheteros, и черную армию высвобождения для того чтобы жить законно в Кубе. In keeping with свое общественное объявление, правительство не снабдило безопасный haven VSе новые хотят беглецы США, котор для террорисма с 2006.

Иронически, это очень объяснение точно объясняет почему Куба не должна быть перечислена по мере того как рекламодатель положения террорисма. Первое предложение заявляет что Куба no longer «активно» не поддерживает террорисм, ясное несоответствие к утверждению Государственного департамента что страны на списке «повторно обеспечили поддержку для актов международного терроризма.» Утверждение что банковская система Кубы «втихомолку и non-transparent» делает маленько для того чтобы вызвать в вопрос реальность что разведовательные службы США не производили single piece credible доказательства доказывая что Куба будет террористами финансирования.

В действительности, будет ample доказательство что кубинское правительство принимало значительно измерения против террорисма. Закон 93, enacted в декабре 2001, обеспечивает правового основание для политики counterterrorism Кубы, и хотя после того как он заявлен в этом рапорте, Куба будет signatory до все 12 из конвенций и протоколов ООН против террорисма. Заявления Государственного департамента что Куба «продолжаемая общественно для того чтобы защитить» чолумбийскую сеть FARC террориста не задерживает против положения Fidel Castro Отдел-подтвердили общественное rebuke своих тактик. Дополнительно, в 2005, Fidel Castro объявило для того чтобы закончить его практику предлагая убежища к беглецам правосудия США, включая беглецов, котор хотят для террорисма, представляющ ясный перенос от политик холодной войны Кубы. В сентябре 2006, кубинское правительство upheld объявление Castro путем deporting американский человек который kidnapped его сынок и летел он к Кубе, единственный недавний случай в котором беглец США изыскивал безопасный haven в Кубе.

Один из аргументов Государственного департамента главным образом в рапорте что потому что Куба «продолжалась снабдить безопасный haven» чолумбийские и баскские террористы, это будет «рекламодателем положения террорисма.» Эта заявка во-первых не показалась в проект что уместное агенство Государственного департамента послало к съезду для своего предварительного просмотрения законотворческием органом. После того как член конгресса Miami-зоны злюще прореагировали к действиям Государственного департамента в не перечислять Кубу как рекламодатель положения террорисма, просмотрение второпях было вспомнено Государственным департаментом, где оно обхватывало к дому. Государственный департамент приняло это действие даже если баскским и чолумбийским террористам дали убежище на кубинской территории по запросу испанских и чолумбийских правительств соответственно, для того чтобы ускорить ожидающий решения отпуск заложника который они спросили на гуманитарных землях. Однако, пока никто отказывает что будут члены чужих организаций террориста живя в Кубе, обмылок запутанности Кубы ранее в случайн подготовлять международных революционеров, там был никаким credible доказательством на леты что поддержки Кубы в настоящее время или condones RABOTы этих групп. Эти ex-guerrillas некоторо не известный для того чтобы дирижировать деятельности при террориста или запустить нападения террориста из Кубы, и в действительности, по мере того как отчет о Государственного департамента заявляет что в страх, некоторые «приезжали в Кубу в связи с мирными переговоры.» В 2002 и 2003, правительство Колумбии общественно объявило что мирные переговоры держались с группой ELN rebel в Кубе, и она изыскивала «продолжаемое посредничество» Кубы в этих беседах. Колумбия, Куба, и ООН узнают 6 раундов переговоров с повстанцами с 2005. Сверх того, совет на чужих отношениях сообщает что FARC и ELN имеют присутсвие в много столиц повсеместно в Europe и латинская америка. Таким образом, присутсвие таких guerrillas в Кубе нельзя использовать для того чтобы образовать Кубу как сторонница международного терроризма.

Другим общим аргументом для Кубы будучи вывешиванным на список государственного терроризма, упорнейше reiterated над прошлой декадой, будет хлебосольство правительства обеспечивая для оцененные 70 беглецов правосудия США, некоторого подключенного с Нас-основанными организациями террориста. В частности, кубинское правительство снабубежит убежищем Джоан Chesimard, которое был член черной армии высвобождения, котор хотят для убийства 1973 положения Trooper Нью-Джерси и осматриваемые как заведомо авторитетами США. Она будет среди другого, котор хотят беглецами соединенными к освободительным движениям черноты и Puerto Rican. Куба отказывала подавляющее большинство США спрашивает, чтобы эти беглецы были переданы, on the grounds that «политические» беглецы не получили бы справедливый суд в США.

Однако, в большой части из этих ситуаций, использовать вышеуказанные случаи по мере того как аргументы для обозначения Кубы как положение террориста были бы увидены некоторым как reeking с лицемерностью. США сами держат нескольких беглецов кубинского правосудия, наиболее значительно Луис Posada Carriles, террорист anti-Castro вовлеченного в бомбометании авиакомпаний Cubana строгают в 1976, также, как серия 1997 бомбометаний в Havana, и попытке assassination на Fidel Castro в 2000. Вашингтон отказало повторные кубинские и венесуэльские запросы для экстрадиции Posada Carriles, требуя что он смотрел на пытку в этих странах, несмотря на обеспечения в противном случае. Случай Posada Carriles поразительн противоречит stance anti-террорисма вашингтона обычному и кажется, что нарушает разрешение 1373 Совета Безопасности ООН, продукт войны США на терроре, который заявляет что «заявки политического мотива» нельзя использовать как земли для «отказывать запросы экстрадиции alleged террористов.» США также отказывали к extradite Orlando Bosch, другому террористу обвиненному masterminding бомбометание самолета 1976 кубинцев.

In response to требования вашингтона для отпуска беглецов США, кубинское правительство требует отпуску 5 ссылалось кубинские шпионки в настоящее время заключинные в турьму в США и наказания которых были посчитаны несколькими группами прав человека как чрезмерно жестковато, которые были жертвы значительно смещения во время их тяжело politicized проба. Эта ситуация была exacerbated в Джун, когда верховный суд просклонял рассмотреть решение федерального аппеляционного суда который upheld первоначально проба в Miami как справедливо. Таким образом, удерживанием Кубы беглецов США будет результат взаимных враждебностей между 2 правительствами, и обязательно не показывает что Куба поддерживает международный терроризм. Сверх того, Мексика и El Salvador оба известного для того чтобы держать нескольких беглецов правосудия США. В январе 2004, времена вашингтона сообщили случаям несколько хотят мексиканца, котор для насильственных преступлений порученных в югозападных США, заявляющ что Мексика - городския власти отказали запросы США для экстрадиции этих подозреваемых. Такое доказательство добавляет к лицемерности обозначения Кубы уникально как положение террориста.

Значительно, самый воинственный язык используемый против Кубы в ранее отчетах о Государственного департамента извлекался от this year's террорисма отчет о страны. Под администрацией кустика, Государственный департамент, используя ritualized риторика, повторно обвиненная Куба отказывать скооперировать с войной Нас-водить на терроре. Пока Государственный департамент использовало бы эти примеры как главным образом доказательство что Куба была рекламодателем положения террорисма, это будет в действительности вс паразитное заключение. Куба не смогла быть предположена к инициативам counterterrorism forthrightly заднего вашингтона, котор дали legacy enmity между этими странами и попытки вашингтона perennial дестабилизируют кубинское правительство. Предположение президента Кустика что каждая страна в мире должна поддержать реакцию Американск-водить к террорисму, и что не сделать так путем следовать за своей моделью, обязательно обусловливает должна ли страна быть рассмотрена положением террориста, пункты к весьма заносчивому stance который удачно несколько был mitigated администрацией Obama. Miami Herald после того как он замечен что администрация Obama, путем извлекать outlandish заявлений от эры кустика, может предпринять окончательный водя к удалению Кубы от списка altogether.

Северная Корея и Ливия: Список террорисма как политическая рукоятка
Предельно, перечень «рекламодатели положения террорисма» часто использован Вашингтоном как политическая рукоятка, морковь или ручка, котор нужно использовать на стране которая abjectly следует за или определенно отрекается от политик США, и не как правомерное измерение ориентации страны к международному терроризму. Это будет самый ясный в случае Севернаи Корея, страна которая не похоже на Кубе, фактическ правоподобна для того чтобы спонсировать террорисм. Северная Корея извлеклась от перечня рекламодатели положения в октябре 2008, после того как правительство Ким Jong Il согласилось продолжать выводить из строя своего завода по обработке плутония на Yongbyon и позволять лимитированные осмотры своих ядерных средств. In this case, чисто expedience находилось на работах.

Удаление Севернаи Корея было немного больше чем чисто политический поступок, продукт желания продемонстрировать результаты бесед 6-Партии которые изыскали конец к программе страны ядерной с 2003 и промах попытка к placate угроза реальн реального. В июне 2008, после того как США сперва объявили удаление Севернаи Корея от списка террорисма и предложили только систему осмотра своих ядерных средств, Ким немедленно обратило путем угрожать возобновить его ядерную программу. Только когда США подперли вниз и предложенные более лимитированные осмотры сделали Ким соглашаются и его правительство извлеклось от положения спонсирует список. Такая польза списка террорисма как политическое приспособление заместителем секретаря Государственного департамента риса положения и совета национальной безопасности Белого дома, игнорирует очень определение террорисма на котором она ostensibly основана. Обрабатывает ли или не Северная Корея плутоний обязательно не обеспечивает убеждать доказательство, ни много, котор нужно сделать, с имеет ли или не она подготовляет международные группы террориста.

Определенно усмешливо, тогда, что несмотря на удаление Севернаи Корея от списка США, над прошлыми летами были постоянно заявления поддержки Севернаи Корея сетей террориста. Французские, японские, и южные корейские газеты и израильская чужая служба ссылались доказательство что режим Ким активно включается в подготовлять и тренировку Hizballah в Ливане; средства японии и чужая служба в Bangkok нашли что Северная Корея подготовляла тигров Tamil в Sri Lanka. Both of these группы чужими организациями террориста США такие, котор рапорты серьезно минируют заявку Государственного департамента Северная Корея «не спонсирует любому поступку террориста» с 1987, которое вытерпелось Государственным департаментом риса для того чтобы нажать вперед с своими программами ядерное разоружение несмотря на putative доказательство в противном случае. Придумка что Северная Корея no longer как рекламодатель положения террорисма, пока Куба remain on список, вздорна.

The case of Libya further highlights the use of Washington’s State Sponsors list as a political tool. The Libyan government was linked to various terrorist attacks in the 1980s and did not conform to the US counterterrorism standards until 2003, when the Libyan head of state Muammar al-Gaddafi agreed to allow United Nations inspectors to oversee the dismantling of Libya’s nuclear weapons program and accepted legal responsibility for the 1986 bombing of a Pan Am flight over Lockerbie. His reward for cooperation was Libya’s removal from the State Sponsors of Terrorism list in May 2006 and the normalization of diplomatic and trade relations.

When Libya opened its arms to the West and endorsed Washington’s unilateral counterterrorism policies, it received a prize; when Cuba fails to do so, it remains blacklisted. Yet despite this, Cuba certainly is no more a terrorist state than Libya. While Libya renounced its former policies in 2003, Cuba renounced its support of terrorist revolutionaries in 1992, and has not been shown to fund them since. Although the anti-Castro lobby alleges that the Cuban government is backing the training of guerillas in Venezuela, neither the State Department nor the intelligence community has produced evidence to back these contentions. In fact, demonstrably, Cuba poses far less a threat to the international security than does Libya, considering the continued presence of al-Qa’ida and other terrorist groups in Libya, despite al-Gaddafi’s current willingness to play into Washington’s hands.

Cuba, Iran, and Syria
Cuba’s designation as a state sponsor of terror becomes further discredited when Cuba is compared to two of its counterparts on the list, Iran and Syria, both of which are verifiable terrorist states. Iran is designated on the State Sponsors list primarily due to the functions of the Qods Force of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Group, a branch of the Iranian military, which has financed and trained Hamas, Hizballah, the Islamic Jihad, as well as radical militants in Iraq. Iran’s government is also holding members of al-Qa’ida, whom it refuses to identify or put on trial.

According to the State Department, Syria “provided political and military support to Hizballah” and its President Bashar al-Assad openly “expressed support” for many Palestinian militant groups. Several groups designated as Foreign Terrorist Organizations actively operate and train militants on Syrian territory, often with the tacit approval of the Syrian government. These allegations are not easily debunked as is the State Department’s far less evidenced language against Cuba.

Cuba’s inclusion on the terrorism list has often been justified by other countries on the State Sponsors list. In particular, the anti-Cuban lobby cites Fidel Castro’s May 2001 visit to Iran, Syria, and Libya as evidence that his government backs terrorism, often recalling Castro’s reported comment to Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khameini: “Iran and Cuba, in cooperation with each other, can bring America to its knees. The U.S. regime is very weak, and we are witnessing this weakness from close up.”

Given the entrenched hostilities between the US and Cuba, it is no surprise that Castro would find an ideological ally in the Islamic Republic, also a government born out of a revolution against an American client state. But there is no evidence that Castro’s rhetoric has materialized into cooperation in backing terrorists. While Cuba and Iran signed a banking agreement in early 2006, which facilitated trade between the two nations and provided for increased economic and scientific cooperation in the future, the US has not been able to prove that this agreement went beyond what it was publicly stated to be. Significantly, Cuban-Iranian relations have not been mentioned in the Country Reports on Terrorism for the past three years, a sign that Cuba cannot be deemed a terrorist state solely on the basis of association.

Conclusions: Moving Forward
As with many other aspects of US-Cuba relations, the Obama administration has so far not enacted the significant policy shifts hoped for by supporters of a rational and respectful approach to Latin America. When Hillary Clinton was questioned by Senator Richard Lugar during her confirmation hearings as to Cuba’s placement on the terrorism list, her vague response suggested the potential for change: “We anticipate a review of US policy regarding Cuba and look forward to working with members of the Committee and other members of Congress as we move forward to the consideration of appropriate steps to take to help advance US interests and values in the context of relations with Cuba.” But clearly her State Department has failed to produce an objective review and, at least up to now, instead has succumbed to the demands of the anti-Castro lobby which, despite fifty years of proof that isolation will not bring about democracy in Cuba, continues to put forth its same confrontational tactics.

The terrorism list is more than a symbol of an anachronistic policy; in an era when the lifting of the trade embargo appears to be a real possibility, Cuba’s designation as a terrorist state has practical implications for the potential extent of trade between the two nations. As it stands, even if the embargo were lifted, there would still exist significant impediments to full bilateral trade and other links between the two countries. The US would be forced to deny tax-free treatment of imported goods coming from Cuba; US citizens wanting to trade with Cuba would first need to seek a license from the Treasury Department; and the US would be forced to oppose any World Bank or IMF loans to the country. These stipulations of the US laws and regulations, under which Cuba is considered a terrorist state, would stall the country’s economic development and the growth of meaningful US-Cuba trading relations.

However, the removal of Cuba from the list of State Sponsors of Terrorism would be a simple procedure: President Obama would only have to present Congress with a statement at least 45 days before the proposed removal, ascertaining that Cuba has not supported international terrorism in the past six months and that it has pledged not to do so in the future. There are two precedents in recent years for the use of such Presidential authority and no precedents for Congress to block a President’s decision.

Such a move would signal the reprioritization of consistency and rationality in Cuba policy over domestic political jockeying. This is a clear sign to the likes of sharply tongued ideologues such as South Florida Reps. Ileana Ros-Lehtinen and Lincoln Diaz-Balart that the administration will no longer allow their ad hoc sense of history to prevent the US from improving its relations with Cuba. Moreover, this action would mark a decisive step toward the full normalization of relations with Cuba, a sign of goodwill to governments throughout Latin America that would have no negative impact on the security of the United States, yet prompt a surge of amity. The removal of Cuba from the list of State Sponsors of Terror is a matter of simple consistency, honesty, and integrity: these are the values Obama vowed to bring to policymaking during his campaign, and Latin Americans as well as North Americans are waiting to see if he will live up to his promises.



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The Council on Hemispheric Affairs, founded in 1975, is an independent, non-profit, non-partisan, tax-exempt research and information organization. It has been described on the Senate floor as being “one of the nation’s most respected bodies of scholars and policy makers.” For more information, visit www.coha.org




Door Brandon Bloch
De Vennoot van het Onderzoek COHA

Het recente opheffen van de opschorting van Cuba van lidmaatschap in de Organisatie van Amerikaanse Staten wijst erop dat de overheersing van Washington van het Inter-Amerikaanse systeem heeft overgegaan. De precondities die door OAS voor de vernieuwde toelating van Cuba worden geplaatst waren veel zwakker dan die Staatssecretaris Hillary Clinton oorspronkelijk had geëiste, aantonend de macht van regionale consensus onder Latijns-Amerikaanse leiders, die hun eerste stap vanaf het niet erkende beleid van het beleid Obama merkte.

De controverse die de vernieuwde toelating van Cuba omringt aan OAS toont ook aan dat Havana het kritiekste punt van geschil in het midden van hoop voor de betere ons-Latijnse banden van Amerika zal zijn. Als het nieuwe beleid snel naar genormaliseerde relaties met Cuba beslist op weg te zijn, zal het enorm de status van de V.S. in het gebied verbeteren; maar als Washington bij het handhaven van de traditionele vijandigheden aandringt heeft het voor decennia tegen Havana afgehandeld, zal het bijna zich zeker politiek onder de meer en meer autonome en vaak linker-leunt Latijns-Amerikaanse staten geïsoleerdn vinden.

Constant duidelijk in Washington is het beleid naar Cuba zijn lietmotif van het houden van irrationele dubbele normen: de V.S. handelen doorgaans naar de eilandnatie met wrok en wederkerend antagonisme, op een manier inconsistent met het beleid van de V.S. naar formidabeler en economisch krachtig, hoewel zelfs nog meer nondemocratic, staten dan Cuba. Deze houding wordt duidelijk vertoond in de voortdurende opneming van Cuba op de jaarlijkse lijst van de Afdeling van de Staat van de „Sponsors van de Staat van Terrorisme.“ Dit is een amorfe aanklacht tegen de overheid Castro die in de gebruikelijke berusting van Washington aan de anti-castro hal aan de grond wordt gezet die van Miami in werking wordt gesteld. Het nalaten van de Afdeling van de Staat om Cuba uit zijn onlangs gecompileerde lijst van „terrorisme“ te verwijderen sponsort tekens nog een ander teken van de inconsistentie en het valse begin die door de initiatieven van Cuba van het beleid Obama recente worden getoond. Het moet als ernstige tegenslag aan de mogelijke toekomstige normalisatie van relaties tussen de twee oude vijanden worden beoordeeld.

Cuba is op het terrorismeblacklist van de Afdeling van de Staat sinds 1 Maart, 1982 gebleven, toen het werd toegevoegd in een tijd van beweringen die het regime Castro bewapend revolutionaries door Latijns Amerika en Afrika had gefinancierd en opgeleid. Nochtans, in 1992 na de instorting van de Sowjetunie, deed afstand Fidel Castro van het vorige beleid van zijn overheid van het steunen van terroristenorganisaties. Vanaf toen, is Cuba niet gekend om financiële of logistieke steun aan zulk groepen verleend te hebben, die het onvergeeflijk maakt dat Cuba hostilely gemerkt door Washington, vooral gezien de recente verwijderingen van Libië en Noord-Korea van de terrorismelijst blijft. Ondanks de ernstige problemen die door de afschaffing van de Cubaanse overheid van democratische vrijheden worden gegeven, kan Cuba convincibly bij Iran of Syrië als zogenaamde terrorist-steunende staat, of, voor die kwestie, ook China, Libië en Noord-Korea worden vergeleken niet.

Het geval voor de Opneming van Cuba: een zelf-Verslaat Argument
Elk jaar tegen 30 April, wordt de Afdeling van de Staat verplicht gesteld om aan Congres een grondig rapport voor te leggen over de terroristenactiviteiten die over de hele wereld zijn voorgekomen, met verscheidene paragrafen toegewijd aan elk land aangewezen een Sponsor van de Staat van Terrorisme. De volgende beschrijving werd gegeven van Cuba in de „Rapporten van het Land over Terrorisme 2008“:

Hoewel de steunen van Cuba niet meer actief strijd in Latijns Amerika en andere delen van de wereld bewapenden, bleef de Cubaanse overheid veilig toevluchtsoord aan verscheidene terroristen verstrekken. De leden van ETA, FARC, en ELN bleven in Cuba in 2008, sommigen die in Cuba met betrekking tot vredesonderhandelingen zijn aangekomen met de regeringen van Spanje en Colombia. De Cubaanse overheid bleef FARC openbaar verdedigen. Nochtans, op 6 Juli, 2008, nodigde vroegere Cubaan President Fidel Castro FARC uit om de gijzelaars te bevrijden zij zonder precondities hielden. Hij heeft ook de mishandeling van FARC van gevangenen en van hun abductie van burgerlijke politici veroordeeld die geen rol in het gewapende conflict hadden.

De Verenigde Staten hebben geen bewijsmateriaal van op terroristbetrekking hebbende witwassen van geld of terrorist financiering activiteiten in Cuba, hoewel Cuba één van de het geslotenst en ondoorzichtige nationale het bankwezensystemen van de wereld heeft. Cuba heeft geen financiële intelligentieeenheid. Wet 93 van Cuba tegen Handelingen van Terrorisme verstrekt het overheidsgezag aan spoor, blok, of grijpt terroristenactiva.

De Cubaanse overheid bleef de één of andere V.S. vluchteling-met inbegrip van leden van de militante groepen van de V.S. zoals Boricua Populair, of Macheteros, en het Zwarte Leger van de Bevrijding toelaten om juridisch in Cuba te leven. In overeenstemming met zijn openbare verklaring, heeft de overheid veilig toevluchtsoord aan geen nieuwe gewilde vluchtelingen van de V.S. voor terrorisme sinds 2006 verstrekt.

Ironisch, verklaart deze eigenlijke verklaring precies waarom Cuba niet als Sponsor van de Staat van Terrorisme zou moeten worden vermeld. De eerste zin verklaart dat Cuba niet meer „actief“ terrorisme, een duidelijke tegenspraak aan het geschil steunt dat van de Afdeling van de Staat de landen op de lijst „herhaaldelijk steun voor handelingen van internationaal terrorisme.“ hebben verleend Het geschil dat het het bankwezensysteem van Cuba „“ geheim en ondoorzichtig is doet weinig de werkelijkheid in vraag stellen dat de de intelligentieagentschappen van de V.S. geen één enkel stuk van geloofwaardige bewijsmateriaaltest hebben veroorzaakt dat Cuba terroristen financiert.

In feite, is er ruim bewijsmateriaal dat de Cubaanse overheid significante maatregelen tegen terrorisme heeft getroffen. Wet 93, die in December 2001 wordt bepaald, vormt een wettelijke basis voor counterterrorismbeleid van Cuba, en hoewel verklaard niet in dit rapport, is Cuba een ondertekenende partij aan alle twaalf van de V.N.- overeenkomsten en protocollen tegen terrorisme. De beweringen dat van de Afdeling van de Staat Cuba „“ het Columbiaanse terroristennetwerk FARC bleef openbaar verdedigen steunen niet tegen de afdeling-Erkende openbare berisping van Fidel Castro Staat van zijn tactiek. Bovendien, in 2005, verklaarde Fidel Castro om zijn praktijk te beëindigen van het aanbieden van toevluchtsoord aan vluchtelingen van de rechtvaardigheid van de V.S., met inbegrip van vluchtelingen die voor terrorisme worden gewild, dat een duidelijke verschuiving van het beleid van de Koude Oorlog van Cuba vertegenwoordigt. In September 2006, bevestigde de Cubaanse overheid de verklaring van Castro door een Amerikaanse mens te deporteren die zijn zoon had ontvoerd en hem aan Cuba, het enige recente geval gevlogen waarin een vluchteling van de V.S. veilig toevluchtsoord in Cuba heeft gezocht.

Één van de belangrijkste argumenten van de Afdeling van de Staat in het rapport is dat omdat Cuba „een veilig toevluchtsoord“ aan Columbiaanse en Baskische terroristen bleef verstrekken, het een „Sponsor van de Staat van Terrorisme.“ is Deze eis verscheen niet eerst in het ontwerp dat het relevante agentschap van de Afdeling van de Staat naar Congres voor zijn inleidend overzicht door het wetgevende lichaam verzond. Nadat de Miami-Gebied leden van Congres woedend aan de acties van de Afdeling van de Staat in het een lijst maken van van geen Cuba als Sponsor van de Staat van Terrorisme hadden gereageerd, werd het overzicht haastig herinnerd door de Afdeling van de Staat, aan waar het aan het Huis boog. De afdeling van de Staat voerde deze actie alhoewel de Baskische en Columbiaanse terroristen toevluchtsoord op Cubaans grondgebied op verzoek van de Spaanse en Columbiaanse overheden respectievelijk waren gegeven om een hangende gijzelaarsversie te bevorderen dieom zij op humanitaire gronden verzochten. Nochtans, terwijl niemand ontkent dat er lid van buitenlandse terroristenorganisaties die in Cuba leven is, een rest van de vorige betrokkenheid van Cuba in nu en dan het bewapenen internationale revolutionaries, is er jarenlang geen geloofwaardig bewijsmateriaal geweest dat Cuba steunt of momenteel de activiteiten van deze groepen vergeeft. Deze ex-guerilla's zeker zijn niet gekend om terroristenactiviteiten uit te voeren of terroristenaanvallen te lanceren uit Cuba, en in feite, aangezien het rapport van de Afdeling van de Staat opgeeft dat in vrees, sommigen „in Cuba met betrekking tot vredesonderhandelingen.“ zijn aangekomen In 2002 en 2003, kondigde de regering van Colombia openbaar aan dat de vredesonderhandelingen met de rebellengroep ELN in Cuba werden gevoerd, en het streefde naar de „voortdurende bemiddeling“ van Cuba in deze besprekingen. Colombia, Cuba, en de V.N. hebben zes rondes van onderhandelingen met de rebellen sinds 2005 erkend. Voorts rapporteert de Raad over Buitenlandse Relaties dat FARC en ELN een aanwezigheid in vele kapitalen door Europa en Latijns Amerika hebben. Aldus, kan de aanwezigheid van dergelijke guerilla's in Cuba worden gebruikt niet om Cuba als verdediger van internationaal terrorisme te vormen.

Het andere gemeenschappelijke argument dat voor Cuba op de lijst van het staatsterrorisme wordt gepost, dat voortdurend tijdens het afgelopen decennium wordt herhaald, is de verstrekkende gastvrijheid van de overheid voor geschatte 70 vluchtelingen van de rechtvaardigheid van de V.S., wat verbonden aan US-based terroristenorganisaties. In het bijzonder, verstrekt de Cubaanse overheid toevluchtsoord aan Joanne Chesimard, die een lid van het Zwarte Leger van de Bevrijding dat voor de moord van 1973 van Trooper van de Staat van New Jersey was wordt gewild en bekend door de autoriteiten van de V.S. bekeek. Zij is onder andere gewilde vluchtelingen die met de bevrijdingsbewegingen van de Zwarte en van Puerto Rican worden verbonden. Cuba heeft de overgrote meerderheid van V.S.- verzoeken geweigerd dat deze vluchtelingen worden omgekeerd, omdat de „politieke“ vluchtelingen geen eerlijke proef in de V.S. zouden ontvangen.

Nochtans, in het grootste deel van deze situaties, de bovengenoemde gevallen als argumenten voor de benoeming van Cuba als terroristenstaat gebruiken door sommigen worden gezien zoals reeking met schijnheiligheid. De V.S. zelf houden verscheidene vluchtelingen van Cubaanse rechtvaardigheid, het meest beduidend Luis Posada Carriles, een anti-castro terrorist die bij het bombarderen van een vliegtuig van Luchtvaartlijnen Cubana in 1976, evenals een reeks van het bombarderen van 1997 in Havana, en een moordpoging wordt betrokken op Fidel Castro in 2000. Washington heeft herhaalde Cubaanse en Venezolaanse verzoeken om de uitlevering die van Posada Carriles geweigerd beweren, dat hij marteling in deze landen, ondanks verzekeringen anders onder ogen zou zien. Het geval van Posada Carriles spreekt opvallend gebruikelijke het anti-terrorismehouding tegen van Washington en schijnt om Resolutie 1373, een product van de Veiligheidsraad van de V.N. Van de Oorlog van de V.S. op Verschrikking te overtreden, die verklaart dat de „eisen van politieke motivatie“ als redenen niet kunnen worden gebruikt tot „het weigeren van de uitleveringsverzoeken van zogenaamde terroristen.“ De V.S. hebben ook geweigerd om Orlando Bosch, een andere terrorist uit te leveren die van het masterminding van het Cubaanse de vliegtuigen van 1976 bombarderen wordt beschuldigd.

In antwoord op de vraag van Washington naar de versie van de vluchtelingen van de V.S., eist de Cubaanse overheid de versie van vijf beweerde Cubaanse spionnen die momenteel in de V.S. worden gevangengenomen en de van wie straffen door een aantal rechten van de mensgroepen bovenmatig ruw zijn geacht, die de slachtoffers van significante bias tijdens hun zwaar gepolitiseerde proef waren. Deze situatie werd verergerd in Juni, toen het Opperste Hof daalde om het besluit van een federaal beroephof te herzien dat de aanvankelijke proef in Miami eerlijk had bevestigd. Aldus, is het behoud van Cuba van de vluchtelingen van de V.S. een resultaat van de wederkerige vijandigheden tussen de twee overheden, en wijst noodzakelijk niet erop dat Cuba internationaal terrorisme steunt. Voorts zijn Mexico en El Salvador allebei gekend om verscheidene vluchtelingen van de rechtvaardigheid van de V.S. te houden. In Januari 2004, meldden de Tijden van Washington de gevallen van verscheidene Mexicanen die voor hevige misdaden toegewijd in de Zuidwestelijke V.S. worden gewild verklaart, die dat de autoriteiten van Mexico-City V.S.- verzoeken om de uitlevering van deze verdachten hebben geweigerd. Dergelijk bewijsmateriaal voegt aan de schijnheiligheid van de unieke benoeming van Cuba toe als terroristenstaat.

Beduidend, is de oorlogszuchtigste taal die tegen Cuba in de vorige rapporten van de Afdeling van de Staat wordt aangewend verwijderd uit Rapporten de van dit jaar van het Land over Terrorisme. Onder het beleid van Bush, de Afdeling van de Staat, ritualized het gebruiken retoriek, herhaaldelijk beschuldigd Cuba van het weigeren om met de ons-Geleide Oorlog op Verschrikking samen te werken. Terwijl de Afdeling van de Staat deze voorbeelden als primair bewijsmateriaal zou gebruiken dat Cuba een Sponsor van de Staat van Terrorisme was, is dit in feite een volledig onechte conclusie. Cuba kon niet verwacht te zijn om counterterrorisminitiatieven van Washington, gezien de erfenis van vijandschap tussen deze landen en van Washington eeuwigdurende pogingen rechtstreeks te steunen om de Cubaanse overheid destabiliseren. De veronderstelling dat van President Bush's elk land in de wereld de Amerikaans-Geleide reactie op terrorisme moet steunen, en dat niet dit doen door zijn model te volgen, noodzakelijk bepaalt of een land een als terroristenstaat zou moeten worden beschouwd, punten aan een uiterst arrogante houding die gelukkig door het Beleid Obama enigszins verlicht is geweest. Miami kondigt opgemerkt aan dat het beleid Obama, door outlandish van de beweringen uit de era van Bush te verwijderen, kan een definitieve maatregel getroffen hebben die tot de verwijdering van Cuba van de lijst totaal leidt.

Noord- Korea en Libië: De lijst van het Terrorisme als Politieke Hefboom
Uiteindelijk, wordt de lijst van de „Sponsors van de Staat van Terrorisme“ vaak aangewend door Washington als politieke hefboom, wortel of stok die op een land moet worden gebruikt dat volgt of absoluut abjectly van het beleid van de V.S., en als geen wettige maatregel van de houding van een land ten opzichte van internationaal terrorisme afstand doet. Dit wordt duidelijkst in het geval van Noord-Korea, een land dat in tegenstelling tot Cuba, eigenlijk waarschijnlijk zal terrorisme sponsoren. Noord- Korea werd verwijderd uit de lijst van de Sponsors van de Staat in Oktober 2008, nadat de overheid van Kim Jong IL overeenkwam om het onbruikbaar maken van zijn installatie van de plutoniumverwerking voort te zetten in Yongbyon en voor beperkte inspecties van zijn kernfaciliteiten toe te staan. In dit geval, zuivere was expedience op de werk.

De verwijdering van Noord-Korea was klein meer dan een zuiver politieke handeling, het product van een wens om resultaten van de zes-Partij besprekingen aan te tonen die een eind aan het kernprogramma van het land sinds 2003 hadden gezocht en een geblunderde poging om een echte veiligheidsbedreiging te kalmeren. In Juni 2008, na de eerst aangekondigd van de V.S. verwijdering Noord- van Korea van de terrorismelijst en voorgesteld een strikt systeem van inspectie van zijn kernfaciliteiten, keerde Kim zich onmiddellijk door om zijn kernprogramma te dreigen om te hervatten. Slechts toen de V.S. terugkrabbelden en voorstelden deden de meer beperkte inspecties Kim akkoord gaan en zijn overheid werd verwijderd uit de lijst van de Sponsors van de Staat. Dergelijk gebruik van de terrorismelijst zoals een politiek apparaat door de Afdeling van de Staat onder de Rijst van de Staatssecretaris En de Veiligheidsraad van de Ingezetene van het Witte Huis, Negeert de eigenlijke definitie van terrorisme waarop het schijnbaar gebaseerd is. Al dan niet Noord-Korea plutonium verwerkt verstrekt noodzakelijk geen overtuigend bewijs, noch heeft veel, met al dan niet te doen het internationale terroristengroepen bewapent.

Het is bijzonder ironisch, dan, dat ondanks de verwijdering van Noord-Korea van de V.S.- lijst, in de loop van de afgelopen jaren er voortdurende beweringen van steun de Noord- van Korea van terroristennetwerken zijn geweest. De Franse, Japanse, en Zuidkoreaanse kranten en de Israëlische buitenlandse intelligentiedienst hebben bewijsmateriaal beweerd dat het regime van Kim bij het bewapenen en opleiding van Hizballah in Libanon actief betrokken is; de media van Japan en de buitenlandse intelligentiedienst in Bangkok vonden dat Noord-Korea de Tamil Tijgers in Sri Lanka heeft bewapend. Beide groepen zijn aangewezen de Buitenlandse Organisaties van de Terrorist door de V.S. Dergelijke rapporten ernstig de eis van de Afdeling ondermijnen van de Staat dat Noord-Korea „geen terroristenhandeling“ sinds 1987 heeft gesponsord, die door de Afdeling van de Staat van de Rijst met zijn kernontwapeningsprogramma's ondanks het vemeende bewijsmateriaal anders naar voren te schuiven werd ondersteund. Het begrip dat Noord-Korea niet meer als Sponsor van de Staat van Terrorisme wordt aangewezen, terwijl Cuba op de lijst blijft, is absurd.

The case of Libya further highlights the use of Washington’s State Sponsors list as a political tool. The Libyan government was linked to various terrorist attacks in the 1980s and did not conform to the US counterterrorism standards until 2003, when the Libyan head of state Muammar al-Gaddafi agreed to allow United Nations inspectors to oversee the dismantling of Libya’s nuclear weapons program and accepted legal responsibility for the 1986 bombing of a Pan Am flight over Lockerbie. His reward for cooperation was Libya’s removal from the State Sponsors of Terrorism list in May 2006 and the normalization of diplomatic and trade relations.

When Libya opened its arms to the West and endorsed Washington’s unilateral counterterrorism policies, it received a prize; when Cuba fails to do so, it remains blacklisted. Yet despite this, Cuba certainly is no more a terrorist state than Libya. While Libya renounced its former policies in 2003, Cuba renounced its support of terrorist revolutionaries in 1992, and has not been shown to fund them since. Although the anti-Castro lobby alleges that the Cuban government is backing the training of guerillas in Venezuela, neither the State Department nor the intelligence community has produced evidence to back these contentions. In fact, demonstrably, Cuba poses far less a threat to the international security than does Libya, considering the continued presence of al-Qa’ida and other terrorist groups in Libya, despite al-Gaddafi’s current willingness to play into Washington’s hands.

Cuba, Iran, and Syria
Cuba’s designation as a state sponsor of terror becomes further discredited when Cuba is compared to two of its counterparts on the list, Iran and Syria, both of which are verifiable terrorist states. Iran is designated on the State Sponsors list primarily due to the functions of the Qods Force of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Group, a branch of the Iranian military, which has financed and trained Hamas, Hizballah, the Islamic Jihad, as well as radical militants in Iraq. Iran’s government is also holding members of al-Qa’ida, whom it refuses to identify or put on trial.

According to the State Department, Syria “provided political and military support to Hizballah” and its President Bashar al-Assad openly “expressed support” for many Palestinian militant groups. Several groups designated as Foreign Terrorist Organizations actively operate and train militants on Syrian territory, often with the tacit approval of the Syrian government. These allegations are not easily debunked as is the State Department’s far less evidenced language against Cuba.

Cuba’s inclusion on the terrorism list has often been justified by other countries on the State Sponsors list. In particular, the anti-Cuban lobby cites Fidel Castro’s May 2001 visit to Iran, Syria, and Libya as evidence that his government backs terrorism, often recalling Castro’s reported comment to Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khameini: “Iran and Cuba, in cooperation with each other, can bring America to its knees. The U.S. regime is very weak, and we are witnessing this weakness from close up.”

Given the entrenched hostilities between the US and Cuba, it is no surprise that Castro would find an ideological ally in the Islamic Republic, also a government born out of a revolution against an American client state. But there is no evidence that Castro’s rhetoric has materialized into cooperation in backing terrorists. While Cuba and Iran signed a banking agreement in early 2006, which facilitated trade between the two nations and provided for increased economic and scientific cooperation in the future, the US has not been able to prove that this agreement went beyond what it was publicly stated to be. Significantly, Cuban-Iranian relations have not been mentioned in the Country Reports on Terrorism for the past three years, a sign that Cuba cannot be deemed a terrorist state solely on the basis of association.

Conclusions: Moving Forward
As with many other aspects of US-Cuba relations, the Obama administration has so far not enacted the significant policy shifts hoped for by supporters of a rational and respectful approach to Latin America. When Hillary Clinton was questioned by Senator Richard Lugar during her confirmation hearings as to Cuba’s placement on the terrorism list, her vague response suggested the potential for change: “We anticipate a review of US policy regarding Cuba and look forward to working with members of the Committee and other members of Congress as we move forward to the consideration of appropriate steps to take to help advance US interests and values in the context of relations with Cuba.” But clearly her State Department has failed to produce an objective review and, at least up to now, instead has succumbed to the demands of the anti-Castro lobby which, despite fifty years of proof that isolation will not bring about democracy in Cuba, continues to put forth its same confrontational tactics.

The terrorism list is more than a symbol of an anachronistic policy; in an era when the lifting of the trade embargo appears to be a real possibility, Cuba’s designation as a terrorist state has practical implications for the potential extent of trade between the two nations. As it stands, even if the embargo were lifted, there would still exist significant impediments to full bilateral trade and other links between the two countries. The US would be forced to deny tax-free treatment of imported goods coming from Cuba; US citizens wanting to trade with Cuba would first need to seek a license from the Treasury Department; and the US would be forced to oppose any World Bank or IMF loans to the country. These stipulations of the US laws and regulations, under which Cuba is considered a terrorist state, would stall the country’s economic development and the growth of meaningful US-Cuba trading relations.

However, the removal of Cuba from the list of State Sponsors of Terrorism would be a simple procedure: President Obama would only have to present Congress with a statement at least 45 days before the proposed removal, ascertaining that Cuba has not supported international terrorism in the past six months and that it has pledged not to do so in the future. There are two precedents in recent years for the use of such Presidential authority and no precedents for Congress to block a President’s decision.

Such a move would signal the reprioritization of consistency and rationality in Cuba policy over domestic political jockeying. This is a clear sign to the likes of sharply tongued ideologues such as South Florida Reps. Ileana Ros-Lehtinen and Lincoln Diaz-Balart that the administration will no longer allow their ad hoc sense of history to prevent the US from improving its relations with Cuba. Moreover, this action would mark a decisive step toward the full normalization of relations with Cuba, a sign of goodwill to governments throughout Latin America that would have no negative impact on the security of the United States, yet prompt a surge of amity. The removal of Cuba from the list of State Sponsors of Terror is a matter of simple consistency, honesty, and integrity: these are the values Obama vowed to bring to policymaking during his campaign, and Latin Americans as well as North Americans are waiting to see if he will live up to his promises.



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The Council on Hemispheric Affairs, founded in 1975, is an independent, non-profit, non-partisan, tax-exempt research and information organization. It has been described on the Senate floor as being “one of the nation’s most respected bodies of scholars and policy makers.” For more information, visit www.coha.org




ب [برندون] [بلوش]
[كها] بحر شريكة

الأخيرة يشير يرفع من كوبا تعليق من عضوية في ال [أرغنيزأيشن وف] [أمريكن ستت] أنّ واشنطن سيطرة من النظامة [إينتر-مريكن] قد مرّ. كان ال [بركنديأيشن] يثبت ب ال [وأس] لكوبا [ردميسّيون] بعيدا ضعيفة من أنّ وزير الدولة [هيلّري] [كلينتون] أصلا كان قد طلب, يعرض القوة من توافق الآراء إقليميّة بين زعيمات [لتين-مريكن], أيّ علم [إينيتيل ستب] هم بعيدا من ال ينكر سياسات من [أبما] إدارة.

يبدي الجدال يحيط ال [ردميسّيون] كوبا إلى ال [وأس] أيضا أنّ هافانا سيكون النقطة حرجة خلاف أكثر في أمل ل يحسن [أوس-لتين] أمريكا روابط. إن الإدارة جديدة يقرّر أن بسرعة تحرّكت نحو علاقات [نورمليزد] مع كوبا, سيحسن هو بوفرة ال [أوس] الموقف في المنطقة; أنزل غير أنّ إن واشنطن يلحّ على يبقي العداءات تقليديّة هو يتلقّى لعقود ضدّ هافانا, هو تقريبا بالتّأكيد سيجدبنفسي سياسيّا يعزل بين ال بدرجة متزايدة مستقلّة وغالبا [لفت-لنينغ] دول [لتين-مريكن].

باستمرار ظاهرة في واشنطن سياسة نحو كوبا [ليتموتيف] ه من يمسك [دووبل ستندرد] غير منطقيّ: يتصرّف ال [أوس] [هبيتثلّي] نحو الجزيرة أمة مع حقد وتعارض انعكاسيّة, [إين ا منّر] متناقضة مع [أوس] سياسات نحو أكثر هائلة واقتصاديّا قوّيّة, رغم أنّ [إفن مور] [نوندموكرتيك], دول من كوبا. أبديت هذا موقف بوضوح في كوبا يستمرّ تضمن على الدولة قسم قائمة ميلان إلى جانب سنويّة من "دولة كفيلات الإرهاب." هذا تهمة غير متبلور ضدّ كاسترو حكومة يعتمد في واشنطن إذعان معتادة إلى ال [أنتي-كسترو] ردهة يركض من ميامي. الدولة قسم يعلم إخفاق أن يزيل كوبا من ه أكثر مؤخّرا ينسّق قائمة ميلان إلى جانب من "إرهاب" كفيلات [يت نوثر] إشارة من التقلبات وبدايات زائفة يكون يعرض ب [أبما] إدارة أخيرة كوبا مبادرات. هو ينبغي كنت قضيت كنكسة جدّيّة إلى ال يمكن تسوية مقبلة علاقات بين الاثنان أعداء قديمة.

قد [رمين ون] كوبا الدولة قسم إرهاب قائمة سوداء منذ مارس - آذار 1, 1982, عندما هو كان أضفت [أت ا تيم] من ادّعاءات أنّ كاسترو نظامة كان قد كان يموّل ويدرّب [رفولوأيشنريس] مسلّحة طوال [لتين مريك] وإفريقيا. مهما, في 1992 عقب أنكر الانهيار من [سفيت ونيون], فيديل كاسترو حكومته سياسة سابقة من يساند إرهابية تنظيمات. منذ أنّ وقت, لا يعرف كوبا أن يتلقّى يزوّد ماليّة أو دعم [لوجستيكل] إلى [أني سوش] مجموعة, أيّ يجعل هو [إينإكسكسبل] أنّ كوبا أثر [هوستيللي] يوسم بواشنطن, خصوصا [إين ليغت وف] الإزالة أخيرة من ليبيا و [نورث كورا] من الإرهاب قائمة ميلان إلى جانب. طرح على الرغم من المشاكل جدّيّة بالكوبيّة حكومة إخماد من حريات ديموقراطيّة, كوبا يستطيع لا [كنفينسبلي] كنت قارنت إلى إيران أو سوريا كمزعومة [ترّوريست-بكينغ] دولة, أو, ل أنّ أمر, أيضا الصين, ليبيا و [نورث كورا].

الحالة لكوبا تضمن: [سلف-دفتينغ] حجة
[إش ر] بأبريل - نيسان 30, الدولة انتدبت قسم أن يقدّم إلى إجتماع تقرير كاملة على الإرهابية أنشطة أنّ قد وقع طوال العالم, مع عدّة فقرات يكرّس إلى كلّ بلد يعيّن دولة كفيلة الإرهاب. أعطيت الوصف تالي كان من كوبا في ال "بلد تقارير على إرهاب 2008":

رغم أنّ كوبا [نو لونجر] بنشاط دعامات يسلّح يكافحون في [لتين مريك] وأخرى أجزاء من العالم, استمرّ الحكومة كوريّة أن يزوّد مأوى آمنة إلى عدّة إرهابيات. بقي أعضاء من [إتا], ال [فرك], وال [إلن] في كوبا أثناء 2008, بعض يتلقّى يصل في كوبا [إين كنّكأيشن ويث] سلام مفاوضات مع الحكومات إسبانيا وكولومبيا. سلطات كوريّة يستمرّ أن علنا دافعت ال [فرك]. مهما, في يوليو-تمّوز 6, 2008, [كلّ ون] رئيس سابقة كونيّة فيديل كاسترو ال [فرك] أن يطلق الرهائن هم كان أمسكوا دون [بركنديأيشن]. يدين هو يتلقّى أيضا ال [فرك] معاملة ظالم من أسيرات ومن اختطافهم من سياسيات مدنيّة الذي تلقّى ما من دور في النزاع مسلّحة.

يتلقّى الولايات المتّحدة الأمريكيّة ما من بيّنة من مال [ترّوريست-رلتد] يغسل أو إرهابية تمويل أنشطة في كوبا, رغم أنّ كوبا يتلقّى واحدة من العالم أكثر كتوم ونظام بنكيّ [نون-ترنسبرنت] وطنيّة. كوبا يتلقّى ما من [إينتلّيجنس ونيت] ماليّة. كوبا يزوّد قانون 93 ضدّ أعمال الإرهاب الحكومة سلطة إلى أثر, قالب, أو على قبض إرهابية أصول.

استمرّ الحكومة كوبيّ أن يسمح بعض [أوس] [فوجتيفس-ينكلودينغ] أعضاء من [أوس] مجموعة مناضلة مثل [بوريكا] شعبيّة, أو [مشتروس], والسوداء تحرير جيش أن يعيش قانونيّا في كوبا. [إين كيبينغ ويث] إعلانه عامّة, لم يزوّد الحكومة يتلقّى مأوى آمنة إلى أيّ جديدة [أوس] [فوجتيفس] يراد لإرهاب منذ 2006.

بسخرية, يفسّر هذا شرح جدّا تماما لما كوبا سوفت لا يكون عدّلت بما أنّ دولة كفيلة الإرهاب. يفيد الجملة أولى أنّ كوبا [نو لونجر] "بنشاط" يساند إرهاب, تناقض واضحة إلى الدولة قسم خلاف أنّ بلاد على القائمة ميلان إلى جانب "يتلقّى بشكل متكرّر يزوّدون دعم لأعمال من إرهاب دوليّة." يتمّ الخلاف أنّ كوبا نظام بنكيّ "سرّيّة و [نون-ترنسبرنت]" بعض أن يدعو داخل سؤال الحقيقة أنّ ال [أوس] وكالة المخابرات يتلقّى لم ينتجوا [سنغل بيس] من بيّنة معقولة يبرهن أنّ كوبا تمويل إرهابيات.

[إين فكت], هناك بيّنة وافرة أنّ قد أخذ الحكومة كوبيّة إجراءات هامّة ضدّ إرهاب. يزوّد قانون 93, يشرّع في ديسمبر - كانون الأوّل 2001, [لغل بسس] لكوبا [كونترترّوريسم] سياسة, ورغم أنّ لا يفيد في هذا تقرير, كوبا [سنتوري] إلى كلّ إثنا عشر من المنظّمة الأمم المتّحدة إتّفاق وبروتوكولات ضدّ إرهاب. الدولة قسم ادّعاءات أنّ لا يعطّل كوبا "يستمرّ أن علنا دافعت" الكولومبيّة إرهابية شبكة [فرك] ضدّ فيديل كاسترو دولة [دبرتمنت-كنوولدجد] [ربوك] عامّة من تكتيكاته. إضافة إلى ذلك, في 2005, أفاد فيديل كاسترو أن ينهي ممارسته من يقدّم مأوى إلى [فوجتيفس] من [أوس] عدل, بما في ذلك [فوجتيفس] يراد لإرهاب, يمثّل تغير واضحة من كوبا حرب باردة سياسات. في سبتمبر - أيلول 2006, دعم الحكومة كوبيّة كاسترو إعلان ب يرحّل رجل أمريكيّة الذي كان قد خطف إبنته وطاره إلى كوبا, الحالة وحيدة أخيرة في أيّ [أوس] هاربة قد بحث مأوى آمنة في كوبا.

واحدة من الدولة قسم حجات رئيسيّة في التقرير أنّ لأنّ كوبا "استمرّ أن يزوّد مأوى آمنة" إلى كولومبيّة وإرهابيات باسكيّ, هو "دولة كفيلة الإرهاب." لم يظهر هذا إدعاء أوّلا في المسوّدة أنّ الموافقة دولة قسم وكالة أرسل إلى إجتماع لمراجعاته تمهيديّة بالجسم تشريعيّة. عقب [ميمي-را] تجاوب أعضاء الإجتماع تلقّى بغضب إلى الدولة قسم أعمال في لا يعدّل كوبا كدولة كفيلة الإرهاب, المراجعات كان بتهوّر تذكّرت بالدولة قسم, حيث هو حنى إلى المنزل. الدولة أخذ قسم هذا عمل [إفن ثوو] الباسكيّ وإرهابيات كولومبيّة تلقّى يكون أعطيت مأوى على أرض كوبيّ [أت ث رقوست وف] الإسبانيّة وحكومات كولومبيّة على التّوالي, [إين وردر تو] عجّلت معلّقة رهينة إطلاق أنّ هم رجاوا على أراضي إنسانيّة. مهما, بينما لا أحد ينكر أنّ هناك أعضاء من أجنبيّة إرهابية تنظيمات يعيش في كوبا, قد كان بقية من كوبا تورط سابقة في أحيانا يسلّح [رفولوأيشنريس] دوليّة, هناك ما من بيّنة معقولة لسنون أنّ كوبا حاليّا دعامات أو يغفر الأنشطة من هذا مجموعة. لا يعرف هذا [إإكس-غرّيلّس] بالتّأكيد أن يوصل إرهابية أنشطة أو أطلقت إرهابية هجوم من كوبا, و [إين فكت], بما أنّ الدولة قسم تقرير يفيد أنّ في خوف, بعض "قد وصل في كوبا [إين كنّكأيشن ويث] سلام مفاوضات." في 2002 و2003, أعلن الحكومة كولومبيا علنا أنّ سلام مفاوضات كان يكون أمسكت مع ال [إلن] مجموعة متمرّدة في كوبا, وهو بحث ال "يستمرّ توسط" من كوبا في هذا محادثات. قد ميّز كولومبيا, كوبا, والمنظّمة الأمم المتّحدة ستّة دورات المفاوضات مع المتمردات منذ 2005. فضلا عن ذلك, يفيد المجلس على علاقات أجنبيّة أنّ ال [فرك] و [إلن] يتلقّى وجود في كثير رأس مال طوال أوروبا و [لتين مريك]. لذلك, الوجود من هذا [غرّيلّا] في كوبا يستطيع لا يكون استعملت أن يمثّل كوبا كمؤيدة من إرهاب دوليّة.

الأخرى حجة عاديّة لكوبا يكون يعيّن على الدولة إرهاب قائمة ميلان إلى جانب, باستمرار يكرّر على العقد سابقة, الحكومة يزوّد ضيافة ل يقدّم 70 [فوجتيفس] من [أوس] عدل, بعض يربط مع [أوس-بسد] إرهابية تنظيمات. [إين برتيكلر], يزوّد الحكومة كوريّة مأوى إلى [جوأنّ] [شسمرد], الذي كان عضوة من السوداء تحرير جيش يراد ل ال 1973 جريمة قتل من [نو-جرسي] دولة [ترووبر] ويشاهد بما أنّ شهيرة ب [أوس] سلطات. هو بين أخرى يراد [فوجتيفس] يربط إلى أسود و [بورتو] [ريكن] تحرير حركات. قد رفض كوبا ال [فست مجوريتي] ال [أوس] يرجو أنّ هذا [فوجتيفس] ينكّسوا, [أن ث غرووندس ثت] "سياسيّة" [فوجتيفس] لم يستلموا محاكمة عادلة في ال [أوس].

مهما, في أكثر من هذا حالات, أن يستعمل الحالات آنفة بما أنّ حجات لكوبا تعيين كإرهابية دولة كنت رأيت ب بعض بما أنّ يفوح مع نفاق. يمسك ال [أوس] بنفسي عدّة [فوجتيفس] من عدل كوريّة, أكثر بشكل ملحوظ [لويس] [بوسدا] [كرّيلس], [أنتي-كسترو] إرهابية يورّط في القصف من [كبنا] خطوط يمسح في 1976, [أس ولّ س] [سري] من 1997 قصفات في هافانا, وإغتيال محاولة على فيديل كاسترو في 2000. قد رفض واشنطن يكرّس كوريّة وطلبات فنزويليّة لالعمليّة تسليم ال [بوسدا] [كرّيلس], يدّعي أنّ هو واجه تعذيب في هذا بلاد, على الرغم من تأمينات خلاف ذلك. ال [بوسدا] [كرّيلس] يناقض حالة [ستريكينغلي] واشنطن معتادة [أنتي-ترّوريسم] وقت ويظهر أن ينتهك منظّمة الأمم المتّحدة أمن مجلس قرار 1373, منتوج من ال [أوس] حرب على ذعر, أيّ يفيد أنّ "إدعاءات من تحريض سياسيّة" يستطيع لا يكون استعملت كأراضي ل "يرفض العمليّة تسليم طلبات من إرهابيات مزعومة." قد رفض ال [أوس] أيضا أن يسلّم [أرلندو] [بوسكه], آخر إرهابية يتّهم من يقود ال 1976 [كبن] طائرة قصف.

[إين رسبونس تو] واشنطن طلبات للإطلاق من ال [أوس] [فوجتيفس], يطلب الحكومة كوبيّة الإطلاق من خمسة زعم [سبيس] كوبيّة حاليّا يسجن في ال [أوس] والذي عقوبات يتلقّى يكون اعتبرت ب [ا نومبر وف] حقوق الإنسان مجموعة بما أنّ بإفراط قاسية, الذي كان الضحايا من إنحراف هامّة أثناء هم بثقل سيّس محاكمة. فاقمت هذا حالة كان في يونيو - حزيران, عندما المحكمة عليا انخفض أن يراجع القرار من [أبّل كورت] فيديراليّة أنّ كان قد دعم المحاكمة أوّليّة في ميامي بما أنّ عادلة. لذلك, كوبا احتجاز من [أوس] [فوجتيفس] نتيجة من العداءات تبادليّة بين الاثنان حكومات, ولا بالضّرورة يشير أنّ يساند كوبا إرهاب دوليّة. فضلا عن ذلك, عرفت مكسيك و [إل سلفدور] كلا أن يكون أمسكت عدّة [فوجتيفس] من [أوس] عدل. في يناير - كانون الثّاني 2004, واشنطن أفاد أوقات الحالات من عدّة مكسيكية يراد لجرائم عنيفة يرتكب في ال [أوس] جنوبيّ غربيّ, يفيد أنّ [مإكسيك-ستي] سلطات قد رفضوا [أوس] طلبات لالعمليّة تسليم من هذا مشبوهات. يضيف هذا بيّنة إلى النفاق من كوبا تعيين فريد كإرهابية دولة.

بشكل ملحوظ, أزلت اللغة قتاليّة أكثر يستخدم ضدّ كوبا في سابقة دولة قسم تقارير يتلقّى يكون من [ثيس ر'س] بلد تقارير على إرهاب. تحت ال [بوش دمينيسترأيشن], الدولة [ريتثليزد] قسم, يستعمل بلاغة, بشكل متكرّر يتّهم كوبا من يرفض أن يتعاون مع ال [أوس-لد] حرب على ذعر. بينما الدولة قسم استعمل هذا مثل كبيّنة أوّليّة أنّ كان كوبا دولة كفيلة الإرهاب, هذا [إين فكت] استنتاج زائفة كلّيّا. كوبا استطاع لم يتلقّى يكون توقّعت إلى واشنطن خلفيّة [كونترترّوريسم] مبادرات [فورثريغتلي], يعطى الميراث العداوة بين هذا بلد وواشنطن يفقد محاولات معمّرة أن الحكومة كوبيّة. رئيس بوش يحدّ افتراض أنّ كلّ بلد في العالم ينبغي ساندت ال [أمريكن-لد] إستجابة إلى إرهاب, وأنّ لا أن يتمّ هكذا ب يتبع نموذجه, بالضّرورة ما إذا بلد سوفت كنت اعتبرت إرهابية دولة, نقطات إلى جدّا يتفخّر وقت أنّ لحسن الحظّ يتلقّى يكون نوعا ما خفّفت ب [أبما] إدارة. ميامي لاحظ معلنة أنّ [أبما] إدارة, ب يزيل ال أكثر أجنبيّة من الادّعاءات من بوش عصر, يمكن يتلقّى أخذت خطوة محدّدة يقود إلى الإزالة كوبا من القائمة ميلان إلى جانب بالإجمال.

[نورث كورا] وليبيا: الإرهاب قائمة ميلان إلى جانب كذراع عتلة سياسيّة
أخيرا, استخدمت القائمة ميلان إلى جانب من "دولة كفيلات الإرهاب" غالبا بواشنطن كذراع عتلة سياسيّة, جزر أو عصا أن يكون استعملت على بلد أنّ [أبجكتلي] يتبع أو بالتّأكيد ينكر [أوس] سياسات, ولا كإجراء شرعيّة من بلد موقف نحو إرهاب دوليّة. هذا يصبح أكثر واضحة [إين ث كس وف] [نورث كورا], بلد أنّ بخلاف كوبا, يكون واقعيّا مرجّحة أن يكون كفلت إرهاب. أزلت [نورث كورا] كان من القائمة ميلان إلى جانب من دولة كفيلات في أكتوبر - تشرين الأوّل 2008, عقب الحكومة [كيم] [جونغ] [إيل] وافق أن يستمرّ ال يعجز من ه مادّة بلوتونيوم [بروسسّ بلنت] في [يونغبون] وأن يسمح لتفتيش محدودة من منشأت نوويّةه. [إين ثيس كس], كان ملاءمة صافية في أعمال.

كان الإزالة [نورث كورا] قليلا أكثر من عمل سياسيّة بصفاء, المنتوج من رغبة أن يعرض نتيجات من ال [سإكس-برتي] محادثات أنّ كان قد بحث نهاية إلى البلد برنامج نوويّة منذ 2003 ويتخبّط محاولة إلى [بلكت] [رل سكريتي] تهديد. في يونيو - حزيران 2008, عقب أعلن ال [أوس] أولى [نورث كورا] إزالة من الإرهاب قائمة ميلان إلى جانب واقترح نظامة صارمة تفتيش من منشأت نوويّةه, [كيم] فورا عكسبنفسي ب يهدّد أن يستأنف برنامجه نوويّة. فقط عندما ساعد ال [أوس] إلى أسفل ويقترح أكثر تفتيش محدودة أتمّوا [كيم] يوافق وحكومته كان أزلت من الدولة يكفل قائمة ميلان إلى جانب. يتجاهل هذا إستعمال من الإرهاب قائمة ميلان إلى جانب بما أنّ أداة سياسيّة بالدولة قسم تحت وزير الدولة أرز والبيضاء منزل وطنيّة أمن مجلس, التعريف جدّا إرهاب على أيّ هو يكون [أستنسبلي] أسّست. يعالج ما إذا أو لا [نورث كورا] مادّة بلوتونيوم لا بالضّرورة يزوّد يقنع برهان, ولا يتلقّى كثير أن يتمّ, مع ما إذا أو لا هو يسلّح دوليّة إرهابية مجموعة.

هو بشكل خاصّ ساخرة, بعد ذلك, أنّ على الرغم من الإزالة [نورث كورا] من ال [أوس] قائمة ميلان إلى جانب, على السنون سابقة قد كان هناك ادّعاءات متواصلة من [نورث كورا] دعم من إرهابية شبك. فرنسيّة, يابانيّة, وقد زعم جرائد جنوبيّة كوبيّة وال [فورين ينتلّيجنس سرفيس] إسرائيليّة بيّنة أنّ [كيم] نظامة بنشاط تضمّنت في ال يسلّح ويدرّب من [هيزبلّه] في لبنان; اليابان أسّس أوساط وال [فورين ينتلّيجنس سرفيس] في بنكوك أنّ [نورث كورا] قد سلّح ال [تميل] أنمار في سيريلانكا. عيّنت [بوث وف ثيس] مجموعة يتلقّى يكون أجنبيّة إرهابية تنظيمات ب ال [أوس] هذا تقارير بجدّيّة يضعفون الإدعاء من الدولة قسم أنّ [نورث كورا] يتلقّى "لم يكفل أيّ إرهابية عمل" منذ 1987, أيّ كان أبقيت بالأرز دولة قسم أن يدفع إلى الأمام مع ه نوويّة نزع السلاح برامج على الرغم من البيّنة [بوتتيف] خلاف ذلك. الفكرة أنّ عيّنت [نورث كورا] [نو لونجر] كدولة كفيلة الإرهاب, بينما كوبا [رمين ون] القائمة ميلان إلى جانب, حمقاء.

The case of Libya further highlights the use of Washington’s State Sponsors list as a political tool. The Libyan government was linked to various terrorist attacks in the 1980s and did not conform to the US counterterrorism standards until 2003, when the Libyan head of state Muammar al-Gaddafi agreed to allow United Nations inspectors to oversee the dismantling of Libya’s nuclear weapons program and accepted legal responsibility for the 1986 bombing of a Pan Am flight over Lockerbie. His reward for cooperation was Libya’s removal from the State Sponsors of Terrorism list in May 2006 and the normalization of diplomatic and trade relations.

When Libya opened its arms to the West and endorsed Washington’s unilateral counterterrorism policies, it received a prize; when Cuba fails to do so, it remains blacklisted. Yet despite this, Cuba certainly is no more a terrorist state than Libya. While Libya renounced its former policies in 2003, Cuba renounced its support of terrorist revolutionaries in 1992, and has not been shown to fund them since. Although the anti-Castro lobby alleges that the Cuban government is backing the training of guerillas in Venezuela, neither the State Department nor the intelligence community has produced evidence to back these contentions. In fact, demonstrably, Cuba poses far less a threat to the international security than does Libya, considering the continued presence of al-Qa’ida and other terrorist groups in Libya, despite al-Gaddafi’s current willingness to play into Washington’s hands.

Cuba, Iran, and Syria
Cuba’s designation as a state sponsor of terror becomes further discredited when Cuba is compared to two of its counterparts on the list, Iran and Syria, both of which are verifiable terrorist states. Iran is designated on the State Sponsors list primarily due to the functions of the Qods Force of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Group, a branch of the Iranian military, which has financed and trained Hamas, Hizballah, the Islamic Jihad, as well as radical militants in Iraq. Iran’s government is also holding members of al-Qa’ida, whom it refuses to identify or put on trial.

According to the State Department, Syria “provided political and military support to Hizballah” and its President Bashar al-Assad openly “expressed support” for many Palestinian militant groups. Several groups designated as Foreign Terrorist Organizations actively operate and train militants on Syrian territory, often with the tacit approval of the Syrian government. These allegations are not easily debunked as is the State Department’s far less evidenced language against Cuba.

Cuba’s inclusion on the terrorism list has often been justified by other countries on the State Sponsors list. In particular, the anti-Cuban lobby cites Fidel Castro’s May 2001 visit to Iran, Syria, and Libya as evidence that his government backs terrorism, often recalling Castro’s reported comment to Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khameini: “Iran and Cuba, in cooperation with each other, can bring America to its knees. The U.S. regime is very weak, and we are witnessing this weakness from close up.”

Given the entrenched hostilities between the US and Cuba, it is no surprise that Castro would find an ideological ally in the Islamic Republic, also a government born out of a revolution against an American client state. But there is no evidence that Castro’s rhetoric has materialized into cooperation in backing terrorists. While Cuba and Iran signed a banking agreement in early 2006, which facilitated trade between the two nations and provided for increased economic and scientific cooperation in the future, the US has not been able to prove that this agreement went beyond what it was publicly stated to be. Significantly, Cuban-Iranian relations have not been mentioned in the Country Reports on Terrorism for the past three years, a sign that Cuba cannot be deemed a terrorist state solely on the basis of association.

Conclusions: Moving Forward
As with many other aspects of US-Cuba relations, the Obama administration has so far not enacted the significant policy shifts hoped for by supporters of a rational and respectful approach to Latin America. When Hillary Clinton was questioned by Senator Richard Lugar during her confirmation hearings as to Cuba’s placement on the terrorism list, her vague response suggested the potential for change: “We anticipate a review of US policy regarding Cuba and look forward to working with members of the Committee and other members of Congress as we move forward to the consideration of appropriate steps to take to help advance US interests and values in the context of relations with Cuba.” But clearly her State Department has failed to produce an objective review and, at least up to now, instead has succumbed to the demands of the anti-Castro lobby which, despite fifty years of proof that isolation will not bring about democracy in Cuba, continues to put forth its same confrontational tactics.

The terrorism list is more than a symbol of an anachronistic policy; in an era when the lifting of the trade embargo appears to be a real possibility, Cuba’s designation as a terrorist state has practical implications for the potential extent of trade between the two nations. As it stands, even if the embargo were lifted, there would still exist significant impediments to full bilateral trade and other links between the two countries. The US would be forced to deny tax-free treatment of imported goods coming from Cuba; US citizens wanting to trade with Cuba would first need to seek a license from the Treasury Department; and the US would be forced to oppose any World Bank or IMF loans to the country. These stipulations of the US laws and regulations, under which Cuba is considered a terrorist state, would stall the country’s economic development and the growth of meaningful US-Cuba trading relations.

However, the removal of Cuba from the list of State Sponsors of Terrorism would be a simple procedure: President Obama would only have to present Congress with a statement at least 45 days before the proposed removal, ascertaining that Cuba has not supported international terrorism in the past six months and that it has pledged not to do so in the future. There are two precedents in recent years for the use of such Presidential authority and no precedents for Congress to block a President’s decision.

Such a move would signal the reprioritization of consistency and rationality in Cuba policy over domestic political jockeying. This is a clear sign to the likes of sharply tongued ideologues such as South Florida Reps. Ileana Ros-Lehtinen and Lincoln Diaz-Balart that the administration will no longer allow their ad hoc sense of history to prevent the US from improving its relations with Cuba. Moreover, this action would mark a decisive step toward the full normalization of relations with Cuba, a sign of goodwill to governments throughout Latin America that would have no negative impact on the security of the United States, yet prompt a surge of amity. The removal of Cuba from the list of State Sponsors of Terror is a matter of simple consistency, honesty, and integrity: these are the values Obama vowed to bring to policymaking during his campaign, and Latin Americans as well as North Americans are waiting to see if he will live up to his promises.



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The Council on Hemispheric Affairs, founded in 1975, is an independent, non-profit, non-partisan, tax-exempt research and information organization. It has been described on the Senate floor as being “one of the nation’s most respected bodies of scholars and policy makers.” For more information, visit www.coha.org




September 16, 2009 | 10:46 AM Comments  {num} comments



Bahamas: Proposed 84.1 Percent National Insurance Board Contribution Tax Hike
Related to country: Bahamas

Translations available in: English (original) | French | Spanish | Italian | German | Portuguese | Swedish | Russian | Dutch | Arabic


by The Nassau Institute:

A recent announcement was made by NIB of a possible contribution tax increase of 2%. At first glance, a 2% tax increase seems bearable. It is definitely better to receive a 2% salary increase, but nonetheless a forced 2% salary decrease seems bearable. However, things are not always as they seem.

A Before & After NIB Contribution Analysis:

Full-time worker
Salary: $600 per week:

Current Total NIB Contributions:

Contribution Ceiling: $400 x 8.8% (employer/employee split):
$35.20 total per week
$1,830.40 total per year

After Proposed 2% NIB Contribution Increase:

Contribution Ceiling: $600 x 10.8% (employer/employee split)
$64.80 total per week
$3,369.60 total per year

Total Additional Annual Contribution:

$3,369.60 - $1,830.40 = $1,539.20 additional per year

Percentage (%) Increase in Total Contributions:

$1,539.20 / $1,830.40 = 84.1% tax increase

84.1% NIB Contribution Tax Increase:

So, the government has proposed to increase the total NIB Contribution Tax by 84.1% (not 2%).

As a counter argument, some will say that the NIB contributions are split by the employer and employee, so the burden is shared. While on the surface of things this is true, it is far too simplistic a view.

Any increase in the NIB contribution tax will definitely have negative side-effects, three prominent side-effects will be:
  1. "Anything Taxed is Discouraged Proportionately": Employers will be less willing to employ full-time Bahamians; instead going without additional staff, pushing existing staff harder, outsourcing to foreign workers (where they don't pay the NIB tax) or hiring part-time/contract Bahamian workers.

  2. "Real Income Eroded": Workers will find the value of their real income eroded. If an employer can afford to pay $30,000 in total compensation for an available position, the cash salary of the employee will be reduced by the additional NIB Contribution Tax increase.

  3. "Black Market": Workers and Employers will seek ways to avoid the NIB Contribution Tax, which paradoxically will result in stagnant or lower NIB revenue increases than expected.

The Nassau Institute's Philosophy:

Why do we need a system where current workers pay for current retirees?

An individual person, extended family or tight-knit community will do a considerably better job keeping their NIB contributions and looking after themselves, their friends and their loved ones. Especially, when compared to an inefficient and politically driven government bureaucracy like NIB.

Contributions paid by individuals should be held in their name with any interest earned until his or her retirement. That way, future generations will not be hamstrung by a failed National Insurance Board scheme.

The Nassau Institute is an independent, a-political, non-profit institute that promotes economic growth in a free market economy with limited government, in a society that embraces the rule of law and the right to private property. Its vision is to see The Bahamas become the first small, developed, sovereign country in the region, recognised as a model for the world. Web Site: www.nassauinstitute.org

September 14, 2009

caribbeannetnews


par l'institut de Nassau :

Une annonce récente a été faite par NIB d'une augmentation possible d'impôts de contribution de 2%. À première vue, une augmentation d'impôts de 2% semble supportable. Il vaut certainement mieux de recevoir une augmentation de salaire de 2%, mais néanmoins une diminution obligatoire de salaire de 2% semble supportable. Cependant, les choses ne sont pas toujours pendant qu'elles semblent.

A avant et après analyse de contribution de GRAINE :

Ouvrier à temps plein
Salaire : $600 par semaine :

Contributions totales courantes de GRAINE :

Plafond de contribution: $400 x 8.8% (employeur/employé dédoublé) :
$35.20 totaux par semaine
$1.830.40 totaux par an

Après augmentation de contribution proposée de GRAINE de 2%:

Plafond de contribution: $600 x 10.8% (employeur/employé dédoublé)
$64.80 totaux par semaine
$3.369.60 totaux par an

Contribution annuelle additionnelle totale:

$3.369.60 - $1.830.40 = $1.539.20 additionnels par an

Augmentation de pourcentage (%) des contributions totales:

$1.539.20/$1.830.40 = augmentation de 84.1% impôts

84.1% Augmentation d'impôts de contribution de GRAINE :

Ainsi, le gouvernement a proposé d'augmenter tout le impôt de contribution de GRAINE de 84.1% (non 2%).

Comme argument contraire, certains indiqueront que les contributions de GRAINE sont dédoublées par l'employeur et l'employé, ainsi le fardeau est partagé. Tandis que sur la surface des choses c'est vrai, c'est une vue trop simpliste lointaine.

N'importe quelle augmentation de l'impôt de contribution de GRAINE aura certainement des effets secondaires négatifs, trois effets secondaires en avant sera :

  1. « Quelque chose imposé est découragé proportionnellement » : Les employeurs seront moins disposés à employer des Bahamiens à temps plein ; au lieu de cela allant sans personnel additionnel, poussant le personnel existant plus dur, externalisant aux ouvriers étrangers (où ils ne payent pas l'impôt de GRAINE) ou louant à temps partiel/ouvriers Bahamien de contrat.


  2. « Revenu réel réel érodé » : Les ouvriers trouveront la valeur de leur revenu réel réel érodée. Si un employeur peut se permettre de payer $30.000 dans la compensation totale une position disponible, le salaire d'argent comptant de l'employé sera réduit par l'augmentation additionnelle d'impôts de contribution de GRAINE.


  3. « Marché noir » : Les ouvriers et les employeurs chercheront des manières d'éviter l'impôt de contribution de GRAINE, qui paradoxalement aura comme conséquence des augmentations stagnantes ou inférieures de revenu de GRAINE que prévues.


La philosophie de l'institut de Nassau :

Pourquoi avons-nous besoin d'un système où les ouvriers courants payent les retraités courants ?

Une personne individuelle, un famille étendu ou serré-tricotent la communauté feront un travail considérablement meilleur gardant leurs contributions de GRAINE et s'occupant, leurs amis et leur ont aimé ceux. En particulier, une fois comparé à une bureaucratie inefficace et politiquement conduite de gouvernement aimez la GRAINE.

Les contributions ont payé par des individus devraient être tenues dans leur nom avec n'importe quel intérêt gagné jusqu'à sa retraite. Que la manière, de futures générations ne sera pas bloquée par un arrangement échoué de conseil d'assurance nationale.

L'institut de Nassau est un institut indépendant, sur-politique, sans but lucratif qui favorise la croissance économique d'une économie de marché de marché libre avec le gouvernement limité, dans une société qui embrasse la règle de la loi et la droite à la propriété privée. Sa vision est de voir les Bahamas devenir le premier petit, développé, souverain pays dans la région, identifiée comme modèle pour le monde. Site Web : www.nassauinstitute.org

14 septembre 2009


caribbeannetnews





por el instituto de Nassau:

Un aviso reciente fue hecho por NIB de un aumento posible del impuesto de la contribución de el 2%. A primera vista, un aumento del impuesto del 2% se parece soportable. Es definitivamente mejor recibir un aumento del sueldo del 2%, pero no obstante una disminución forzada del sueldo del 2% se parece soportable. Sin embargo, las cosas no están siempre mientras que se parecen.

A antes y después del análisis de la contribución de la SEMILLA:

Trabajador a tiempo completo
Sueldo: $600 por semana:

Contribuciones totales actuales de la SEMILLA:

Techo de la contribución: $400 x 8.8% (patrón/empleado partido):
$35.20 totales por semana
$1.830.40 totales por año

Después de aumento de contribución propuesto de la SEMILLA del 2%:

Techo de la contribución: $600 x 10.8% (patrón/empleado partido)
$64.80 totales por semana
$3.369.60 totales por año

Contribución anual adicional total:

$3.369.60 - $1.830.40 = $1.539.20 adicionales por año

Aumento del porcentaje (%) en contribuciones totales:

$1.539.20/$1.830.40 = aumento de 84.1% impuestos

84.1% Aumento del impuesto de la contribución de la SEMILLA:

Así pues, el gobierno ha propuesto aumentar el impuesto total de la contribución de la SEMILLA en 84.1% (el no 2%).

Como discusión contraria, algunos dirán que las contribuciones de la SEMILLA son partidas por el patrón y el empleado, así que se comparte la carga. Mientras que en la superficie de cosas esto es verdad, es una visión demasiado simplista lejana.

Cualquier aumento en el impuesto de la contribución de la SEMILLA tendrá definitivamente efectos secundarios negativos, tres efectos secundarios prominentes será:

  1. “Cualquier cosa gravada se desalienta proporcionalmente”: Los patrones estarán menos dispuestos a emplear Bahamians a tiempo completo; en lugar yendo sin el personal adicional, empujando el personal existente más difícilmente, el outsourcing a los trabajadores extranjeros (donde no pagan el impuesto de la SEMILLA) o empleando por horas/trabajadores de Bahamian del contrato.


  2. “Ingresos reales erosionados”: Los trabajadores encontrarán el valor de sus ingresos reales erosionado. Si un patrón puede permitirse pagar $30.000 en la remuneración total una posición disponible, el sueldo del efectivo del empleado será reducido por el aumento adicional del impuesto de la contribución de la SEMILLA.


  3. “Mercado negro”: Los trabajadores y los patrones buscarán maneras de evitar el impuesto de la contribución de la SEMILLA, que dará lugar paradójico a aumentos estancados o más bajos del rédito de la SEMILLA que esperados.


La filosofía del instituto de Nassau:

¿Por qué necesitamos un sistema donde los trabajadores actuales pagan jubilados actuales?

Una persona individual, una familia extendida o apretado-hacen punto la comunidad harán un trabajo considerablemente mejor que guarda sus contribuciones de la SEMILLA y ocupándose, sus amigos y su amaron unos. Especialmente, cuando está comparado a una burocracia ineficaz y político conducida del gobierno tenga gusto de la SEMILLA.

Las contribuciones pagaron por los individuos se deben sostener en su nombre con cualquier interés ganado hasta su retiro. Que la manera, las generaciones futuras no será paralizada por un esquema fallado del tablero del seguro nacional.

El instituto de Nassau es un instituto independiente, a-political, no lucrativo que promueve desarrollo económico en una economía de mercado libre con el gobierno limitado, en una sociedad que abrace la regla de la ley y la derecha a la característica privada. Su visión es ver las Bahamas convertirse en el primer país pequeño, desarrollado, soberano en la región, reconocida como modelo para el mundo. Web site: www.nassauinstitute.org

14 de septiembre de 2009


caribbeannetnews





dall'istituto di Nassau:

Un annuncio recente è stato fatto da NIB di un aumento possibile di imposta di contributo di 2%. Inizialmente l'occhiata, un aumento di imposta di 2% sembra bearable. È definitivamente migliore ricevere un aumento di stipendio di 2%, ma ciò nonostante una diminuzione forzata di stipendio di 2% sembra bearable. Tuttavia, le cose non sono sempre mentre sembrano.

A prima & dopo analisi di contributo del PUNTO:

Operaio a tempo pieno
Stipendio: $600 alla settimana:

Contributi totali correnti del PUNTO:

Soffitto di contributo: $400 x 8.8% (datore di lavoro/impiegato spaccato):
$35.20 totali alla settimana
$1.830.40 totali all'anno

Dopo aumento di contributo proposto del PUNTO di 2%:

Soffitto di contributo: $600 x 10.8% (datore di lavoro/impiegato spaccato)
$64.80 totali alla settimana
$3.369.60 totali all'anno

Contributo annuale supplementare totale:

$3.369.60 - $1.830.40 = $1.539.20 supplementari all'anno

Aumento di percentuale (%) nei contributi totali:

$1.539.20/$1.830.40 = un aumento di 84.1% imposte

84.1% Aumento di imposta di contributo del PUNTO:

Così, il governo ha proposto di aumentare la tassa totale di contributo del PUNTO di 84.1% (non 2%).

Come contro discussione, alcuni diranno che i contributi del PUNTO sono spaccati dal datore di lavoro e dall'impiegato, in modo da la difficoltà è ripartita. Mentre sulla superficie delle cose questo è allineare, è una vista troppo semplicistica lontana.

Tutto l'aumento nella tassa di contributo del PUNTO definitivamente avrà effetti secondari negativi, tre effetti secondari prominenti sarà:

  1. “Qualche cosa tassato è scoraggiato proporzionalmente„: I datori di lavoro saranno meno disposti ad impiegare Bahamians a tempo pieno; invece andando senza personale supplementare, spingente più duro personale attuale, outsourcing verso gli operai stranieri (dove non pagano la tassa del PUNTO) o assumente a tempo parziale/operai Bahamian del contratto.


  2. “Reddito reale corroso„: Gli operai troveranno il valore del loro reddito reale corroso. Se un datore di lavoro può permettersi di pagare $30.000 nella compensazione totale una posizione disponibile, lo stipendio dei contanti dell'impiegato sarà ridotto tramite l'aumento supplementare di imposta di contributo del PUNTO.


  3. “Mercato nero„: Gli operai ed i datori di lavoro cercheranno i sensi evitare la tassa di contributo del PUNTO, che provocherà paradossalmente gli aumenti stagnanti o più bassi del reddito del PUNTO di quanto previsti.


La filosofia dell'istituto di Nassau:

Perchè abbiamo bisogno di un sistema in cui gli operai correnti pagano i pensionati correnti?

Una persona specifica, una famiglia estesa o stretto-lavorano a maglia la Comunità faranno un lavoro considerevolmente migliore che mantiene i loro contributi del PUNTO ed occupandosi di, i loro amici e loro amavano ones. In particolare, una volta confrontato ad una burocrazia inefficiente e politicamente guidata di governo gradisca il PUNTO.

I contributi pagati dagli individui dovrebbero essere tenuti nel loro nome con tutto l'interesse guadagnato fino alla sua pensione. Quel senso, generazioni future non sarà bloccato da uno schema guastato del bordo di previdenza sociale.

L'istituto di Nassau è un istituto indipendente, a-political, senza scopo di lucro che promuove lo sviluppo economico in un'economia di libero mercato con il governo limitato, in una società che abbraccia la norma di legge e la destra alla proprietà riservata. La relativa visione è di vedere le Bahamas trasformarsi in nel primo piccolo, paese sviluppato e sovrano nella regione, riconosciuta come modello per il mondo. Web site: www.nassauinstitute.org

14 settembre 2009


caribbeannetnews





durch das Nassau Institut:

Eine neue Ansage wurde von NIB einer möglichen Beitragsteuerzunahme von 2% gebildet. Anfangs flüchtiger Blick, eine 2% Steuerzunahme scheint bearable. Es ist definitiv besser, eine das 2% Gehalt Zunahme zu empfangen, aber nichtsdestoweniger scheint eine Zwangsdas 2% Gehalt Abnahme bearable. Jedoch sind Sachen nicht immer, während sie scheinen.

A vor u. nach SPITZE Beitrag-Analyse:

Ganztägiger Arbeiter
Gehalt: $600 pro Woche:

Gegenwärtige Gesamt-SPITZE Beiträge:

Beitrag-Decke: $400 x 8.8% (Arbeitgeber/Angestellter aufgespaltet):
$35.20 Gesamtmenge pro Woche
$1.830.40 Gesamtmenge pro Jahr

Nach vorgeschlagener 2% SPITZE Beitragserhöhung:

Beitrag-Decke: $600 x 10.8% (Arbeitgeber/Angestellter aufgespaltet)
$64.80 Gesamtmenge pro Woche
$3.369.60 Gesamtmenge pro Jahr

Zusätzlicher jährlicher totalbeitrag:

$3.369.60 - $1.830.40 = $1.539.20 zusätzlich pro Jahr

Zunahme des Prozentsatz-(%) der Gesamtbeiträge:

$1.539.20/$1.830.40 = Zunahme mit 84.1% Steuern

84.1% SPITZE Beitrag-Steuer-Zunahme:

So hat die Regierung vorgeschlagen, die Gesamt-SPITZE Beitrag-Steuer um 84.1% zu erhöhen (nicht 2%).

Als Gegenargument sagen einige, daß die SPITZE-Beiträge vom Arbeitgeber und vom Angestellten aufgespaltet werden, also wird die Belastung geteilt. Während auf der Oberfläche von Sachen dieses zutreffend ist, ist es eine weite zu stark vereinfachte Ansicht.

Jede mögliche Zunahme der SPITZE-Beitragsteuer hat definitiv negative Nebenwirkungen, drei vorstehende Nebenwirkungen ist:

  1. „Besteuertes alles wird entsprechend“ entmutigt: Arbeitgeber sind weniger bereit, ganztägiges Bahamians einzusetzen; stattdessen, gehend ohne den zusätzlichen Personal, vorhandenen Personal, Outsourcing zu den fremden Arbeitern stark drückend (wo sie nicht die SPITZE-Steuer zahlen) oder teilzeitlich stellen/Vertrag Bahamian Arbeiter an.


  2. „Realeinkommen abgefressen“: Arbeiter finden den Wert ihres Realeinkommens abgefressen. Wenn ein Arbeitgeber sich leisten kann, $30.000 im Gesamtausgleich für eine vorhandene Position zu zahlen, wird das Bargeldgehalt des Angestellten durch die zusätzliche SPITZE Beitrag-Steuerzunahme verringert.


  3. „Schwarzmarkt“: Arbeiter und Arbeitgeber suchen Weisen, die SPITZE Beitrag-Steuer zu vermeiden, die paradoxerweise die stagnierenden oder niedrigeren SPITZE-Einkommen Zunahmen als erwartet ergibt.


Die Philosophie des Nassau Instituts:

Warum benötigen wir ein System, in dem gegenwärtige Arbeiter für gegenwärtige Rentner zahlen?

Eine einzelne Person, eine ausgedehnte Familie oder fest-stricken Gemeinschaft erledigen eine beträchtlich bessere Arbeit, die ihre SPITZE-Beiträge hält und um kümmernd, liebten ihre Freunde und ihr eine. Besonders wenn Sie mit einer wirkungslosen und politisch gefahrenen Regierung Bürokratie verglichen werden, mögen Sie SPITZE.

Die Beiträge, die von den Einzelpersonen gezahlt werden, sollten in ihrem Namen mit jedem möglichem Interesse gehalten werden, das bis seinen oder Ruhestand erworben wird. Daß Weise, zukünftige Erzeugungen nicht durch einen verlassenen staatliche Sozialversicherung-Brettentwurf gelähmt wird.

Das Nassau Institut ist ein unabhängiges, unpolitisches, gemeinnütziges Institut, das Wirtschaftswachstum in einer Wirtschaft des freien Marktes mit begrenzter Regierung, in einer Gesellschaft fördert, die den Rechtsgrundsatz und das Recht zur privaten Eigenschaft umfaßt. Sein Anblick ist, die Bahamas zu sehen, das erste kleine, entwickelte, souveräne Land in der Region zu werden, erkannt als Modell für die Welt. Web site: www.nassauinstitute.org

14. September 2009


caribbeannetnews





pelo instituto de Nassau:

Um anúncio recente foi feito por NIB de um aumento possível do imposto da contribuição de 2%. No primeiro glance, um aumento do imposto de 2% parece bearable. É definitivamente melhor receber um aumento do salário de 2%, mas nonetheless uma diminuição forçada do salário de 2% parece bearable. Entretanto, as coisas não são sempre enquanto parecem.

A antes & após da análise da contribuição do NIB:

Trabalhador a tempo completo
Salário: $600 por a semana:

Contribuições totais atuais do NIB:

Teto da contribuição: $400 x 8.8% (empregador/empregado rachado):
$35.20 totais por a semana
$1.830.40 totais por o ano

Após o aumento de contribuição proposto do NIB de 2%:

Teto da contribuição: $600 x 10.8% (empregador/empregado rachado)
$64.80 totais por a semana
$3.369.60 totais por o ano

Contribuição anual adicional total:

$3.369.60 - $1.830.40 = $1.539.20 adicionais por o ano

Aumento da porcentagem (%) em contribuições totais:

$1.539.20/$1.830.40 = aumento de 84.1% impostos

84.1% Aumento do imposto da contribuição do NIB:

Assim, o governo propôs aumentar o imposto total da contribuição do NIB por 84.1% (não 2%).

Como um argumento contrário, alguns dirão que as contribuições do NIB estão rachadas pelo empregador e pelo empregado, assim que o burden é compartilhado. Quando na superfície das coisas isto for verdadeiro, é uma vista demasiado simplistic distante.

Todo o aumento no imposto da contribuição do NIB terá definitivamente side-effects negativos, três side-effects proeminentes será:

  1. “Qualquer coisa Taxed é desanimado proporcionalmente”: Os empregadores serão mais menos dispostos empregar Bahamians a tempo completo; instead indo sem equipe de funcionários adicional, empurrando equipe de funcionários existente mais duramente, outsourcing para trabalhadores extrangeiros (onde não pagam o imposto do NIB) ou empregando meio expediente/trabalhadores Bahamian do contrato.


  2. “Renda real corroída”: Os trabalhadores encontrarão o valor de sua renda real corroído. Se um empregador puder ter recursos para pagar $30.000 na compensação total por uma posição disponível, o salário do dinheiro do empregado estará reduzido pelo aumento adicional do imposto da contribuição do NIB.


  3. “Mercado preto”: Os trabalhadores e os empregadores procurarão maneiras evitar o imposto da contribuição do NIB, que paradoxically resultará em aumentos stagnant ou mais baixos do rendimento do NIB do que esperados.


A filosofia do instituto de Nassau:

Por que nós necessitamos um sistema onde os trabalhadores atuais paguem por aposentados atuais?

Uma pessoa individual, uma família prolongada ou apertado-knit a comunidade farão um trabalho consideravelmente melhor que mantem suas contribuições do NIB e olhando após se, seus amigos e seu amaram. Especialmente, quando comparado a uma burocracia inefficient e polìtica dirigida do governo goste do NIB.

As contribuições pagas por indivíduos devem ser prendidas em seu nome com todo o interesse ganho até sua ou sua aposentadoria. Que a maneira, as gerações futuras não hamstrung por um esquema falhado da placa do seguro nacional.

O instituto de Nassau é um instituto independente, a-political, non-profit que promova o crescimento econômico em uma economia de mercado livre com governo limitado, em uma sociedade que embraces a régua de lei e a direita à propriedade confidencial. Sua visão é ver os Bahamas transformar-se o primeiro país pequeno, desenvolvido, sovereign na região, reconhecida como um modelo para o mundo. Web site: www.nassauinstitute.org

Setembro 14, 2009


caribbeannetnews





vid det Nassau institutet:

Ett nytt meddelande gjordes av NIB av en förhöjning för möjlighetbidragskatt av 2%. Kasta en blick först, en 2% skattförhöjning verkar uthärdligt. Det är bestämt bättre att motta en 2% avlönar förhöjning, men icke desto mindre avlönar en tvungen 2% minskning verkar uthärdlig. Emellertid är saker inte alltid, som de verkar.

A för & efter NIBbidraganalys:

Heltids- arbetare
Avlöna: $600 per vecka:

Sammanlagda NIBbidrag för ström:

Bidragtak: $400 x 8.8% (arbetsgivaren/delad anställd):
$35.20 slutsumma per vecka
$1.830.40 slutsumma per år

Efter föreslagen förhöjning för 2% NIBbidrag:

Bidragtak: $600 x 10.8% (arbetsgivaren/delad anställd)
$64.80 slutsumma per vecka
$3.369.60 slutsumma per år

Sammanlagt extra årligt bidrag:

$3.369.60 - $1.830.40 = $1.539.20 som är extra per år

Förhöjning för procentsats (%) i sammanlagda bidrag:

$1.539.20/$1.830.40 = förhöjning för skatt 84.1%

84.1% Förhöjning för NIBbidragskatt:

Så har regeringen föreslaget till förhöjning den sammanlagda NIBbidragskatten vid 84.1% (inte 2%).

Som ett kontraargument ska några något att säga att NIBbidragen delas av arbetsgivaren och anställd, så bördan delas. Stunden på ytbehandla av saker som denna är riktig, det, är alldeles alltför förenklad en beskåda.

Någon förhöjning i NIBbidragskatten som bestämt ska, har negationbiverkningar, tre ska framstående biverkningar är:

  1. ”Beskattad avskräckas något proportionellt”: Arbetsgivare ska är mindre villiga att använda heltids- bahamän; i stället gå utan extrastyrka, bemannar driftigt existerande mer hård, entreprenadisering till utländska arbetare (var de inte betalar NIBskatten) eller hyra på halvtid/avtala bahamanska arbetare.


  2. ”Eroderad verklig inkomst”: Ska arbetare finner värdera av deras eroderade verkliga inkomst. Om en arbetsgivare kan ha råd med för att betala, placerar $30.000 i sammanlagd kompensation för ett tillgängligt, kassan avlönar av ska anställd förminskas av den extra förhöjningen för NIBbidragskatten.


  3. ”Marknadsför svarten”: Arbetare och arbetsgivare ska sökandenväg för att undvika NIBbidragskatten, som ska paradoxically resultat i stangnerande eller lägre NIBintäktförhöjningar än förväntade.


Det Nassau institut filosofi:

Why behöver vi ett system var strömarbetare betalar för strömpensionärer?

En individperson, storfamilj eller åtsittande-sticker den ska gemenskapen gör ett betydligt bättre jobb som håller deras NIBbidrag och ser efter dem, deras vänner och deras älskade. Speciellt när du jämförs till en ineffektiv och politiskt drivande regerings- byråkratinågot liknandeNIB.

Bidrag som betalas av individer, bör rymmas i deras känt med några intresserar tjänat till hans eller hennes avgång. Ditåt stiger ombord framtida utvecklingar som ska för att inte lamslås av en missad medborgareförsäkring, intrig.

Det Nassau institutet är ett oberoende, a-political icke-kommersiellt institut som främjar ekonomisk tillväxt i ett fritt marknadsför ekonomi med den inskränkt regeringen, i ett samhälle, som omfamnar rättssäkerheten och rakt till den privata egenskapen. Dess vision är att se Bahamas bli det första små, framkallade suveräna landet i regionen, igenkänd som en modellera för världen. Webbplats: www.nassauinstitute.org

September 14, 2009


caribbeannetnews





институтом Nassau:

Недавнее объявление было сделано NIB по возможности роста налогов вклада 2%. На первый взгляд, рост налогов 2% кажется bearable. Определенно более лучшее получить увеличение зарплаты 2%, но тем не менее forced уменшение зарплаты 2% кажется bearable. Однако, вещи не всегда по мере того как они кажутся.

A перед & после анализом вклада NIB:

Полный недел работник
Зарплата: $600 в неделю:

В настоящее время полные вклады NIB:

Потолок вклада: $400 x 8.8% (работодатель/разделенный работник):
$35.20 итога в неделю
$1.830.40 итога в год

После предложенного увеличения вклада NIB 2%:

Потолок вклада: $600 x 10.8% (работодатель/разделенный работник)
$64.80 итога в неделю
$3.369.60 итога в год

Полный дополнительный однолетний вклад:

от $3.369.60 до $1.830.40 = $1.539.20 дополнительное в год

Увеличение процента (%) в полных вкладах:

$1.539.20/$1.830.40 = рост налогов 84.1%

84.1% Рост налогов вклада NIB:

Так, правительство предлагало увеличить полное тягло вклада NIB 84.1% (не 2%).

Как встречный довод, некоторые скажут что вклады NIB разделены работодателем и работником, поэтому тягота поделена. Пока на поверхности вещей это поистине, будет далеким слишком simplistic взглядом.

Любое увеличение в тягле вклада NIB определенно будет иметь отрицательные side-effects, 3 видно side-effects будет:

  1. «Таксированное что-нибыдь обескуражито Proportionately»: Работодатели будут более менее охотно готовы использовать полное недел Bahamians; вместо идущ без дополнительного штата, нажимая existing штат более крепко, outsourcing к иностранным рабочим (где они не оплачивает тягло NIB) или нанимая part-time/работники Bahamian подряда.


  2. «Реальный выветренный доход»: Работники будут считать значение их реального дохода после того как они выветрены. Если работодатель может позволять для того чтобы оплатить $30.000 в полной компенсации для имеющегося положения, то зарплата наличных дег работника будет уменьшена дополнительным ростом налогов вклада NIB.


  3. «Черный рынок»: Работники и работодатели будут изыскивать дороги избежать тягла вклада NIB, которое парадоксально приведет к в застойных или более низких увеличениях дохода NIB чем предположено.


Общее соображение института Nassau:

Почему нам нужна система где в настоящее время работники оплачивают для в настоящее время retirees?

Индивидуальная персона, семья из нескольких поколений или плотно-вяжет общину сделает значительно более лучшую работу держа их вклады NIB и look after, их друзья и их полюбили одни. Специально, сравнивано к неработоспособному и политически управляемому правительственному бюрократизму полюбите NIB.

Вклады оплащенные индивидуалами SLEDUET придержать в их имени при любой интерес заработанный до his or her выхода на пенсию. Что дорога, будущие поколения не будет hamstrung вылтинной из строя схемой доски национального страхсбора.

Институтом Nassau будет независимо, аполитичный, бесприбыльный институт который повышает экономический роста в экономии свободного рынка с лимитированным правительством, в обществе которое обнимает торжество права и право к личной собственности. Свое зрение должно увидеть, что Багамы стали первой малой, начатой, властительской страной в зоне, узнанной как модель для мира. Web site: www.nassauinstitute.org

14-ое сентября 2009


caribbeannetnews





door het Nassau Instituut:

Een recente aankondiging werd gemaakt door BONEN van een mogelijke verhoging van de bijdragebelasting van 2%. Eerst schijnt de blik, een 2% belastingsverhoging draaglijk. Het is absoluut beter om een 2% salarisverhoging te ontvangen, maar niettemin schijnt een gedwongen 2% salarisdaling draaglijk. Nochtans, niet altijd zijn de dingen zoals zij schijnen.

A vóór & na de Analyse van de Bijdrage van BONEN:

Full-time arbeider
Salaris: $600 per week:

De huidige Totale Bijdragen van BONEN:

Het Plafond van de bijdrage: $400 x 8.8% (verdeelde werkgever/werknemer):
$35.20 totaal per week
$1,830.40 totaal per jaar

Na de Voorgestelde Verhoging van de Bijdrage van de BONEN van 2%:

Het Plafond van de bijdrage: $600 x 10.8% (verdeelde werkgever/werknemer)
$64.80 totaal per week
$3,369.60 totaal per jaar

Totale Extra Jaarlijkse Bijdrage:

$3,369.60 - $1,830.40 = $1,539.20 extra per jaar

Van het percentage (%) de Verhoging van Totale Bijdragen:

$1,539.20/$1,830.40 = 84.1% belastingsverhoging

De Verhoging van de Belasting van de Bijdrage van de BONEN van 84.1%:

Zo, heeft de overheid voorgesteld om de totale Belasting van de Bijdrage van BONEN met 84.1% (niet 2%) te verhogen.

Als tegenargument, zullen sommigen zeggen dat de bijdragen van BONEN door de werkgever en de werknemer worden verdeeld, zodat wordt de last gedeeld. Terwijl op de oppervlakte van dingen dit waar is, is het een veel te simplistische mening.

Om het even welke verhoging van de de bijdragebelasting van BONEN zal absoluut negatieve bijwerkingen hebben, zullen drie prominente bijwerkingen zijn:

  1. „Belast om het even wat is proportioneel Afgeraden“: De werkgevers zullen minder bereid zijn om full-time Bahamianen tewerk te stellen; in plaats daarvan gaand zonder extra personeel, gaat het duwende bestaande hardere personeel, delocaliserend aan buitenlandse arbeiders (waar zij niet de belasting van BONEN) betalen of part-time hurend/Bahamiaanse arbeiders aan.


  2. Het „echte Inkomen erodeerde“: De arbeiders zullen de waarde van hun echt geërodeerde inkomen vinden. Als een werkgever zich kan veroorloven om $30.000 in totale compensatie voor een beschikbare positie te betalen, zal het contant geldsalaris van de werknemer door de extra verhoging van de Belasting van de Bijdrage van BONEN worden verminderd.


  3. „Zwarte Markt“: De arbeiders en de Werkgevers zullen manieren zoeken om de Belasting van de Bijdrage van BONEN te vermijden, die paradoxaal in stagnerende of lagere de opbrengstverhogingen van BONEN dan verwacht zal resulteren.


De Nassau Filosofie van het Instituut:

Waarom hebben wij een systeem nodig waar de huidige arbeiders voor huidige gepensioneerden betalen?

Een individuele persoon, een uitgebreide familie of tight-knit gemeenschap zullen een aanzienlijk beter werk doen dat hun bijdragen van BONEN houdt en voor, hun vrienden en hun gehouden van degenen zorgt. Vooral, wanneer vergeleken bij een inefficiënte en politiek gedreven overheidsbureaucratie zoals BONEN.

De bijdragen die door individuen worden betaald zouden in hun naam met om het even welke rente moeten worden gehouden die tot zijn of haar pensionering wordt verdiend. Die manier, zal toekomstige generaties niet verlamd worden door een ontbroken regeling van de Raad van de Nationale Verzekering.

Het Nassau Instituut is een onafhankelijk, apolitiek, zonder winstbejag instituut dat de economische groei in een markteconomie met beperkte overheid, in de maatschappij bevordert die de rechtsstaat en het recht op privé bezit omhelst. Zijn visie moet de Bahamas zien het eerste kleine, ontwikkelde, soevereine land in het gebied worden, dat als een model voor de wereld wordt erkend. Website: www.nassauinstitute.org

14 september, 2009


caribbeannetnews





ب [نسّو] معهد:

جعلت إعلان أخيرة كان ب [نيب] من يمكن مساهمة ضريبة زيادة من 2%. [أت فيرست غلنس], 2% ضريبة يبدو زيادة محتملة. هو بالتّأكيد جيّدة أن يستلم 2% راتب زيادة, غير أنّ ومع ذلك قسريّة 2% راتب يبدو تناقص محتملة. مهما, ليس أشياء دائما بما أنّ هم يبدوون.

[ا] قبل & بعد طرف مستدقّ مساهمة تحليل:

عاملة [فولّ تيم]
راتب: $600 لكلّ أسبوع:

حاليّة إجماليّة طرف مستدقّ مساهمة:

مساهمة سقف: $400[إكس]8.8% (مستخدمة/موظفة ينقسم):
$35.20 مجموعة لكلّ أسبوع
$1,830.40 مجموعة لكلّ سنة

بعد يقترح 2% طرف مستدقّ مساهمة زيادة:

مساهمة سقف: $600[إكس]10.8% (مستخدمة/موظفة ينقسم)
$64.80 مجموعة لكلّ أسبوع
$3,369.60 مجموعة لكلّ سنة

مساهمة إجماليّة إضافيّة سنويّة:

$3,369.60 - $1,830.40= $1,539.20 إضافيّة لكلّ سنة

نسبة مئويّة (%) زيادة في مساهمة إجماليّة:

$1,539.20/$1,830.40= 84.1% ضريبة زيادة

84.1% طرف مستدقّ مساهمة ضريبة زيادة:

هكذا, قد اقترح الحكومة أن يزيد الإجماليّة طرف مستدقّ مساهمة ضريبة ب 84.1% (لا 2%).

ك [كونتر رغمنت], سيقول بعض أنّ الطرف مستدقّ مساهمة انقسمت بالمستخدمة وموظفة, لذلك الحمل شاركت. بينما على السطح الأشياء هذا يكون يصحّ, هو منظرة بعيد تبسيطيّة أيضا.

سيتلقّى أيّ زيادة في الطرف مستدقّ مساهمة ضريبة بالتّأكيد [سد-فّكتس] سلبيّة, ثلاثة [سد-فّكتس] بارزة سيكون:

  1. "ثبّطت أيّ شيء يفرض تناسبيّا": [إمبلورس] سيكونون أقلّ مستعدّة أن يستخدم [بهمين] [فولّ تيم]; بدلا من ذلك يذهب دون ملاكة إضافيّة, يدفع ملاكة موجودة [هردر], مناولة إلى عاملات أجنبيّة (حيث هم لا يدفعون الطرف مستدقّ ضريبة) أو يوظّف جزئيّا/عقد [بهمين] عاملات.


  2. "[رل ينكم] يحتّ": عاملات سيجدون القيمة من [رل ينكم] هم يحتّ. إن مستخدمة يستطيع أمكنت أن يدفع $30,000 في تعويض إجماليّة ل يتوفّر موقعة, النقد سيقلّل راتب من الموظفة كنت بالإضافيّة طرف مستدقّ مساهمة ضريبة زيادة.


  3. "[بلك مركت]": سيبحث عاملات و [إمبلورس] طرق أن يتفادى الطرف مستدقّ مساهمة ضريبة, أيّ مفارقة سينتج في راكدة أو [لوور] طرف مستدقّ إيراد زيادات من يتوقّع.


[نسّو] معهد فلسفة:

لماذا نحن نحتاج نظامة حيث عاملات حاليّة يدفعون لمتقاعدات حاليّة?

فرديّة [تيغت-نيت] شخص, [إإكستندد فميلي] أو جماعة سيتمّ شغل جيّدة إلى حدّ كبير يحافظ هم طرف مستدقّ مساهمة ورعىبنفسي, صديقاتهم وهم أحبّوا أحد. أحبّت خصوصا, عندما يقارن إلى غيرفعّال وسياسيّا يقاد حكومة ديوانيّة طرف مستدقّ.

مساهمة دفعوا بفردات سوفت كنت أمسكت في اسمهم مع أيّ فائدة يكسب حتّى [مي ور مي] تقاعد. أنّ [همسترونغ] طريق, أجيال مقبلة لن يكون ب [فيلد] [نأيشنل ينسورنس] لوح خطة.

[نسّو] معهد مستقلّة, [أ-بوليتيكل], معهد [نون-بروفيت] أنّ يروّج حالة نموّ اقتصاديّة في [فر مركت كنومي] مع حكومة محدودة, في مجتمعة أنّ يعتنق ال [رول وف لو] والحق إلى خاصية خاصّة. رؤيته أن يرى باهاماس أصبحت الأولى صغيرة, يطوّر, بلد مسيطرة في المنطقة, يميّز كنموذج للعالم. [وب ست]: www.nassauinstitute.org

سبتمبر - أيلول 14, 2009


[كريبّنّتنوس]





September 15, 2009 | 9:54 AM Comments  {num} comments

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Bahamas Ranked 53rd of 141 Countries in Economic Freedom
Related to country: Bahamas

Translations available in: English (original) | French | Spanish | Italian | German | Portuguese | Swedish | Russian | Dutch | Arabic

The Bahamas has been ranked 53rd of 141 countries in the Economic Freedom of the World: 2009 Annual Report released today by the Nassau Institute.

Last year, The Bahamas ranked 42nd.

The Institute noted in a statement that this year's report also includes new research that examines the likely impact of the global recession on levels of economic freedom. It suggests that economic freedom may decline in the short term in response to crises, but over a longer time, economic freedom has a tendency to increase after a banking crisis.

"Economic freedom is vitally important to building prosperity and reducing poverty so the finding that it may increase in the long run following a financial crisis is good news," said Joan Thompson, President of the Nassau Institute, a local research institute that promotes capitalism and free markets.

The report ranks Hong Kong number one, followed by Singapore then New Zealand. Zimbabwe once again has the lowest level of economic freedom among the 141 jurisdictions included in the study, followed by Myanmar, Angola, and Venezuela. The 2009 report is based on data from 2007, the most recent year for which comprehensive data available.

The annual peer-reviewed Economic Freedom of the World report is produced by the Fraser Institute, Canada's leading economic think tank, in cooperation with independent institutes in 75 nations and territories.

The Economic Freedom of the World report uses 42 different measures to create an index ranking countries around the world based on policies that encourage economic freedom. The cornerstones of economic freedom are personal choice, voluntary exchange, freedom to compete, and security of private property. Economic freedom is measured in five different areas: (1) size of government; (2) legal structure and security of property rights; (3) access to sound money; (4) freedom to trade internationally; and (5) regulation of credit, labor and business.

Research shows that individuals living in countries with high levels of economic freedom enjoy higher levels of prosperity, greater individual freedoms and longer life spans, according to the statement. This year's report also contains new research showing the impact of the global recession on levels of economic freedom.

"Economic freedom is the key building block of the most prosperous nations around the world. Countries with high levels of economic freedom are those in which people enjoy high standards of living and personal freedoms. Countries at the bottom of the index face the opposite situation; their citizens are often mired in poverty, are governed by totalitarian regimes and have few if any, individual rights or freedoms," said Thompson.

The Bahamas scores in key components of economic freedom (from 1 to 10 where a higher value indicates a higher level of economic freedom): The ratings in the five components of the Index are:

* Size of government: changed to 8.2 from 7.85 in the last year's report

* Legal structures and security of property rights: changed to 7.1 from 8.47

* Access to sound money: changed to 6.7 from 7.04

* Freedom to trade internationally: changed to 5.1 from 4.12

* Regulation of credit, labor and business: changed to 8.3 from 8.17

"Improvement shows in some categories; however, in the critical areas of Legal Structure and Sound Money it is disappointing to note that The Bahamas is losing ground," the Nassau Institute's statement read.

Economic Freedom of the World measures the degree to which the policies and institutions of countries are supportive of economic freedom.

This year's publication ranks 141 nations representing 95 percent of the world's population for 2008, the most recent year for which data are available. The report also updates data in earlier reports in instances where data have been revised.

The full report is available at www.freetheworld.com.


September 14, 2009

thenassauguardian


September 14, 2009 | 10:25 AM Comments  {num} comments

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