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Rescuing the rescue plan
Related to country: United States

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By ASIM ERDİLEK:



What a turbulent and dramatic week it was for the US and the global economies, with sudden political uncertainty about the fate of the bailout plan on top of the worsening financial crisis!

The rescue plan had to be rescued itself with political scrambling and maneuvering after it was voted down in its initial narrow form by the US House of Representatives last Monday, surprising almost everyone, especially its leaders, who witnessed a spectacular failure of their leadership.

Last week’s enactment of the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 (EESA) by the US Congress, first by the Senate by a wide margin on Wednesday and then the House of Representatives on Friday, created the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) for the government to buy toxic securities. This $700 billion mammoth financial bailout program is now referred to officially as a financial rescue program, the positive and popular “rescue” having replaced the pejorative and unpopular “bailout” in the official lexicon. The House passed the act in its revised form by a comfortable margin after initially rejecting it by a narrow margin last Monday.

After the House’s negative vote, the Dow Jones Industrial Average dropped by 778 points, shocking constituents on Main Street whose retirement accounts and other investments dived and forcing them to question and reverse their initial opposition to the bailout. Moreover, big as well as small businesses outside the financial sector began to suffer more directly and painfully from the credit crisis as they found borrowing increasingly more difficult and expensive. Even the strong and stable industrial giant General Electric Co. found itself incurring significantly higher short-term borrowing costs in raising billions of dollars.

The barrage of bad economic news about the real economy -- such as non-farm job losses in September for the ninth month in a row and at the fastest rate in five years -- continued, leaving little doubt that the US economy is either already in a recession or soon will be in one. US government officials, including President George W. Bush, kept on warning (”scaremongering,” according to opponents of government intervention) that unless the Congress passed the rescue bill, the US economy would face its worst crisis since the Great Depression of the 1930s.

The initial public fury against the bailout reversed itself very suddenly during the week, although many spooked taxpayers found themselves facing an unpleasant choice between (1) a potentially expensive as well as ineffective government intervention aimed at evading an economic apocalypse, and (2) potentially having to confront that apocalypse without government intervention. The shift in public opinion forced jittery members of Congress, especially in the House, to reassess their political exposure to the crisis in terms of their votes on the bailout package. Fifty-nine House members switched their “no” votes on Monday to “yes” votes on Friday.

However, not all House members were persuaded by the sudden change in the sentiments of their constituents about the bailout. One Republican member, who voted against it twice, voiced his opposition by asking, “How can we have capitalism on the way up and socialism on the way down?” It took less than two hours for President Bush, anxious to minimize the extraordinary damage the US financial system and the economy suffered during his watch, to sign the bailout law. His successor will have to clean up the big mess left behind by his administration.

The US Treasury’s Sept. 18 original three-page draft bailout proposal ended up as a 442-page law, with sweeteners, such as $152 billion in all kinds of unrelated tax breaks, to enable enough lawmakers to swallow it. Other unrelated provisions that turned the bailout package into a “Christmas tree” included requiring insurers in group health plans to cover mental illnesses at rates comparable to their coverage of physical illnesses. The enacted bill also contained additional financial rescue-related provisions, besides the government purchase of toxic mortgage-related securities, such as the temporary (until the end of 2009) increase in the maximum limit of Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC)-insured deposits from $100,000 per depositor per bank account to $250,000, and the authority of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to suspend mark-to-market accounting rules requiring banks to report their financial assets at market prices instead of face values.

Some of the bailout-related provisions added to the original Treasury bill are themselves no less controversial than its essential component authorizing the government to buy up to $700 billion in troubled assets. The opponents of the mark-to-market rules have blamed them for worsening the financial crisis by forcing financial institutions to undervalue their assets at fire-sale prices in illiquid markets. Their proponents, on the other hand, have argued that suspending the rules would hide from the public and investors the mistakes and troubles of weak financial institutions, prolonging their misery and causing misallocation of capital. It seems, however, that in the currently frozen markets for many mortgage-related securities, it does not really matter whether those securities are booked on balance sheets at face values or market prices. Investors are likely to assess the financial health of a financial institution by piercing through the accounting veil, no matter what specific bookkeeping rules are used to determine balance sheet values. As for the temporary increase in the maximum limit of FDIC-insured deposits, it would restore depositors’ confidence in their banks and therefore decrease the incidence of runs on banks. But it would also keep weak and unhealthy banks from going bankrupt quickly, and thus prolong the cleansing of the financial system.

The EESA, whether an urgent “emergency medicine” to stop economic collapse according to its proponents or just a costly and futile “Band-Aid” according to its opponents, paves the way for the biggest US government intervention in financial markets since the Great Depression of the 1930s. It is expected to be the first in a series of laws -- reminiscent of the New Deal securities legislation of the 1930s -- that will revamp the financial landscape by introducing sweeping government regulations in a seismic shakeup, especially if Senator Barack Obama becomes president and the Democrats gain control of both chambers of Congress.

Many questions about the now official bailout remain. Most of them relate to the highly specific and technical ways, such as the design of the reverse auctions for purchasing bad debt, in which the TARP will be administered by the Treasury’s new Office of Financial Stability. But two major questions that transcend such technical questions pop to mind. Here is the first one: Will the program work, resolving the financial crisis speedily? Too early to tell, although it is widely agreed that the program should help in the competitive price discovery for distressed securities, unfreezing their markets and making them more liquid. But that might not be enough by itself as a permanent cure, especially without solving the banks’ recapitalization problem and resolving the housing crisis itself, caused by falling home values.

Here is the second major question: Where will the US government get up to $700 billion for the bailout? It will have to rely largely on official as well as private foreign lenders, especially those in China and the Middle East, in selling Treasury securities to finance the bailout. After voicing strong reservations, in the earlier stages of the financial crisis, about borrowing from Sovereign Wealth Funds (see my three columns on SWFs), the US could find itself having to reverse those reservations, as it “risks becoming the world’s largest subprime borrower,” according to The Wall Street Journal. Isn’t it sobering to imagine Treasury officials having to go overseas and persuade foreigners in “road shows” to buy US securities?

06.10.2008

todayszaman

October 6, 2008 | 3:52 PM Comments  0 comments

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